ISIM Review, 15, Spring, 2005 by ISIM
Ads
N O W  A V A I L A B L E  F R O M  I D C  P U B L I S H E R S
For more information please contact any of the following addresses For American customers only
IDC Publishers 2301 EE Leiden Phone +31 (0)71 514 27 00 Internet www.idc.nl IDC Publishers Inc. Foxboro, MA 02035 Toll free 800 757 7441 Phone 508 698 9707
P.O. Box 11205 The Netherlands Fax +31 (0)71 513 17 21 E-mail info@idc.nl 39 Joanna Drive USA Fax 508 698 0148 E-mail   info@idcpublishers.com
Early Printed Korans: The Dissemination of the Koran in the West
This collection of Early Printed Korans demonstrates
what impact the holy book of Islam achieved in
Europe. Long before printing with movable type
became common practice in the Islamic world in the
early 19th century, Korans were printed in Arabic
type in several European cities. This collection
includes Korans and Koran translations in eight
languages. It is of interest to orientalists, theologians,
philologists and book historians.
This collection contains all Arabic Koran editions
printed in Europe before 1850, as well as complete
translations directly form the Arabic (until about
1860). Among the secondary translations, only those
offered in German and Dutch are offered completely.
Advisors: 
Prof. Dr. Hartmut Bobzin, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany and 
Prof. Dr. August den Hollander, University of Amsterdam/Free University, The Netherlands
This collection includes:
 The only surviving copy of the first printed Koran
(Venice, 1537/38)
 Korans from seven libraries in four countries
 Korans and Koran translations in eight languages
Title list 
The title list can be downloaded from www.idc.nl
If you prefer a printed list, please contact us by e-mail
at info@idc.nl
 62 titles
 404 microfiche
 Including MARC21 bibliographic records 
Alcoranus Arabice. [Venice between August
9, 1537 and August 9, 1538].
2 I S I M R E V I E W  1 5 /  S P R I N G 2 0 0 5
Hurst
C. HURST & CO. (PUBLISHERS) LTD
38 KING STREET, LONDON WC2E 8JZ
Phone 020-7240-2666    Fax 020-7240-2667
email: hurst@atlas.co.uk   http:www.hurstpub.co.uk/
‘The Inﬁ del 
Within’
Muslims in Britain 
since 1800
HUMAYUN ANSARI
‘ﬂ uently written and easily 
accessible to a wide range of  
readers [...] has the potential 
of  becoming the initial reference text for people 
starting research in the area as well as a required text 
for university courses.’––Prof. J.S. Nielsen, University 
of  Birmingham
xiv, 438pp.  2004  
Hbk £45.00 1-85065-686-X   Pbk £16.95 1-85065-685-1 
To place an order or to request an inspection 
copy for teaching please email 
maria@hurstpub.co.uk
Islam, the State 
and Population
GAVIN JONES & 
M.S. KARIM (EDS)
Examines family planning and 
fertility in Indonesia, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Iran, Turkey and 
Egypt.
xvi, 286pp. Jan. 2005  
Hbk  £35.00 1-85065-493-X
Pbk  £16.50  1-85065-791-2
Exploring 
Ottoman and 
Turkish History
JACOB M. LANDAU
‘Although this collection covers only 
a part of  Landau’s research interests, 
it still serves to remind us of  the 
astonishing breadth of  his scholar-
ship. In the articles there is political and social history as well 
as history of  ideas, biography as well as linguistics. He has an 
unfailing eye for interesting and original topics.’ 
––Professor Erik Jan Zürcher, University of  Leiden
viii, 434pp. Dec. 2004 
Pbk £22.00 1-85065-752-1
Globalised Islam
The Search for 
a New Ummah
OLIVIER ROY
‘A new book by Roy [is] something of  
an event [...]. Globalized Islam is a highly 
original, methodologically rigorous [...] 
superb and complex sociological study.’
––Washington Post
xii., 352pp. Oct. 2004
Hbk £45.00 1-85065-593-6
Pbk  £16.95 1-85065-598-7
Revolution 
Unending
Afghanistan,1979 to 
the Present
GILLES DORRONSORO
‘This magniﬁ cent work of  research 
and interpretation deserves to 
become a classic in the ﬁ eld.’ 
––Anatol Lieven, Carnegie Endowment.
xviii, 370pp. Jan. 2005
Hbk £45.00  1-85065-683-5  
Pbk  £16.95  1-85065-703-3   
Landscapes of  
the Jihad
Militancy, Morality 
and Modernity
FAISAL DEVJI
‘[...] an original analysis of  Al Qaeda 
and Jihad in metaphysical terms 
discarding geo-strategic and cultural 
dimensions... [Devji’s] new approach to the writings of  Osama 
bin Laden and Al Zawahiri is very illuminating.’–– Olivier Roy
186x123mm., c. 176pp. May 2005  
Hbk  £15.95 1-85065-775-0
ISIM-RV-15-OMSLAG-PDF  15-02-2005  14:30  Pagina 2
I S I M  R E V I E W  1 5  /  S P R I N G  2 0 0 5  3
Contents
I S I M
4 Editorial / Dick Douwes and Linda Herrera
5 Letters to the Editors
D E B A T E S  O N  I S L A M  I N  E U R O P E
6 A Clash of Cultures or a Debate on Europe’s Values? / Olivier Roy
8 Submission / Annelies Moors
10 Multiculturalism and Citizenship in the Netherlands / Halleh Ghorashi
11 Transnational Islam in Western Europe / Ralph Grillo & Benjamin F. Soares
P O L I T I C S
12 Theses on Religion and Violence / Bruce Lincoln
13 The Beslan Massacre / Vladimir Bobrovnikov
14 Darfur in War: The Politicization of Ethnic Identities? / Karin Willemse 
16 Jihadi Opposition in Saudi Arabia / Roel Meijer
17 Post-Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia? / Stéphane Lacroix
M I N O R I T I E S  &  M I G R A T I O N
18 Conversion and Conflict: Muslims in Mexico / Natascha Garvin
20 The Veil and Fashion Catwalks in Paris / Alec H. Balasescu
21 Conflicts Among Hawaii’s Muslims / Mona Darwich-Gatto
E D U C A T I O N
22 Academic Freedom Post-9/11 / Beshara Doumani
24 From Showcase to Basket Case: Education in Iraq / Nabil Al-Tikriti
26 Islamist Responses to Educational Reform / Johannes Grundmann
A R T S  &  M E D I A
28 Mahmoud Darwish: Hope as Home in the Eye of the Storm / Ashwani Saith
30 Local Contexts of Islamism in Popular Media / Lila Abu-Lughod
32 Courtesans in the Living Room / Kamran Asdar Ali
34 Bahibb Issima: Copts and the Public Sphere / Samia Mehrez
C O N S U M P T I O N
36 Fashion among Chinese Muslims / Maris Gillette
38 Today’s Consumption in Egypt / Mona Abaza
I S L A M ,  S O C I E T Y ,  &  T H E  S T A T E
40 Civil Society and the Islamic Experience / Mohammed A. Bamyeh
42 The Reform Nobody Wants Anymore: Iran's Elections / Morad Saghafi
R E L I G I O U S  A U T H O R I T Y
44 “Pilgrims of Love”: Sufism in a Global World / Pnina Werbner
46 “Official” Islam in Post-9/11 Mauritania / Francisco Freire
47 In Search of a Global Islamic Authority / Bettina Gräf
48 An Imam in France: Tareq Oubrou / Alexandre Caeiro
50 Internet in a Sectarian Islamic Context / Thomas Pierret
I N S T I T U T I O N S
51 Timbuktu’s First Private Manuscript Library / Aslam Farouk-Alli
52 Public Opinion on Iraq: The Use of Historical Documents / Penelope Tuson
I S I M  I N F O  P A G E S
53 Religion and Modernity / Linda Herrera
54 Challenges Facing Activists / Abdulkader Tayob
55 Islam and Public Life in Africa / José van Santen
56 Reading Religion and the Religious in Modern Islam / Abdulkader Tayob
58 Editors’ Picks
59 Arts 
60 Photo Commentary
University of Amsterdam
Leiden University
Radboud University Nijmegen
Utrecht University
ISIM Review 15
Spring 2005
60 Pages
ISSN 1 388-9788
Editorial Office
Visiting Address
Rapenburg 59
Leiden
Postal Address
ISIM, P.O. Box 11089
2301 EB Leiden
The Netherlands
Telephone
+31 (0)71 527 7905
Fax:
+31 (0)71 527 7906
E-mail
review@isim.nl
Homepage
www.isim.nl
Editors
Dick Douwes
Linda Herrera
Copy and language editor
Sanaa Makhlouf 
Desk editor
Dennis Janssen 
Design
De Kreeft, Amsterdam
Printing
Dijkman Offset, Diemen
Coming Issue
 ISIM Review 16
Deadline for Articles
 15 April 2005
Publication Date
Fall 2005
Author Guidelines
Authors are invited to submit original 
articles to the ISIM Review for publication 
consideration. Articles should deal with 
issues relating to contemporary Muslim 
societies and communities from within a 
social science or humanities framework. 
Of especial interest are research and 
debates dealing with culture, social 
movements, development, youth, politics, 
gender, religion, arts, media, education, 
minorities, migration, public intellectuals, 
and popular culture. Please consult the ISIM 
website for the style sheet. 
The ISIM Review is published by the 
International Institute for the Study of Islam 
in the Modern World (ISIM) and represents 
a forum for scholarly exchange. The ISIM 
Review is free of charge.
Disclaimer
Responsibility for the facts and opinions 
expressed in this publication rests solely 
with the authors. Their views do not 
necessarily reflect those of the Institute or 
its supporters.   
© 2005, ISIM. All rights reserved. Nothing 
in this publication may be reproduced 
without the permission of the publisher. 
 D I C K  D O U W E S  &
L I N D A  H E R R E R A
Yet, as Olivier Roy so astutely argues, 
Islamic radicalism in Europe should not 
be viewed as the result of an inherent 
inflexibility in the culture of Muslim im-
migrants. Rather, radicalization can be 
understood as a process of “de-cultur-
alization” of religion in which western-
ized Muslims and converts “endeavour 
to reconstruct a ‘pure’ religion outside 
traditional or Western cultures, outside 
the very concept of culture itself.” ( Roy, 
p. 6). Seen in this light, one pauses to 
seriously question the efficacy of disci-
plining governmental projects for integration currently under-
way in several European countries. It would seem that policies 
that strive to provide more equitable access to education and 
labour markets could serve much more productive ends. It is 
also becoming more evident that secure spaces for Muslim 
and other voices to participate in public debates need to be 
better preserved.
Within a growing climate of alarmist politics, pluralistic 
democratic spaces for public discussion and debate about 
and by Muslims in Europe are narrowing. Attempts are being 
made to silence, rather than engage with, the spectrum 
of voices. An example of the reluctance to offer adequate 
space to divergent opinions can be found in the case of Tariq 
Ramadan. A Swiss citizen of Egyptian background, Ram-
adan's popularity among Muslim youths in Europe has been 
steadily growing, yet he is met with suspicion by the politi-
cal and intellectual elite. For reasons never made clear, the 
US authorities denied Ramadan the permit to take up a pro-
fessorship at Notre Dame University, in France his talks are 
regularly cancelled at the last moment, and a media cam-
paign has been underway to keep him out of the country. In 
January 2005 the French ambassador to the Netherlands put 
strong pressure on the organizers and panellists of a pub-
lic debate in The Hague to cancel Ramadan’s participation. 
Whatever one’s opinion of Ramadan—and the opinions vary 
widely—the attempts to restrict his appearances—without 
providing any clear explanation as to why—raise serious 
questions about knowledge production and control and 
appear entirely incompatible with principles of democratic 
transparency and civic freedoms. As Beshara Doumani cau-
tions (p. 22-23), knowledge production, particularly when 
it relates to Islam and Muslim societies, is undergoing new 
challenges and modes of censorship. An open society can 
only be safeguarded by maintaining spaces for critical in-
quiry and debate.
The International Institute for the Study of 
Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) conducts and 
promotes interdisciplinary research on social, 
political, cultural, and intellectual trends and 
movements in contemporary Muslim societies 
and communities. The ISIM was established in 
1998 by the University of Amsterdam, Leiden 
University, Utrecht University, and Radboud 
University Nijmegen in response to a need for 
further research on contemporary developments 
of great social, political, and cultural importance 
in the Muslim world from social science and 
humanities perspectives. The ISIM’s research 
approaches are expressly interdisciplinary and 
comparative, covering a large geographic range 
which includes North Africa, the Middle East, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, South and 
South East Asia, and Muslim communities in the 
West. Broad in scope, the ISIM brings together all 
areas of disciplinary expertise in anthropology, 
sociology, religious studies, political science, and 
cultural studies.
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Western Europe has been struggling to 
accommodate its Muslim migrants. Pol-
iticians and opinion makers often dis-
play irritation towards Muslim citizens 
and those (non-Muslims) who call for 
reason and restraint in the ever-prevail-
ing critical policy and media debates on 
Islam. In the Netherlands Islam became 
publicly visible from the late-1980s 
following family reunion programmes 
which allowed women and children 
from countries such as Morocco and 
Turkey to join their husbands and fa-
thers. Although Muslims faced some criticism during that 
period, Islam-bashing only later became a political fashion 
when Pim Fortuyn put Islam – in his observation a backward 
culture - on the political agenda. After his violent death and 
the ensuing spectacular electoral results of his populist party 
politicians and intellectuals exploited his legacy and came 
to dominate the Dutch debate. One of the most outspoken 
critics, Somali born activist and parliamentarian Ayaan Hirsi 
Ali, publicly denounced her Islamic faith (see Moors, p. 8 and 
Ghorashi, p. 10). 
Muslim voices are hardly ever heard in the debate, partly 
due to the intolerant posture of many of their critics who 
actively try to limit the space for divergent views, and partly 
because of the lack of Muslim spokespersons sufficiently 
backed by the larger community (who speak the language 
of their opponents). This unbalanced situation has created 
room for radical and marginal groups to articulate what it 
means to be Muslim, to the detriment of the more moderate 
and mainstream voices. The Islam critics have subsequent-
ly—and gratuitously—used these voices as proof of their 
basic assumption that Islam tends toward radicalism and 
impedes its adherents from becoming responsible citizens. 
While Islamist radicalism undoubtedly exists in Europe, most 
Muslims have ordinary daily concerns revolving around fam-
ily, work, education, relationships, and the future. Yet, by 
virtue of being Muslim, or Moroccan, or Turkish, or accent 
speaking, or headscarf wearing, they are assumed to en-
danger the status quo and are incessantly confronted with 
demands to denounce, for example, radical imams, jihadist 
Internet sites, and extremist groups. 
The brutal murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by 
a seemingly integrated Dutch citizen of Moroccan origin has 
made matters worse in that it strengthened the idea that the 
existence of Muslim communities as a whole constitutes a se-
curity risk and that multiculturalism has unequivocally failed. 
 
N A M E  C H A N G E
The name of the ISIM Newsletter 
has been changed to the ISIM 
Review to more accurately reflect 
the publication’s objective of 
providing a review of debates and 
research on contemporary Muslim 
societies and communities in an 
accessible manner to a broad 
readership.
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Left Behind Graphic Novel
Dear Dr Colla,
I read with interest your article, 
“A Culture of Righteousness and 
Martyrdom,” in the ISIM Newsletter 14. 
While I share fully in your opposition 
to American crusaderism, the article 
fails to demonstrate a concrete con-
nection between the eschatological 
fantasies of the Left Behind series and 
the actual outworking of U.S. policy 
towards the Islamic Middle East, if 
that was your purpose. It is of course 
true, and has been proved down to 
the ground, that evangelical Chris-
tians in the U.S. are overwhelmingly 
pro-Zionist, and that this has had 
some impact on both the attitudes of 
Congresspersons and on the strength 
of U.S. support for Israel. However, it 
seems to me more likely that popular-
ity of the Left Behind series is just a 
momentary reflection of enduring mil-
lenarian convictions about the place 
of the Middle East in the “end-times,” 
rather than actually contributing to 
some kind of new American culture 
of martyrdom. Don’t forget that Hal 
Lindsey’s Late Great Planet Earth was 
selling like hotcakes in the 1970s, long 
before September 11 or the Taliban or 
the Iraq war—and the theology of the 
Left Behind series is really just warmed-
over Lindsey. 
For the record, I am myself evangeli-
cal in conviction but do not accept the 
eschatology of the Left Behind authors. 
I abhor Israeli policy toward the Pales-
tinians and do what I can to advocate 
the justice of Palestinian demands, 
as do other evangelical Christians in, 
for example, Evangelicals for Middle 
East Understanding, an organization 
devoted to building supportive links 
to the churches of the Middle East and 
promoting an historically informed 
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ISIM Newsletter 14 
A Culture of Righteousness and Martyrdom
Letters to the Editors
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view of the Palestine conflict. This is 
just to say that the evangelical “com-
munity” in the U.S. and abroad is so 
large that there is considerably more 
theological and political diversity than 
is often imagined.
I am also troubled by your incorpo-
ration of Mel Gibson’s film as indica-
tive of a martyr cum crusader complex 
that is specifically American, and your 
linking it at all with the Left Behind se-
ries. First, it is worth remembering that 
Gibson is Roman Catholic, and that 
while evangelicals did turn out for the 
film in large numbers, so did Catholics 
and Orthodox Christians, both in the 
U.S. and throughout the world. I live 
in Egypt, where Coptic Christians were 
very enthusiastic about the film, and 
of course there were many thousands 
of appreciative Muslim viewers here as 
well. Secondly, Jewish anxiety about 
the film was based on an assessment 
of the film as, politically, at the polar 
opposite of the Left Behind series with 
its implicit pro-Zionism, since Gibson’s 
film allegedly portrayed the Jews as 
villains. Of course, the fear was that 
the film would stoke the old antipathy 
toward Jews as Christ-killers, although 
I don’t think there’s any evidence to 
show that it did. Third, there is in your 
article, and in the editorial, a tendency 
to equate all forms of “martyrdom” 
in the various religions of the Middle 
East and connect them vaguely with 
the valorization of violence. But it is 
simply not true that “martyr” means 
the same thing in all religions at all 
times and all places. In this context, it 
should be recalled that “martyr” in the 
traditional Christian understanding re-
fers to someone who suffers passively 
in the service of God, or for the sake 
of conscience, and who emphatically 
does not resort to any kind of violent 
aggression or resistance, hence the 
passio Christi depicted very movingly 
in Gibson’s film.
Yours sincerely,
Michael J. Reimer 
Associate Professor
Department of History 
American University in Cairo
Elliott Colla’s response
Dear Dr Reimer, 
I appreciate your points. While I agree 
with some, I disagree with others. First, 
in terms of “causality” or “influence,” we 
cannot say with any empirical exact-
ness the degree to which evangelical 
theology (especially of the different 
strands of millenarianism) is shaping 
the Middle East foreign policy of the 
Bush administration. I attempted to 
use language that showed that such 
theology is “informing” (rather than 
commanding) the thought, and prob-
ably even some aspects of policy. It 
may be difficult living outside the US 
right now to see how popular millena-
rian evangelical thinking is, but from 
my perspective, living here, I have 
seen it move from the margins to the 
mainstream since 9-11. It hasn’t hurt 
that Bush, Ashcroft, and others in the 
administration invoke, in their public 
addresses, language that is meant to 
resound with their evangelical church 
membership. 
If there was a big point to my want-
ing to write on those novels it was 
this: I wanted to say that if there were 
similar millenarian novels geared for 
Muslim audiences, and if these novels 
were popular in Riyadh or Tehran, you 
can bet that the US media would be 
making a big deal about them as an 
example of Islam’s “culture of intoler-
ance and hatred.” In other words, one 
of the things that most fascinated me 
was the post-9-11 cultural context 
which allowed these novels to move 
from a marginal readership to main-
stream blockbusters. 
With regard to the Left Behind se-
ries, it’s abundantly clear that they’re 
not offered, nor are they being read 
as pure fiction. I encourage you to 
look at the Newsweek issue with Tim 
LaHaye on the cover (24 May 2004, 
U.S. edition). One of the most inter-
esting points covered was how the 
publication of a volume in the series 
was speeded up after the 9/11 at-
tacks. It went on to be the top novel 
in sales for all of 2001. There’s also a 
powerful picture in that article of a GI 
in Iraq reading a Left Behind novel. A 
spokesman for the US Armed Forces 
mentioned that the “military series” of 
Left Behind were given away en masse 
to soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. I 
can’t help but wonder if some soldiers 
reading these books aren’t thinking 
they’re involved in the first stages of 
Armageddon. 
As for including Mel Gibson’s film in 
the piece, it seems fair to read Gibson’s 
Passion and the Left Behind series as 
part of a single, deeper cultural nar-
rative about the inequity of the world 
and the comfort that God will punish 
the wicked and reward the righteous. 
That these texts are circulating at a 
moment in which Americans por-
tray themselves as innocent victims 
of evil terror (rather than as victims 
of a terrorist attack that took place 
within a history of violence in which 
the US government has been a major 
participant) seems significant. The 
relationship between images of inno-
cents suffering and the desire for just 
retribution seems to me to be a key 
part of what righteousness is all about. 
Believe me, Americans—especially 
Evangelical ones—are feeling pretty 
righteous about the violence that US 
forces are bringing to the Middle East 
right now. I don’t expect you to agree 
with my interpretation, but I hope that 
my reading is a bit clearer now.
Best wishes,
Elliott Colla
MEMRI
Dear Editors,
I was surprised to see MEMRI cited as 
a reliable source of information in the 
editorial of the June issue of the ISIM 
Newsletter. Reactions to The Passion of 
Christ in the Arab world are certainly 
worth study, but MEMRI, an organiza-
tion co-founded by a former Israeli 
intelligence officer, is the last place 
such a study should be done. MEMRI 
devotes its efforts to seeking out the 
most bizarre and rabid articles from 
the Arab press and presenting them as 
mainstream public opinion. MEMRI’s 
main goal, it seems, is to document, 
and frequently, to exaggerate rising 
levels of anti-Semitism in the Arab 
world, and its analysis of Mel Gibson’s 
controversial film can only be viewed 
in light of this agenda. In short, de-
spite its claims to be a “non-partisan” 
translation service, MEMRI is primarily 
a political propaganda tool, not a 
scholarly reference source.
Among the many critiques of MEMRI’s 
origins and bias is Brian Whitaker’s “Se-
lective Memri” (Aug. 12, 2002) in the 
Guardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk/
elsewhere/journalist/story/  
0%2C7792%2C773258%2C00.html
Sincerely,
Mark Pettigrew
Berkeley, CA
Response
Dear Mr Pettigrew,
Thank-you very much for your 
message concerning MEMRI and for 
providing The Guardian link which we 
have since read. We made reference 
to the MEMRI source without a full 
awareness of the background of the 
organization. 
The Editors  
Letters to the Editors can be sent to 
review@isim.nl and 
should include the author's name 
and affiliation.
O L I V I E R  R O Y  
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The murder of Theo van Gogh, which 
sent a shock wave through the Nether-
lands, has been largely interpreted as 
the proof of an obvious failure of the 
multiculturalist approach that prevailed 
in the country at least until the electoral 
success of Pim Fortuyn in 2002. The 
crime appeared as the exacerbated ex-
pression of an Arab or “Muslim” culture 
unable to accept Western values. This 
could have been true, were the mur-
derer and his accomplices traditional 
Muslims, barely able to speak Dutch and 
from a tight-knit closed community of 
immigrants. But Van Gogh’s alleged kill-
er, Mohammed B, is a Dutch citizen, although born into a migrant family 
from Morocco. Two of those arrested —Jason W. and Jermaine W.— are 
Dutch-American converts to Islam. 
 
Trajectories of Muslim radicalization in Europe
Developments in the Netherlands have been very much in line 
with developments in the rest of Europe. Since the end of the 1980’s, 
both the Islam-related violence and the identity patterns of radicals, 
have corresponded to similar trends throughout Europe. The Brad-
ford demonstrations against Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses (Janu-
ary 1988) represented the first open claim by Muslims living in the 
West that Islam should be protected in Europe against “blasphemy,” 
although the fatwa against Rushdie was launched by Ayatollah Kho-
meini in Iran for purely political reasons. In the summers of 1994 and 
1995 a string of terrorist actions had also been perpetrated by Islamic 
radicals in France. Many young European Muslims joined different ji-
hads in the world (Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir and, more 
recently, Iraq), and, although not all of them became terrorists, some 
did join al-Qaida (Zacarias Moussaoui, Richard Reid). There have been 
some twenty European Muslims jailed in Guantanamo; even if many of 
them did not have direct connections with al-Qaida, they nevertheless 
all went to fight alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan. Many terrorist ac-
tions have been perpetrated or planned by young Muslims living in the 
West: the 9/11 pilots, the “Roubaix gang” (1996), the Jamal Beghal net-
work (2001), the Hamburg cell (accused of having provided logistical 
support to the 9/11 attack), even the group responsible for the Madrid 
deadly bombings of 2004, share common patterns.
The process of radicalization among second generation Muslims in 
Western Europe is therefore nothing new. They fall roughly into three 
categories: 1) second generation young males whose families usually 
originated from North-Africa, 2) young men who came from North Africa 
or the Middle-East and settled in the West either to study or to work, 3) 
converts who are often outcasts (non-Muslim racial minorities, usually 
black and/or Caribbean, former delinquents converted in jail, drug-ad-
dicts who found in Islam a way to quit addiction, or just “buddies” who 
joined their Muslim friends when the latter became “born-again”). All of 
them are fully westernized and usually keep aloof from the mainstream 
Muslims.1 The murder of Van Gogh was a consequence of the merging 
of two trends: the call to fight blasphemy, and the jumping of young 
westernized Muslims into “international jihadism.”
The westernization of these young radicals is obvious from many 
points: they are fluent in Western languages (and often do not speak 
Arabic), they often have citizenship in 
a Western country (Moussaoui, Mo-
hammed B.), marry European women 
(Daoudi, Beghal), have a Western par-
ent (the mother of Abdelkrim Mejjati, 
the Madrid ring leader, is French), and 
are born-again. Few if any went to a 
religious school. The weight of con-
verts in radical groups should never 
be underestimated: almost all radical 
and violent networks dismantled in 
Europe during the last ten years had 
at least one convert (Reid, Grandvizir, 
Courtailler, Ganczarski, to name a few). 
The group responsible for Van Gogh’s 
murder seems to fit these patterns: Mohammed B. speaks fluent Dutch, 
is a Dutch citizen, and is obviously a “born again,” who had a “normal” 
life until he became a fanatic; the other Moroccans involved in the case 
settled in Europe. Finally, we should note the presence of the converts, 
embodied by the two sons of a US black military officer and a Dutch 
woman, who went to Pakistan for religious and military training.
 
The de-culturalization of religion 
The uproar generated in the Netherlands by the murder concentrates 
on the issue of “multiculturalism,” which is now expressed in terms of 
a clash of cultures, although nobody can explain why no “traditional 
Muslim,” but only westernized Muslims and converts, were involved 
in the act. The answer is that what has been seen as an exception (a 
fanatical westernized Muslim) is precisely the norm: the more radical 
the terrorists, the more they do not embody a traditional culture or 
a culture at all. Islamic radicalization is a consequence of decultura-
tion and not the expression of a pristine culture. It is an endeavour to 
reconstruct a “pure” religion outside traditional or Western cultures, 
outside the very concept of culture itself.
All the present forms of Islamic religious radicalization (which I call 
“neo-fundamentalism,” and which do not necessarily entail violence 
or political radicalization), are both a product and an agent of decul-
turation and globalization. The Taliban in Afghanistan did not fight to 
defend a traditional culture against Western encroachments: on the 
contrary, they were initially on good terms with the US government 
and fought first of all against the traditional Afghan culture (I take 
the term culture here both in the sense of arts and literature, and 
in the anthropological sense of socially transmitted behaviour pat-
terns, beliefs, institutions). In the Muslim world, Salafis and Tablighis, 
whatever their differences, are all fighting against traditional Muslim 
cultures, accused of having distorted the pure Islam of its origins. 
Such a predication is very successful among segments of decultur-
ated second generation Muslims, who find in it an apology and a 
vindication of their own uprootedness: they prefer halal fast-food to 
traditional Muslim cuisines. The generation gap, coupled with a sense 
of disenfranchising, became suddenly of some value: the more they 
ignored their grandfather’s Islam, the more they had an opportunity 
to become “true Muslims.” Individualization of faith, self-teaching, 
generational gap, rejection of authority (including that of established 
religious leaders), loosening of family ties, lack of socialization with 
a broader community (including the ethnic community of their par-
ents), and withdrawal towards a small inward-looking group, akin to 
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The murder of Theo van Gogh in the 
Netherlands (2 November 2004) represents 
a recent example of how westernized Muslims 
and converts have been implicated in acts 
associated with Islamic radicalism in Europe. 
Despite widespread interpretations that 
Islamic radicalization represents the failure 
of the multiculturalists approach vis-à-vis 
Muslim immigrants, radicalism can better be 
explained as the consequence of de-culturation 
and globalization. Radicals endeavour to 
reconstruct a “pure” religion outside traditional 
or Western cultures, outside the very concept 
of culture itself.
A Clash of Cultures or
a Debate on Europe’s 
Values?
issue, then, is not so much integration into Europe, but the status of the 
different European languages. Islam arrives in Europe at a time when 
European integration is weakening the political dimension of national 
identities. The traditional nation-states are fading away. At the same 
time, at the grass roots level, national cohesion seems also to vanish 
due to the consequences of immigration. European identities are in a 
process of recasting and new terms such as “Englishness,” “Dutchness,” 
“Frenchness” are emerging.
Europe historically used two models to deal with immigration: as-
similationism (France) and multiculturalism (Northern Europe). Both 
failed for the same reason: they ignored the de-linking of culture and 
religion. France rightly considered that imported cultures would fade 
away, but wrongly asserted that this would lead to individual assimi-
lation. Northern Europe considered that pristine cultures would be 
steady enough to maintain a cohesive community, which could keep 
the new generation under some sort of social control. It also failed in 
favour of a purely religious identity. In both cases, what emerges is a 
call to be recognized as “Muslims” and no more as “immigrants,” or as 
a “cultural minority.” This means that, although the initial approaches 
were very different, Europe is now facing the same challenge: how to 
deal with Islam as a “mere” religion. But the emergence of Islam as a 
mere religion does not create a divide between “East” and “West” but a 
realignment between conservative and religious values on one hand, 
versus progressive and liberal ideas on the other hand. But values are 
not the expression of a given culture. 
When Pim Fortuyn entered politics in the Netherlands on an anti-Is-
lamic agenda, it was not to defend traditional European values, but to 
protect the homosexual rights that had been won in the 1970s against 
a conservative Christian tradition. Interestingly enough, the Moroccan 
Imam el-Moumni, who triggered Fortuyn’s anger by saying in a radio 
broadcast that homosexuality is a disease and has to do with bestial-
ity, was not in line with traditional ulama, for whom homosexuality is 
a sin and thus should be punished by death. By calling it a disease, he 
took the same line as the Catholic church in modern times: exonerating 
the homosexual of sin as long as he does not practise it, but refusing 
to give him any legal rights as a homosexual, which, in the eyes of the 
church, is a modern and benevolent position.
The debate with Islam is in fact a European search for a European 
soul.
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a cult: all these factors show the extent of the process of 
deculturation of the radicals.
The quest for authenticity is no longer a quest to maintain 
a pristine identity, but to go back to and beyond this pris-
tine identity through a non-historical, abstract, and imag-
ined model of Islam. It is not an issue of nostalgia for a given 
country, for one’s youth or for family roots. In this sense, 
“westernization” means something other than becoming 
Western, hence the ambivalent attitude towards it. But such 
behaviours do not necessarily lead to violence, although 
they provide a fertile ground. There are two elements that 
could explain the violence. The first issue is that such radi-
cals are not linked to any real community. Their community 
is not rooted in a given society or culture, and hence has to 
be reconstructed and experienced as an act of faith. They 
refer to a virtual ummah (community of believers) whose ex-
istence relies on their behaviour and deeds. The obsession 
about blasphemy and apostasy goes along with the vanish-
ing of the social authority of Islam. The “dreamed” commu-
nity becomes a “nightmared” one. The issue of “boundary” 
comes to the fore. By slaughtering a “blasphemer” Moham-
med B. literally inscribed the boundary on his victim’s throat. 
Do not trespass.
 If we examine patterns of other terrorists we can observe a different 
and more political approach: their targets are the same as the tradition-
al targets of the Western ultra-left of the seventies (US imperialism), 
and not Christianity as such. Even if they achieved a level of mass mur-
der unknown to their predecessors, they still followed the path opened 
by Baader Meinhof, the Red Brigades, and Carlos. The proponents of 
the “clash of civilizations” should look at the footages of the hostage 
takings in Iraq: the “trial” of a blind-folded hostage under the banner 
of a radical organization, the “confession” of the hostage, followed by 
his execution, are literally borrowed from the staging technique of the 
Italian Red Brigades when they captured and killed the former Prime 
minister Aldo Moro in 1978.
 
Beyond multiculturalism
Nevertheless, the reaction of the Dutch society overwhelmingly in-
terpreted the murder of Van Gogh in terms of the failure of multicultur-
alism. Multiculturalism has suddenly been seen as negative. But going 
from positive to negative means that the intellectual paradigm of mul-
ticulturalism is still at work. Multiculturalism has obviously failed, but 
for a different reason: the culture one is referring to is disappearing 
and this is the real cause of violence. At a time when the territorial bor-
ders between the great civilizations are fading away, mental borders 
are being reinvented to give a second life to the ghost of lost civiliza-
tions: multiculturalism, minority groups, clash or dialogue of civiliza-
tions, communautarisation and so on. Ethnicity and religion are called 
to draw new borders between groups whose identity relies on a per-
formative definition: we are what we say we are, or what others say 
we are. These new ethnic and religious borders do not correspond to 
any geographical territory or area. They work in minds, attitudes, and 
discourses. They are more vocal than territorial, but also so much more 
eagerly endorsed and defended because they have to be invented, 
and because they remain fragile and transitory. De-territorialization of 
Islam leads to a quest for definition, because Islam is no longer embed-
ded in territorial cultures, whatever their diversity, which is, by the way, 
always experienced from outside.
The crisis of the concept of culture is also obvious in the West. It is 
interesting to see how the way Islam is perceived as a threat is differ-
ent from one European country to the other. In France the “headscarf 
affair” amounted to a debate on French national identity, while the idea 
that veiled schoolgirls are a problem is just seen as silly in Great Britain. 
This does not mean that Great Britain is more tolerant than France: in 
the UK it is strictly forbidden to slaughter animals the “halal” way, while 
in France it has never been a problem. The issue of animal protection 
in Northern Europe is almost a civilizational one (nobody seems to 
have given thought to the fact that Pim Fortuyn was killed by an ani-
mal rights activist). The language issue is also complex. In France and 
Great Britain, Muslims do speak the language of their host European 
country, and often before their arrival to Europe. In Holland many do 
not, although if they plan to stay in the country they must follow “en-
culturation courses” which include intensive language instruction. The 
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1. See my Globalised Islam (London: Hurst 
& Co., 2004), Chap. 7; see also Marc 
Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks 
(Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University press, 
2004).
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A N N E L I E S  M O O R S Ayaan Hirsi Ali, activist, publicist, and 
Member of Parliament, appeared on 
Dutch television in the prime-time 
programme Zomergasten (Summer 
Guests) for the first time on 29 August 
2004. Broadcast in the low of the sum-
mer season, Zomergasten is a “high-
quality” programme in which the host 
has over three hours to interview one 
guest about various facets of his or her 
personal and public life. To facilitate the conversation, guests to this 
programme are invited to select a number of brief television or film 
clips that have special significance to them. The last clip Hirsi Ali chose 
to air was Submission, the twelve-minute film for which she herself had 
written the script. Publicity for the film had started the day before the 
broadcast when the NRC, a Dutch up-scale newspaper, published a 
full two-page portrait of Hirsi Ali in which she announced the airing 
of Submission. An unusually high number of over 750,000 households 
watched this instalment of Zomergasten.
Hirsi Ali is a Somalia-born refugee who, in an attempt to avoid an ar-
ranged marriage, settled in the Netherlands and later became involved 
in Dutch party politics through the Labour Party (PvdA).   She became 
increasingly disenchanted with its stance on multiculturalism that she 
saw as too soft on Muslims, with Muslim women paying the price. In a 
much-publicized move, she left the social democrat PvdA in 2002 to 
join the right-wing People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) 
which received her with open arms; in 2003 she became a member of 
parliament for this party. Raised as a Muslim, she has publicly declared 
that she no longer is a believer, but points to the fact that she knows 
from experience how oppressive Islam can be for women.   She  rapidly 
turned into a highly controversial public figure because of her outspo-
ken criticism of Islam. While in some circles she has reached celebrity 
status, she has also received many death threats and had to go into 
hiding after the murder of Theo van Gogh on 2 November 2004. 
The film
Submission was written by Hirsi Ali and filmed by the late Theo van 
Gogh, a filmmaker and columnist well-know for his highly controversial 
style of criticizing Christians, Jews, and, especially, Muslims. The film 
opens with a prayer and then presents, through Hirsi Ali’s voice-over, 
the stories of four women addressing God about the abuse they have 
suffered at the hands of men. These stories vary from forced marriage 
and incestuous rape to domestic violence and penal lashings because 
of sexual relations outside of marriage.  The film  has drawn public 
attention more due to its form than its content; images of women in 
transparent dress with Quranic verses calligraphed on their skin, cov-
ered with traces of whiplashes and beatings, cut through the narra-
tives. 
In making Submission Hirsi Ali and Van Gogh were well-aware of the 
power of the visual. Although some have referred to the film as a work 
of art, it is first and foremost striking in its unimaginative resonance 
with the visual imagery of Orientalism. Hirsi Ali’s argument that she 
opted for a transparent veil in order to show the audience that there 
is a person, a woman of flesh and blood, underneath sounds hollow 
and overlooks long standing Western conventions of representations 
of the Orient. Simultaneously covering and revealing the female body 
through the use of transparent forms of dress or veiling has not only 
been a trope of Orientalist painting but also of representations of the 
erotic and the exotic in popular visual imagery. Allowing the viewer 
to scrutinize women’s bodies while simultaneously covering their faces 
and using the technique of a voice-over disables processes of identi-
fication and turns these women into the generic category of “the op-
pressed Muslim woman.” The visual language of tortured female bodies 
and Quranic calligraphy, with a text that does not leave much to be 
imagined, turns the film into a pamphlet preaching to the converted. 
It is hard to avoid reading Submission as a film whose main message is 
that Islam is bad for women. The film has all the characteristics of hard 
core Orientalism. If, in its visual lan-
guage, women’s bodies are eroticized 
through a discourse of seduction and 
pain, the spoken texts refer to a more 
academic form of Orientalism that sees 
people’s everyday lives as determined 
by Islam, providing a direct link be-
tween specific Quranic verses and the 
behaviour of Muslim men who abuse 
women. In an odd convergence with 
fundamentalist thought, Hirsi Ali sees the meaning of Quranic verses 
as one-dimensional, only allowing for one possible interpretation, the 
one that is most harmful to women. Muslim men are then seen as taken 
to abuse their wives because of the content of these Quranic verses. 
While some  may indeed legitimate their violent behaviour towards 
women with such references, arguing that Quranic verses are the cause 
of their behaviour is something entirely different. Furthermore, the film 
seriously misrepresents Islamic teachings; for instance, even the most 
conservative religious scholars would not be able to legitimize incestu-
ous rape on Islamic grounds. Although Hirsi Ali has stated that it is not 
her intention to make others give up their religion, her presentation of 
violence against women as part of the essence of Islam and her use of a 
generalizing language that defines women first and foremost as victims 
of their own religion, makes it difficult to draw another conclusion. 
What sort of reactions did Hirsi Ali and Van Gogh expect? Although 
Hirsi Ali did not like the title of the NRC article announcing Submission 
as “A new provocation by Hirsi Ali,” she was very well aware of the fact 
that the film would give rise to controversy. In her words, “The whole of 
the Muslim world will criticize me.” Van Gogh himself, finding the film 
a bit boring and overly serious, said his next film would need to have 
more humour. He seems to have engaged in the film project for the 
sake of Hirsi Ali. Jokingly, he also referred to a worst-case scenario in 
which Muslims would simply ignore the film.
At first, the fears of Van Gogh almost seemed to materialize. In spite 
of the obvious attempts of the media to get sensational responses from 
Muslim organizations, the latter either chose not to respond at all to 
the film, or did so in a restrained manner. By and large they regretted 
that such a  film was made, but there was no concerted action on their 
part to get the film banned, as many had expected.1 Most agreed that 
the topic —violence against women— was indeed relevant, but many 
were not convinced by the analysis and most pointed out that the 
visual language of Quranic verses and transparent dress was counter-
productive. The responses of individuals varied from praise to outrage, 
with very few reactions from the target group, Muslim women them-
selves. In a televised discussion of Hirsi Ali with a number of abused 
women in a shelter, the latter walked out as an expression of offence by 
Hirsi Ali’s injunction that they needed to acknowledge that the Quran 
condones the abuse of women. Interviews conducted by Amnesty In-
ternational correspondents with professional women in Muslim com-
munities abroad —as the film was made in English, evidence of it being 
intended for an audience abroad— also were by and large negative.
It was not until after the murder of Van Gogh that Submission again 
became the topic of debate. Hirsi Ali sent a letter to the NRC in which 
she stated that  she felt guilty that Van Gogh had been killed because 
of his cooperation with her in producing the film.2 In the days after his 
murder   “the friends of Van Gogh” and others made a passionate plea 
for the right of freedom of opinion, translated in terms of an absolute 
right to say “whatever we want.” There were good reasons for such a 
“translation.” Van Gogh had not  been as much a major opinion-leader 
but as a a public figure due to his style of provoking and insulting, the 
vulgarity of his language, and his use of ethnic slurs, with Muslims con-
sistently referred to in terms of bestiality.   A host of intellectuals joined 
his anti-civil discourse with great zeal, claiming they were preserving 
“Dutch norms and values” which they perceived as being under threat 
by the presence of “almost one million Muslims” in the Netherlands. 
The right to insult seems to have become one of those central Dutch 
values. It was within this context that Submission was time and again 
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The film Submission, written by Hirsi Ali and 
filmed by the late Theo van Gogh, was aired on 
Dutch television in the summer of 2004. Some 
have referred to the film as a work of art while 
others have stressed its offensive nature due to 
its portrayal of violence against Muslim women. 
Yet the film is first and foremost striking in 
its unimaginative resonance with the visual 
imagery of Orientalism.
Submission
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referred to as a prime example of the right of freedom of expression 
that needed to be defended. As if to underline this point, some argued 
for an immediate second airing of Submission. The company holding 
the film rights, however, refused permission to air it on the day of Van 
Gogh’s cremation, giving as its reason that it would draw attention 
away from his earlier and more interesting  work. 
Faced with criticism about her generalizing discourse, Hirsi Ali has in 
various interviews and talk shows acknowledged that only a minority 
of Muslim men beat their wives, that there are also positive elements 
in Islam, and has pointed out that she only wants to remove from Islam 
those elements that are incompatible with human rights and individu-
al freedom. Still, her stance remains highly ambiguous, for she often si-
multaneously presents contrasting positions. When, almost one month 
after the murder of Van Gogh she presented her plans for another film, 
Submission 2 (about the ways in which Islam oppresses the individual, 
starting from the position of women) and for a book, she stated that 
whereas people admit behind closed doors that Islamism is dangerous, 
she herself considers Islam in its purest form, the Islam of the prophet 
Mohammed, of the Quran and the hadith, as a threat to life.3 
The Dutch elite
Hirsi Ali has been seen as a lone voice willing to take great personal 
risks to reveal the cruelty Islam inflicts on women that others had tried 
to cover up. It is certainly true that she  has taken great risks, but the 
presentation of her position in Dutch society as a lone voice is remark-
able. Whereas she does not have much support amongst Muslims, men 
or women, she finds herself in the com-
pany of very powerful political play-
ers. She stands in a tradition of Islam 
bashers that have become increasingly 
influential in Dutch society, starting 
with Frits Bolkestein, former European 
Commissioner and former leader of the 
VVD, one of the first in the early 1990s 
to argue that Islam and modernity are 
incompatible and that a strong anti-mi-
gration stance is needed. Her ideas are 
also similar to those of the more popu-
list discourse of the late Pim Fortuyn 
who considered Islam a backward reli-
gion. Her move from the Labour party 
to the VVD was facilitated by former 
Minister of Transport and currently the 
European Commissioner for Competi-
tion Neelie Kroes and former VVD party 
leader and present vice- Prime Minister 
Gerrit Zalm, whose consent she sought 
(and gained) in airing Submission. 
She is also strongly supported by 
intellectuals who more often than not 
are self-proclaimed experts on Islam, 
the Arab world, and women, and who 
present their rehashings of Orientalist 
perspectives with an awe of respect-
ability through their stature. Likewise, 
another major supporter of Hirsi Ali’s 
work is the Editor-in-Chief of the Dutch 
mainstream feminist monthly Opzij, 
Cisca Dresselhuys, who publicly de-
clared that while she might consider 
hiring a woman wearing a headscarf 
for an administrative position, she 
would not hire such a woman as a jour-
nalist, for, in her eyes, wearing a head-
scarf cannot be but the expression of 
women’s subordination and hence 
it clashes with the feminist mission 
of Opzij. Dresselhuys compares Hirsi 
Ali’s confrontational style with that of 
Dutch feminists of the 1960s. This anal-
ogy, however, seems to miss the point. 
While feminists of the 1960s attacked 
the male power elite, Hirsi Ali finds her 
support there; her confrontational stance has been vis-a-vis Muslims 
(and those “soft on them”), a disproportionately underprivileged if not 
disenfranchised social group. 
This is not to say that Hirsi Ali has not raised important issues; she 
may even have put sensitive issues on the agenda of a party that oth-
erwise would have ignored them. Yet, her film 
Submission is not only ineffective in that it by and 
large alienates her intended audience, but it also 
has negative side effects. Whereas immediately 
after the murder of Van Gogh, the mayor of Am-
sterdam underlined the importance of uniting 
together all who are against violence, Submission 
builds on and contributes to further polarization 
along the lines of the simplistic contrast scheme 
of Muslims versus non-Muslims. Violence against 
women is certainly an important issue to address,4 
but it would have been far more productive to ac-
knowledge the work Muslim feminists have done 
in order to develop alternative interpretations, 
and to investigate causes and possible solutions 
for men’s abusive behaviour rather than to as-
sume a simple causal link with Islamic texts. 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali 
and Theo van 
Gogh on the set 
of Submission
 Notes
1. When Hirsi Ali announced that she intended 
to make a follow up to Submission some 
Muslims went to court to seek a court 
injunction to stop her from doing so. 
2. Hirsi Ali strongly criticized the fact that she, 
as  Member of Parliament, was entitled to 
police protection while Theo van Gogh was 
not. The issue of police protection then 
became an issue of debate in parliament. 
3. See NRC, November 29, 2004.  
4. There are quite a number of films produced 
in Muslim majority countries on the very 
topic of violence against women, one 
example being Subhi al-Zobaidi’s, Women 
in the Sun (Palestine: Refugee Camp 
Production), that includes the testimonies 
of the women concerned, as well as debates 
between female activists and religious 
scholars. 
Annelies Moors is an anthropologist and holds the ISIM chair 
at the University of Amsterdam. 
E-mail: a.c.a.e.moors@uva.nl
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Post-war economic growth and the 
need for unskilled labour forced the 
Dutch government to look beyond 
its borders, fostering labour contracts 
first with Italy and Spain, and later with 
Turkey and Morocco. The migrants 
from Muslim majority countries were 
seen as especially problematic for in-
tegration into the Dutch society. Their low economic position and 
social isolation made them both the underclass citizens of the Dutch 
society and the scapegoats for the ills of society. Rightwing political 
movements, represented early on in the ideas of Bolkestein and the 
People's Party for Democracy and Freedom (VVD), cast immigrants 
as uneducated, uncivilized, criminal, and dangerous, and emphasized 
the need for the state to deal with them with “toughness.” In his view 
the only way to preserve Western values and achievements was to 
leave politically correct attitudes behind and pressure immigrants to 
completely integrate into Dutch society. Although many distanced 
themselves from Bolkestein’s approach, he was able, for the first time, 
to provide a public space from which to argue against the previously 
dominant “toleration of difference” discourse. By the year 2000 the 
assimilative discourse on migration became the dominant discourse 
on migration in the Netherlands, and after 11 September 2001 the 
climate became even more anti-Muslim.
The appearance of Pim Fortuyn onto the political landscape as the 
leader of the newly established Leefbaar Nederland party (Liveable 
Netherlands) would further change the debates around immigration. 
His party eventually disassociated itself with him and his statements 
such as “Islam is a backward culture.” Fortuyn therefore founded his 
own party, Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) which won the largest number of 
seats in the municipal elections of Rotterdam. His party was up for 
elections in the National Parliament when, on 6 May 2002, Fortuyn 
was murdered by an animal rights activist. With Fortuyn the politi-
cal discourse around migrants, particularly Muslim migrants, became 
more polarized than ever before.
Debates on Islam in the Netherlands
I came to the Netherlands as a refugee sixteen years ago from the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran. Although I experienced political (as a leftist) and 
gender (as a woman) suppression in the name of Islam, I have learned 
that Islam as a religion should not be blamed for the acts of a repres-
sive regime. By practising democracy in the Netherlands I have learned 
to respect people for their thoughts as long as those thoughts are not 
forced on me. And it is here that I have come to differ from Ayaan Hirsi 
Ali, arguably one of the most controversial politicians today on Islam in 
the Netherlands. 
Born in 1967 in Mogadishu (Somalia), Ayaan Hirsi 
Ali also came to the Netherlands as a refugee in 
1992. She graduated in political science and was 
active within the Labour party until 2002 when 
she switched to the VVD and became a member 
of the Dutch Parliament in 2003. Hirsi Ali is fa-
mous for her radical standpoints against Islam in 
general and the Muslim community in the Neth-
erlands in particular. I first saw Ayaan in 2002 as 
she appeared in a discussion program on Dutch 
television. At that time, I saw a strong woman 
who fought for her ideas: someone 
who dared to distance herself from her 
traditional, Islamic background and by 
doing so, position herself against the 
traditional Muslim community in the 
Netherlands. Her arguments on the 
incompatibility between Islamic belief 
and women’s emancipation were sharp. 
She stood up for the rights of Muslim women, whom she believed were 
suppressed by Islamic tradition and law. I initially identified with Hirsi 
Ali, however my identification with her did not last long. 
I soon realized that Ayaan had become a welcome mouthpiece for the 
dominant discourse on Islam in the Netherlands that pictures Muslim 
migrants as problems and enemies of the nation. Who could better rep-
resent the dominant view than a person with an Islamic background? 
Predictably, Ayaan soon became a prominent figure both for the media 
and in politics. She sailed on the conservative ideas in the Netherlands 
that push migrants—the most marginalized group in society—even 
further into isolation. It was in the Netherlands that I discovered that 
real enlightenment does not come from exclusion, but rather inclu-
sion. Real enlightenment means thinking and reflecting upon one’s 
own thoughts, and being brave enough to listen to the other. The art 
of knowing is not in excluding other ideas by suppressing or ignoring 
them; the art is to confront other ideas through dialogue. When one is 
able to suspend one’s own thoughts for a short while in order to really 
listen, a space is created even if it is for a short while to challenge those 
notions that are taken for granted. 
Forging a democratic citizenry
Beneath this rightist discourse in the Netherlands lay particular defi-
nitions of “nation” and “culture.” What the above-mentioned figures in 
the Netherlands share is their emphasis on the incompatibility of cul-
tures, the need to protect Dutch culture and identity from cultural in-
vasion, and the need to promote Dutch cultural norms and values. This 
newly formed exclusionary rhetoric is based on a homogeneous, static, 
coherent, and rooted notion of culture which Stolcke calls “cultural fun-
damentalism.”2 Explaining the immigrants’ problems through culture 
is not only naive, it is also a specific form of cultural fundamentalism 
which weakens the very foundations of the nation. 
There has emerged a dual discourse of citizenship: one discourse for 
the “real Dutch,” and another one for the “unwanted Dutch” who need 
to “integrate,” “be saved from their husbands,” or “learn the language.” 
The latter discourse presumes that migrants are not mature enough 
to decide matters for themselves, and thereby promotes a passive citi-
zenship. Migrants can only feel part of a society if they know that their 
voices are taken seriously as active citizens. When migrants’ choices, 
including the choice to maintain aspects of their culture, are respected, 
migrants can feel included in the society. This is the only fruitful path 
for any multicultural state. 
Debates on Islam in Europe
The discourse on multiculturalism in the 
Netherlands dates to the arrival of the so-called 
“guest workers” in the late 1950s. By the 1980s, 
when the Dutch government realized that 
migration, initially viewed as temporary, had 
gained a more permanent character, it started 
to focus on the integration of the immigrants.1
Multiculturalism 
and Citizenship
in the Netherlands
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Debates on Islam in Europe
Sixteen years ago the publication of 
Gerholm and Lithman’s collection of es-
says The New Islamic Presence in Western 
Europe2 was an important first attempt 
to try to understand the so-called “pres-
ence” of Muslims on the continent. 
Since then, the literature has expanded 
exponentially with detailed mono-
graphs and overviews now available 
for many countries and for Europe as a 
whole. This increasing academic atten-
tion reflects the changing nature of the 
Muslim population and its significance for societies which in varying de-
grees see themselves as “multicultural.” There are now some 10-15 mil-
lion Muslims in Western Europe, and compared with the 1980s they are 
more widespread (e.g. in Italy and Spain) and come from a wider range 
of societies of origin (Africa, the Middle East, South and Central Asia, the 
Balkans), than even 16 years ago, and as well as migrants they include 
many refugees. The Muslim presence is not only wider, but deeper. In 
many places, the early circulatory migration of Muslim men from former 
colonies to the metropole has given way to the settlement of families 
and the coming of age of second and third generations, with enormous 
implications during periods of economic change and uncertainty and in 
a post-9/11 world. 
Though many Muslims are now long-term migrants and refugees 
and/or have been born and raised in the countries of immigration, the 
relationship with societies of origin has not diminished, on the con-
trary, and this is one way transnationalism enters. The significance of 
transnationalism or what is now understood as the transnational char-
acter of Islam and of migrant populations who espouse it, was not fully 
apparent or appreciated 16 years ago, and remains under-researched 
despite studies which have placed Islam in the context of globalization. 
Transnationalism is not, however, a single phenomenon. There are dif-
ferent ways of living transnationally; transnational Islam takes numer-
ous forms.
West African Muslims from Senegal or Mali for example, often prac-
tice Islam within the context of transnational labour migration circuits. 
Although residing in France or Italy, their lives are firmly “anchored” in 
West Africa. Their presence in Europe is temporary and they associate 
Islam with “home.” Others, Turks in Germany, Pakistanis or Iranians in 
Britain, North Africans in France, are more firmly rooted in their coun-
try of residence, but pursue bi-national or pluri-national agendas. That 
is, they operate in two or more nation-state systems, engaging, albeit 
in different ways, with the culture, society, economy, politics, and not 
least, religion of each. Nonetheless, there may be considerable diver-
sity both within and between such populations in the extent to which 
they do so. Iranian Sufis in Britain, for example, have relatively little to 
do with other Muslims or with addressing British institutions, but are 
heavily concerned with the situation in Iran and with the internation-
ally distributed Iranian exile community. Pakistani Muslims are often 
fully engaged with British institutions through mosques, British politi-
cal parties, participation in local government etc.
Another way in which Muslims may operate transnationally is through 
the idea of the ummah, the global Islamic “imagined” community many 
Muslims, as well as analysts, frequently invoke. Although the ummah 
remains abstract and de-territorialized, case studies from many parts 
of Europe show how watershed events (debates about the hijab on the 
one hand, wars in Afghanistan or Iraq on the other) lead to a height-
ened sense of a transnational community. At the same time, national, 
ethnic, doctrinal or sectarian differences within the Muslim population 
continue to be important. Against the wishful thinking of Islamists (and 
the exuberance of students of cultural studies and cosmopolitan intel-
lectuals) transnational has not meant 
post-national. 
The importance of the ummah for 
Muslims in Europe is that it constitutes 
a transnational public sphere, a network 
of relations and institutions encompass-
ing but extending beyond Europe to in-
clude scholars and authorities through-
out the Muslim world. This transnational 
Muslim public sphere intersects with 
other public spheres in Europe, and this 
has implications for the way in which 
the important question of what it means to be a Muslim in Europe is 
being addressed. 
European nation states have been defined by both religious (Judeo-
Christian) traditions and secular (liberal-democratic) ideals which often 
make it seem difficult if not impossible to accommodate Islam. Con-
sequently, the question whether and if so how, 
one might live as a Muslim in Europe is widely de-
bated by both Muslims and non-Muslims. There 
is no definitive answer. Various routes are being 
explored, some more quietist, some more secular, 
some more clamorous, some more negotiatory. 
Contemporary discussions of “European Islam” 
illustrate some of these responses. Whether con-
cerned with the construction of “European-Mus-
lim” as a (hyphenated) personal or collective iden-
tity, or with “European Islam” as a set of Islamic 
ideas, institutions, and practices specific to the 
European context, these discussions are key sites 
for understanding the intersection of Islam, tran-
snationalism, and the public sphere in Europe.
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Islam is undeniably transnational, yet Muslims 
may experience transnationalism differently 
depending on their countries of origin and 
residence and mode of settlement. This article 
indicates some of the various ways in which 
Islam and transnationalism intersect and 
suggests how transnationalism impinges 
on contemporary debates about how to live 
as a Muslim in Western Europe and on the 
emergence of a “European Islam” or “European-
Muslim” identity.1
Transnational Islam
in Western Europe
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A protest 
against racism 
in Hamburg, 
24 August 2002
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The following observations constitute a preliminary and 
provisional response to two recent events: the murder 
of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands, and the American 
assault on Fallujah, both of which prompt broader 
reflections on issues pertaining to violence and religion. 
1. If war is the continuation of politics by other means, as von Clause-
witz observed, violence is the continuation of conflict by means of 
physical force. Understanding the causes of violence thus involves 
two questions: a) What are the causes of conflict (in general and 
specific)? b) Why is it that a given conflict was not resolved—or not 
resolvable—by other means?
2. Some violence is the product of psychopathology: paranoia, sad-
ism, wildly displaced rage, and the like. Violence of this sort ac-
counts for a very small portion of the total and holds relatively little 
theoretical interest. The designation of violence as irrational, how-
ever, is attractive to certain theorists and policy-makers since it re-
moves such acts from the realm of the comprehensible and relieves 
them of the responsibility to have prevented or understood them. 
3. Most conflict is caused by competition over scarce resources. Vio-
lence represents the attempt to resolve such conflict to one’s own 
(individual or collective) benefit against the determined resistance 
of an adversary. 
4. The resources most often and most bitterly contested include not 
only material desiderata—above all, wealth, power, and territory—
but also such non-material items as prestige (the respect of others), 
dignity (the capacity for self-respect), and justice (or at least the 
sense of having been treated justly). This latter set is more diffuse 
and harder to quantify than the material desiderata, and as a result 
such considerations tend to be analytically undervalued. Nonethe-
less, they have enormous importance, especially when the mald-
istribution of material goods is compounded (also facilitated and 
legitimated) by non-material maldistributions.
5. Crossing the threshold from non-violent to violent conflict involves 
a qualitative leap that can be difficult to accomplish, particularly if 
it is motivated only by material desires. Normally, the naked pur-
suit of self-interest is perceived and defined as greed, not only by 
observers, but also by those who experience such temptation. To 
reveal oneself as motivated by greed calls forth sanctions. These 
include the loss of non-material assets (reputation, trust, self-re-
spect, et al.) that seriously offsets potential material gains, thereby 
inhibiting the move to violence.
6. Insofar as a sense of suffering non-material maldistribution also 
entails a sense of having been wronged, would-be aggressors be-
come able to define their violent acts as not just greedy, but mor-
ally justified. The discourses they develop and circulate toward that 
end may be intended to persuade others, but above all they help 
overcome their own subjective (i.e. moral) inhibitions. 
7. Certain kinds of religious discourse can assist in this task, specifi-
cally those which recode otherwise problematic acts as righteous 
deeds, sacred duties or the like, as when killing is defined as sacri-
fice, destruction as purification, or war as Crusade.
8. In principle, no religious tradition is more inclined than any other 
to make arguments of this sort. All people are capable of this move 
and the canonic texts of all religions include passages that can be 
put to such purpose. Those who are interested in undertaking vio-
lence can always find arguments and precedents that sanctify their 
purpose, but selective reading and tendentious interpretation are 
an important part of this process.
9. When social groups constitute their identity in religious terms 
and experience themselves as a sacred collectivity (the faithful, 
the righteous, or God’s chosen people, for instance), as a corollary 
they tend to construe their rivals in negative fashion (heretics, in-
fidels, apostates, evil, bestial, demonic, satanic, etc.). Under such 
circumstances, the pursuit of self-interest—including vengeance 
for slights to one’s pride (a.k.a. “honour”) — can be experienced as 
a holy cause, in support of which any violence is justified.
10. The factors that determine whether a group will embark on vio-
lent action include the extent to which it feels itself to have been 
wronged; the extent to which it experiences those wrongs as un-
bearable and intractable; and its ability to define itself and its cause 
as righteous, even sacred. 
11. Religious considerations are never the sole determining factor and 
there is no necessary relation between religion and violence. In 
most instances, religious considerations probably help to inhibit 
violence. But when religious discourse, authority, or communal 
identity are deployed in such a way as to facilitate the leap from 
non-violent to violent conflict, they can be enormously effective in 
accomplishing what Kierkegaard called “the religious suspension 
of the ethical.”
12. In such moments, religion can help disadvantaged groups to gain 
a more equitable division of the world’s resources by unleashing 
violence (or the threat thereof ) that helps them overcome the re-
sistance of their better-situated adversaries. 
13. The ugliest, most dangerous situations of all are not those in which 
the disadvantaged turn violent, believing they enjoy divine favour. 
Worse still are episodes in which groups who already enjoy dispro-
portionate power (and other resources) persuade themselves that 
religious injunctions, like the need to convert the heathen or the 
need to spread “freedom,” justify use of their superior force against 
disadvantaged others, construing such aggression as benevolent, 
meritorious, or holy.
14. Just as the use of violence tends to elicit a violent riposte, so the 
religious valorization of violence prompts its victims to frame their 
violent responses in religious terms. In doing so, they normally 
invert the signs through which their adversaries mark one side as 
sacred and the other, profane. When both sides experience their 
struggle in religious terms, the stage is set for prolonged, ferocious, 
and enormously destructive combat. 
Politics
Theses on 
Religion & Violence
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A British priest gives a 
service at the Shaibah Base, 
Basra, Iraq, 30 October 
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Politics
On 1 September 2004 the festive be-
ginning of a new school year in Rus-
sia turned into a national tragedy. A 
group of about 30 armed men and 
two women wearing explosive belts 
seized a secondary school in the small 
town of Beslan near Vladikavkaz in 
Northern Ossetia. Teachers, pupils, and 
their relatives were taken hostages. 
Their number reached about 1300 and 
consisted mostly of children. The hos-
tage-takers demanded the withdrawal 
of Russian troops from neighbouring 
Chechnya. Russian commandos and 
local militia surrounded the school. In a bloody assault that ensued on 
3 September most hostages were freed, but in the fighting the school 
was destroyed, leaving most terrorists together with 11 Russian sol-
diers and 344 civilians killed and many others injured. Some of the ter-
rorists escaped. 
The impact of the Beslan massacre in Russia is comparable to that 
of the 9/11 attacks in the United States. Russians felt and expressed 
solidarity with the Beslan victims. The State Bank opened an account 
for numerous donations to be transferred to them and a special Inter-
net site on Beslan was created (www.beslan.ru). About 135,000 people 
took part in an anti-terrorist demonstration held near the Kremlin in 
Moscow on 7 September. The official Russian media blamed “interna-
tional Islamic terrorists” for carrying out the Beslan assault and named 
al-Qaida as responsible for it. At the same time fears from “Caucasians” 
and Islam in general grew. A Levada-Center poll indicated that 33% of 
Russians were in favour of preventing Chechens from entering Russian 
towns. In Moscow, over 10,000 Muslim migrants were detained by the 
police, among them the Daghestani cosmonaut Magomed Tolboev 
who was taken for a Chechen. 
Causes of violence
It is unlikely that the Beslan tragedy and occurrence of 
terrorist violence in Russia in general is the result of the 
“export of Islamic terrorism” from the Middle East as the of-
ficial media put it. The causes of violence are rooted in two 
recent Russian-Chechen wars, in particular in the atrocities 
committed by the Russian army. Many terrorists have been 
recruited from amongst Chechens who as teenagers had 
suffered during these wars. It is not without coincidence 
that some of the terrorists who attacked the school in Beslan 
had lost relatives and livelihood in the mid-1990s, like the 
only captured hostage-taker, Nur-Pasha Kulaev (b. in 1980). 
The supposed heads of the terrorists, Ruslan Khochubarov 
(b. 1972) and Khodov (b. in 1976), also belong to the war 
generation.
There are numerous reports of dramatic recollections 
of the Russian-Chechen wars playing an important role 
in escalating violence in Russia. As one of the terrorists 
in Beslan told a hostage girl: “Russian troops in Chechnya 
caught children just like you and cut their heads off.” His 
own daughter had been killed. In this way atrocities such 
as the use of children as human shields are being repro-
duced. The Chechen background of the Beslan massacre 
is also confirmed by a number of similar attacks that had 
preceded it. The most important incidents include hos-
tage-taking in Budenovsk (1995), Kizliar (1996) and Moscow (2002), 
explosions in Moscow and Volgodonsk (1999), Kaspiisk (2002) and 
Grozny (2004), a recent case of two planes blown up by suicide 
women-bombers. The terrorist units often include young women 
referred to as Black Widows who had lost relatives during the wars. 
Some of these attacks were carried out by one of the main Chechen 
rebels, Shamil Basaev. On 17 September he claimed responsibility for 
the Beslan hostage-taking.
The Beslan incident sheds light on the 
complicated relationship between reli-
gion and terrorism. Though terrorism 
is not supported by Islamic law, never-
theless there are also different visions 
of Islam, including that of Basaev and 
his sympathisers which consider ter-
rorist attacks as legitimate tools in the 
defence of the Muslim community (of 
Chechnya). The Beslan case demon-
strates that, in Russia, radical nation-
alist groups use religious identifica-
tion and adopt the Islamic principle of 
martyrdom to meet their political ends. 
The Beslan attack was carried out by al-Riyad al-Salihin group which 
appeals mostly to Caucasian Muslim populations such as Chechens, In-
gushes, and Daghestanis. By choosing their victims to be from among 
the Russian Orthodox Ossetians they effectively positioned themselves 
as “Muslims” in contrast to the captured “infidel” civilians and Russian 
troops. A survivor remembered that “…one of the gunmen was read-
ing the Quran constantly.” Fragments of the interrogation of detained 
attacker Kullaev diffused by the Russian First Channel also demonstrate 
the radical Islamist stance of the group.
The Beslan massacre reveals both the strengths as well as the weak-
nesses of Islamist radicals. On the one hand, great powers like Russia 
and the United States are unable to bring to a halt the growth of terror-
ism and its spreading through their “porous” frontiers.  Military counter-
actions like the one in Beslan are not likely to eradicate terrorism and 
nobody knows what will be the next target. On the other hand, terror-
ism will bring the Caucasian Muslims neither national liberation nor 
a sharia state. It might only result in human casualties and economic 
degradation along the Caucasian frontiers of Russia.
V L A D I M I R  B O B R O V N I K O V
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Violence has severely affected Russian society 
with the increase of terrorist attacks since 
1995. The school massacre in the Ossetian 
town of Beslan caused shock and awe in all 
of Russia and beyond. It culminated a series of 
terrorist attacks whose foundations were laid 
in the history of the two Chechen wars in which 
Russian troops brought havoc to Chechen 
society. Though terrorism is usually regarded 
as a violation of basic Islamic principles, today 
Islam is effectively used in Russia by radical 
nationalist factions to justify their political 
strategies.
The Beslan Massacre
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The so-called Opposition Forces in 
Darfur rebelled against the Sudanese 
military government of General Omar 
al-Bashir early in 2003. The Opposition 
Forces consisted of the Sudan Liberation 
Army/Movement (SLA/SLM, formerly 
the Darfur Liberation Front) led by Abd 
al-Wahid Mohamed Nur, a former mem-
ber of the Communist party; and the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 
led by Khalil Ibrahim, a former member 
of the National Islamic Front, the main 
Sudanese Islamist party. Though these 
factions were not indigenous to Darfur, 
they justified their cause by accusing the 
government of neglecting the huge economic problems in Darfur while 
doing nothing about the increasing insecurity and lawlessness related 
to the continuous influx of high-tech arms into the region. Immediately 
after the first violence broke out in February 2003 the local government 
organized a habitual “tribal conference” in al-Fashir. While local leaders 
proposed negotiation with the different parties, the government was de-
termined to crush the rebellion through military force. It thereby used 
local militias, now commonly referred to as Janjawiid.
The Janjawiid are usually characterized as “Arab” nomads who have 
been provided with arms by the Sudanese government. The strategy of 
turning Arab nomads into a militia is not novel: it was applied by con-
secutive regimes in the civil war with southern Sudan. Both the demo-
cratic regime (1985-89) under the leadership of Sadiq al-Mahdi, and the 
current Islamist regime, armed Arab nomads from Kordofan and Darfur 
and turned them into so-called murahiliin. The recent deployment of 
similar counterinsurgency tactics in Darfur suggests that the conflict 
represents a “southern Sudan speeded up” rather than a new “Rwanda 
in slow motion.”2
Ironically, the recent peace negotiations between the United States 
of America, the United Kingdom, Norway, and the warring parties on 
the North-South conflict in Sudan which took place in Naivasha, Kenya, 
fuelled the insurgency in Darfur. The people of Darfur feared that an in-
ternational success might allow the Sudanese government more room 
to isolate Darfur and keep them out of national politics altogether. The 
anxiety of local sedentary groups to lose all grip on political and eco-
nomic power in their region seems justified by the impunity enjoyed by 
the murahiliin in South Darfur and their increasing political influence. 
At the same time, the Sudanese government favours a war in Darfur as 
it temporarily postpones the problem for the government of how to 
deal with the large numbers of soldiers who have now become redun-
dant in the South. It also prevents its officers from plotting against one 
of the most unpopular regimes Sudan has known. Moreover, the pres-
ence of oil in Darfur might be an ulterior motive for the government 
to divide, displace, and disband the population in order to “rule” the 
oilfields, as was the case in the South.
Apart from fighting techniques and the application of a “scorched-
earth” policy, the ethnic rhetoric used to justify the violence also bears 
similarities with the war in the south. In Darfur the conflict is construct-
ed as one of “Arab Muslim nomads” against “Black African farmers.” This 
religious-racial discourse of Islamic superiority hides the fact that the 
parties involved are all Muslims who are linked with each other by a 
history of exchange, intermarriage, and even life-style: until recently 
Fur farmers who converted their wealth 
into cattle might take up a nomadic 
life-style, “becoming” an Arab Baqqara 
nomad within a generation.3 Similarly, 
Arabs have become Fur farmers. Con-
structing the war as a conflict between 
fixed ethnic groups fits well into the 
Islamist government’s discourse, but 
hides a more complex history.
A religious war between 
“Arabs” and “Africans”?
Although the Sudanese Arab elite 
from Central Sudan are involved in the 
war in Darfur as affiliates of the Arab 
nomads, the meaning of “Arab” carries different connotations of class 
and culture. The educated Arab elite residing in the Nile Valley have 
constructed themselves as awlad Arab and awlad al-balad,children 
(sons) of Arabs and inheritors of the land. They were instrumental in 
founding political Arab nationalism and claimed the Sudanese na-
tion-state as theirs. By constructing Sudan both as Islamic and Arab 
they excluded not only Southerners, but other marginal groups like 
the Fur, the Beja, and the Nubians, respectively in the west, east, and 
north of the country. Alternatively, the notion of “Arab” that is used 
for the nomadic peoples in Darfur is used in the sense of Bedouin and 
indicates backwardness and marginality. 
When the current military regime, backed by the Islamist National Is-
lamic Front, took power in 1989 it proclaimed Darfur the “least Islamized 
region after the South.” This stigma concerned all Darfurians: nomads 
and sedentary farmers alike. This racist Islamist ideology has in the re-
cent war in Darfur been adjusted, or one could say “refined.” Since mem-
bers of the Fur and the Masalit, both predominantly sedentary farmers, 
and the Zaghawa, semi-nomads, have become involved in the rebel 
movement they have been cast collectively as Black Africans: black sug-
gesting the status of a slave and automatically of a non-Muslim. These 
so called “non-Muslims” have become opposed to Arab Muslims which, 
in Darfur, now include nomads. However, these recent events date back 
to a much longer history of ethnic strife and political conflict.
After the Darfur sultanate became part of the Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium of the Sudan in 1916, it was divided into “dar(s),” ad-
ministrative areas under the control of appointed tribal leaders. This 
division led to clearly demarcated “homelands” related to fixed eth-
nic identities referred to in names such as “Dar Zaghawa” and “Dar al-
Arab,” particularly in North-Darfur. Although the tribal leaders never 
lost complete power, in 1994 the native administration council was 
“re-invented” in order to govern the area via local leaders “on the 
cheap”: it directly led to renewed conflicts in the far west of Darfur.4 
Due to ongoing desertification camel nomads, who had been al-
lotted “dar(s)” in the far north of Darfur, suffered most from the dete-
riorating environmental conditions. In particular since the droughts 
of the 1970 and 1980s they would more frequently and earlier in the 
season come down with their camels that trampled, ate, or otherwise 
destroyed the not yet harvested crops of the local farmers and threat-
ened to deplete the local water resources. 
Moreover, in the 1980s ethnic identities became increasingly politi-
cized. In 1981 Darfur people rallied for a Darfur governor demanding 
equality with other regions in Sudan under the 1972 Regional Auton-
Politics
Since early 2003 Darfur has been the site 
of mounting violence which has led the UN to 
describe the conflict as currently “the world’s 
worst humanitarian crisis.” The US Congress 
even labelled the conflict a “genocide.” Diverse 
ethnic groups as well as the government 
were engaged in violence in the 1980s and 
1990s. However, violence has reached a 
new dimension in the recent war where 
racism has become the main legitimating 
discourse of the conflict. The recent history 
of the conflict suggests, however, that the 
root causes are socio-economic and political 
rather than ethnic.1
Darfur in War 
The Politicization of 
Ethnic Identities?
Politics
omy Act. However, the installation of a Fur as 
governor turned out to be a bone of contention. 
Intellectuals claiming Arab descent organized 
themselves in the Arab Congregation which was 
supported by the government. As intellectuals 
from other ethnic groups were drawn into the 
conflict as well, ethnic differences were fed into 
national politics and became even more fixed. 
As a consequence, raids by Arab fursan (knights) 
and Fur malishat (militia) were quite un-prob-
lematically cast as an ethnic conflict waged be-
tween the “Arab belt” versus the “African belt.” 
The Fur felt that the Arabs aimed at destroying 
their ancestral rights to the land, while Arabs 
claimed that Fur threatened to oust them under 
the slogan “Darfur for the Fur.”5 The influx of high-
tech weapons in the same period due to the war 
between Libya and Chad, the donations of arms 
by diverse political parties after the democratic 
elections, and the arming of militia by consecu-
tive governments has fuelled this conflict. 
Youth, guns, and the quest 
for power
In the media the term Janjawiid, referring to 
the Arab nomadic militia, has been dissected 
into “evil” (jaan) “horsemen” (jawid), or even devils riding horses carry-
ing GM 3 rifles. However, prior to the recent conflict, the term was used 
more generally to refer to “rabble” or “outlaws”, in particular in cases of 
banditry and camel theft committed predominantly by young men.6 It 
is this reference to young men that is crucial to any understanding of 
the situation.
In the early 1990s, when I conducted anthropological research in Keb-
kabiya, a town that has been recently under heavy siege, conflicts over 
scarce resources concerned predominantly Fur and Zaghawa, groups 
that have now become allies in the conflict. The failure of traditional 
negotiation and peace keeping mechanisms, such as tribal reconcilia-
tion conferences—the last one between Fur and Arabs took place only 
in 1989, to no avail—proved to be not only due to the politicization of 
ethnic identities. Of importance as well was the discontent within the 
ethnic groups. The authority of tribal leaders, and elderly men in gen-
eral, was increasingly contested by young males. The general neglect 
of Darfur in national development plans left youngsters with few pos-
sibilities of becoming a “man” in socio-cultural terms. They had difficul-
ties paying for the bride-price and wedding-arrangements that mark 
maturity and social status. Even when they did marry, young nomads 
were hardly able to provide for their families as nomads. For their part, 
many young sedentary farmers had to migrate to towns for some ex-
tended period of time in order to earn the money necessary to raise a 
family. Moreover, despite the high expectations placed on education, 
educated young men barely had the means and ability to provide for 
their families. 
In farming communities in Darfur, women are the main cultivators 
while single young men are often redundant. Formerly they would 
wander from one Quranic school to the next, or engage in odd jobs 
for survival. Single nomadic young men were most important for herd-
ing camels. In times of drought only young men would tend to the 
smaller herds temporarily leaving behind women, children, and the 
elderly in small settlements near sedentary peoples. This process of 
settling by female nomads coupled with male out-migration among 
sedentary farmers has created communities that consist of predomi-
nantly female-headed households, of both sedentary and nomadic 
backgrounds. These populations engage with increasing frequency 
and scale in interethnic exchange, share-cropping, and intermarriage. 
As the temporary nomadic settlements have become more permanent 
and, moreover, host a larger number of young male nomads, the no-
madic lifestyle becomes increasingly extinct. This change creates inse-
curity and anxiety among the settled nomadic communities. Moreover, 
in order to survive the new settlers need access to land, water, labour, 
and knowledge, thus competing more directly over exactly the same 
resources that sedentary farmers use in these transition zones. These 
happen also to be the areas where most of the outbursts of violence 
have taken place.
In these deteriorating conditions of deprivation and despair among 
nomadic and sedentary young men “without a future,” weapons form 
an easy and immediate satisfaction in the quest for respect, self-iden-
tity, and a sense of control. The label genocide seems therefore to miss 
the point: apart form its legal complexity, the conflict has its base in 
socio-economic and political factors with a far more complicated his-
tory. Moreover, it is not clear whether the Janjawiid are ethnically ho-
mogeneous, or include young men from diverse ethnic backgrounds. 
And, even though youths who make up the Janjawiid have been armed 
by the government, this is not to say that the government is able to 
control and direct this monster it helped create. In Africa, where a ma-
jority of the population is under 30 years of age, conflicts which en-
gage predominantly youngsters is unfortunately more common than 
the “uniqueness” of the conflict in Darfur might suggest.
Due to the high presence of young disenfranchised men, the conflict 
has taken on an especially troubling gender dimension. Women are sys-
tematically verbally abused, raped, assaulted, mutilated, their relatives 
killed in front of their eyes, while young men of “battle age” are main 
targets of mass killings. This gender biased targeting, or “gendercide,” 
is part of many recent so-called ethnic conflicts.7 In Darfur, where eth-
nic affiliation is traced patrilineally, intermarriage 
results in women begetting children of different 
background than their own. This also means that 
women, as the keepers in many cases of multieth-
nic families, react to ethnic wars in a different way 
than men who tend to identify more with a fixed, 
unified, ethnic identity. Women and children of di-
verse ethnicities have in fact been caught similarly 
in the crossfire between rebels, government, and 
bandits. At the same time women have proven to 
be resilient and perseverant when it comes to con-
structing a future for their children. Though peace-
negotiations will be a long and difficult process and 
do not seem to be possible in the near future, not 
only the obvious tribal leaders and government of-
ficials should be party to negotiations: young men 
and women should be included as well. In Darfur 
the saying “Your mother’s family is from the heart, 
your father’s family comes from far” might be of 
help in trying to find an alternative, common de-
nominator for reconciliation-talks.
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R O E L  M E I J E R Who are the 48 men on the two lists 
published by the Saudi authorities of 
most wanted terrorists (the “List of 19” 
and the “List of 26”) and the list of the 
twelve who had died in the first suicide 
attack in Riyad on 12 May by the al-
Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP)? 
The place of origin and tribal back-
ground of the QAP members listed in 
these lists is highly diverse, but it is noticeable that at least thirteen 
lived in Riyadh, with nine of them in the Suwaydi quarter which ap-
pears to be the hotbed of the movement. 
The social background of the members is more difficult to ascertain 
because not all lists contain the necessary information. Some have an 
upper-middle class background (their fathers being dentists, high-rank-
ing civil servants, and police officers), and a few have a lower middle 
class background. Remarkably, quite a number were married, including 
those who lost their lives in the suicide bombings in Riyad. One of the 
most striking features of the group is their youth with 27 being their 
average age. The four leaders who belong to the “second generation” of 
al-Qa‘ida were in their early thirties, while most of their followers were 
younger, some of them as young as 22. Moreover, the average age of 
the members of one of the QAP cells, the “Khalidyya cell,” located in 
Mecca, was only nineteen.
Educational Background
QAP also shows an interesting picture both in terms of the level and 
kind of education of its members. Whereas the non-violent Islamist 
movement is typically a student movement, only eighteen of the listed 
members had a higher education and only ten of these had acquired a 
degree. Quite a few did not even have a secondary school certificate. 
None of the four leaders of the movement finished secondary school.
The type of education of the QAP members is also remarkable. While 
supporters of Islamist movements very often have a background in 
the technical and natural sciences or 
in medicine, this was the case for only 
two of the listed QAP members, while 
at least twelve had enjoyed a religious 
higher education. Most of them stud-
ied at the Imam Muhammad bin Sa‘ud 
Islamic University in Riyadh. This root-
ing in religious studies also explains 
why the formulation and spreading of 
ideology plays such an important role in this group. While most mem-
bers were coined “foot soldiers” (muqatilin maydaniyyin), nine were 
called “sharia theoreticians” (munazzarin shari‘iyyin). It was this small 
group of “intellectuals” that wrote the articles for QAP’s bi-monthly in-
ternet-magazine, Sawt al-Jihad and, thereby, spread the group’s ideas 
of jihad amongst a large audience.
Afghanistan
The one common characteristic of the QAP members was their 
connection with Afghanistan. Nearly half of the persons listed had 
been in training camps in Afghanistan and at a very young age. The 
first three leaders had gone there when still in their teens, and the 
third leader, ‘Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, “Abu Hajir,” when he was 17 years 
old. Later he became a trainer himself and left Afghanistan to fight 
in Algeria, Bosnia, and Somalia. The first leader, Yusuf al-Ayiri, was 
trained in Afghanistan during the early 1990s, while the second 
leader, Khalid Hajj, “Abu Hazim al-Sha‘ir,” had probably been there at 
a later date. At least ten from the younger generation either fought 
side by side with the Taliban or with Osama bin Laden in the caves of 
Tora Bora against the Americans when they were still in their teens 
or early twenties. It may very well be that these probably traumatic 
experiences, together with the Saudi endorsement of the American 
demolition of the Taliban, led them to add to their struggle against 
the “external enemy,” the United States, a struggle against the “inter-
nal enemy,” Saudi Arabia.
Finally, there has been considerable debate on the organi-
zation of al-Qaida. Some commentators regard it as a loose 
network with no central command structure. This evaluation 
may apply more to al-Qaida on the international than on the 
local level. For, although it is not clear how the Saudi “cells” 
are linked, the information available from the three official 
lists points to a hierarchical organization. It seems clear that 
the QAP had a leadership, a propaganda and a sharia com-
mittee, as well as subordinate military cells. This structure 
suffered, however, severe blows during the first clampdown. 
The ensuing disarray within the movement could account 
for the diversity in tactics, ranging from suicide bombings of 
foreign resident compounds to bombings of state buildings, 
to the random killing of foreigners in the street. To what ex-
tent the network is still able to mobilize its sympathizers is a 
moot point, but it seems unlikely that the attacks in Jedda in 
December 2004 concludes the series clashes with the Saudi 
state.
 
Politics
Since May 2003 Saudi Arabia has been 
the scene of an armed confrontation between 
al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP) and 
the State. The Saudi authorities issued three 
lists of suspects who were either wanted or 
already killed. These lists provide some insight 
into the background of QAP members and 
the nature of the organization.1
Jihadi Opposition
in Saudi Arabia
Roel Meijer is Lecturer at the Radboud University Nijmegen and Postdoctoral 
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 Note
1. The information herein was collected from 
Arabic newspapers and corroborated with 
the information gathered from Sawt al-Jihad, 
the web-publication of QAP.
Politics
Substantial changes have taken place 
in the last few years in Saudi Arabia, 
especially within the local political-
intellectual field. Significant among 
these is the rise to prominence of a 
group of “Islamo-liberals,” who are 
“made up of former Islamists and lib-
erals, Sunnis and Shiites, calling for a 
democratic change within an Islamic 
framework through a revision of the 
official Wahhabi religious doctrine.”1 Although not all have given as 
much importance to religious criticism as they have to political criti-
cism, the critique of Wahhabism—in its political, social, and religious 
aspects2—has undoubtedly been one of the mainsprings of this new 
trend. That is not to say that this phenomenon is completely without 
precedence in Saudi Arabia: certain doctrinal aspects of Wahhabism 
had, at times, come under attack by prominent ulama from al-Hijaz 
and al-Hasa provinces and—though less commonly—from “dissident” 
ulama from the Najd region, the birthplace of Wahhabism. However, 
the word “Wahhabism” itself was not long ago nearly completely taboo. 
The few critiques that surfaced came mostly from Saudis belonging to 
peripheral geographical or religio-po-
litical groups, and these moves were 
always isolated. What we have today 
is quite different: the critique of Wah-
habism—which is now often bluntly 
called by this name—has gained 
ground. It touches upon all aspects of 
the Wahhabi tradition, and even comes 
from within Wahhabism’s own ideolog-
ical and geographical core.
Critical trends
Among the non-Shiite3 critical 
trends, the first includes Saudi liber-
als, such as writer and political analyst 
Turki al-Hamad, who for decades had 
denounced social manifestations of Wahhabism, such as the religious 
police or the ban on women’s driving. This group has, in the post-9/11 
climate, considerably sharpened its criticism and clearly indicated their 
enemy by name. Secondly, a group of young and daring intellectuals—
Mansur al-Nuqaidan and Mishari al-Zayidi being the two best known—
have taken advantage of the Islamic credentials inherited from their 
Islamist past in order to develop an Islamic critique of Wahhabism. 
Through a series of articles they have denounced “the excesses of the 
Wahhabi doctrine,” notably drawing an explicit link between it and the 
jihadi violence experienced by the country since May 2003. Thirdly, 
some Islamic thinkers have, since the mid-1990s, formulated a salafi 
critique of Wahhabism. Hasan al-Maliki, the most prominent among 
these, castigates the doctrinal rigidity of Wahhabism and its tendency 
to slavishly imitate Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Ibn Taymiyya, rather than to 
create thoughts on the basis of what are, in his view, genuine Salafism 
tenets. Abdallah al-Hamid shares al-Maliki’s belief that Wahhabism has 
only become a caricature of true Salafism and calls for a return to the 
latter. This is a condition which becomes for him the theoretical basis 
of his pro-democracy activism. Lastly, a fourth kind of critique has ap-
peared which could be called a Wahhabi critique of Wahhabism. One 
of its champions is Islamist lawyer and political activist Abd al-Aziz al-
Qasim, who insists on the internal plurality of the original Wahhabi tra-
dition as it has developed over the past 250 years, and believes that he 
can revive some of its most tolerant aspects. 
Governmental backing
What is even more unprecedented is 
that the Saudi government has partly 
subscribed to these critical trends and 
has taken a number of preliminary steps 
towards—though not yet political—but 
at least social and religious reform. The 
organization in June 2003 of the first 
national dialogue conference in which 
thirty ulama belonging to all the con-
fessional groups present in the kingdom’s territory—Wahhabi and non-
Wahhabi Sunnis, Sufis, Ismaili, and Twelver Shiites—participated was a 
clear move in that direction. This conference led to the adoption of a 
charter containing a set of “recommendations.” Some of these can be 
considered as a severe blow to the Wahhabi doctrine: first, the charter 
acknowledges the intellectual and confessional diversity of the Saudi na-
tion, which is contrary to traditional Wahhabi exclusivism; second, it criti-
cizes one of Wahhabism’s juridical pillars, the principle of sadd al-dhara’i' 
(the blocking of the means), which requires that actions that could lead 
to committing sins must themselves be prohibited. It is notably in pursu-
ing this principle that women are denied the right to drive in Saudi Ara-
bia. Furthermore, none of the figures of 
the official Wahhabi establishment were 
invited to attend the conference, which 
obviously denotes a willingness to mar-
ginalize them. In addition, the fact that 
the government-controlled press has 
recently opened its columns to the Is-
lamo-liberals’ religious criticism clearly 
reflects a degree of official support for 
it. It is also worth noting that there have 
been some improvements on two cru-
cial socio-religious issues: the status of 
women, whose economic role has of-
ficially been acknowledged and who 
have been given a voice in the national 
dialogue, and that of the Shiites, who 
have recently witnessed a relative loosening of the restrictions imposed 
on their religious practice.
It therefore seems that part of the ruling elite now acknowledges the 
necessity for a revision of Wahhabism. The reasons for this go far be-
yond the American pressures on the kingdom. It 
has indeed become clear that only such a move 
would permit the creation of a true Saudi nation, 
based on the modern and inclusive value of citi-
zenship—a reality still missing and much needed 
in times of crisis. However, the sticking point is 
that this ideological shift must go hand in hand 
with a radical reformulation of old political alli-
ances both at home and abroad. And therein lies 
the problem.
S T É P H A N E  L A C R O I XThe critique of Wahhabism has gained 
unprecedented momentum in Saudi Arabia in 
recent years. First formulated by a small group 
of prominent liberal and Islamist intellectuals, 
it seems to have received the approval of at 
least part of the ruling elite who have taken 
a few official steps towards socio-religious 
reform. But is Saudi Arabia ready to enter 
the era of Post-Wahhabism?
Post-Wahhabism
in Saudi Arabia?
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2. “Wahhabism” initially refers to the religious 
tradition developed over the centuries by 
the ulama of the official Saudi religious 
establishment founded by the heirs of 
Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. It is 
however commonly used in Saudi Arabia 
in a broader meaning, encompassing its 
social and political implications. 
3. Shiite critique on Wahhabism has a long 
history given the antagonism between 
the two. Currently the Saudi Shiite reformist 
intellectuals, as part of their strategy of 
conciliation with the regime, are careful 
not to publicly make direct attacks on 
Wahhabism.
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The critique ... 
even comes from within 
Wahhabism’s own ideological 
and geographical core. 
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Religious pluralism in Latin America 
has grown steadily since the second 
half of the twentieth century. Embed-
ded in a broad spectrum of syncret-
istic Catholicism which incorporated 
various Amerindian beliefs and prac-
tices, communities first began to join 
the movement for liberation theol-
ogy. The second and more diverse 
trend has been to move away from Catholicism altogether and join 
a variety of Protestant denominations. In Mexico, and especially in 
Chiapas, a new facet of religious pluralism is emerging: the spread 
of Islam.1 
Muslims in Mexico
Although the Muslim community in Mexico is quite small (about 
1,000 members which means about 0,001% of the 97,5 million inhabit-
ants of the country), the panorama is already showing considerable di-
versity: There are roughly equal numbers of Muslims of foreign origin 
(mainly Lebanese and Syrian) and Mexican converts. Centro Cultural 
Islámico de México (CCIM), a Sunni organization headed by Omar We-
ston, a British convert to Islam, is active in several big cities of north-
ern and central Mexico. It has established a da‘wa (call for conversion) 
centre near Mexico City with the aim of offering a place for recreation, 
prayer and learning. Shi’a Muslims, for their part, number only a few 
dozen and most of them are diplomats from Lebanon, Syria and Iran. 
Apart from the CCIM there is a Sufi order called Nur Ashki Jerrahi in 
Mexico City which is headed by two women, Shaykha Fariha and Shay-
kha Amina, whose beliefs and practices are considered by many to be 
a fairly unorthodox mixture of Islamic and New Age-like mysticism 
and feminism. A second and larger community of Sufis founded by 
Mohammed Nafia, a Spanish convert 
from Granada, exists in San Cristóbal 
de las Casas (Chiapas). This commu-
nity is attached to the transnational 
Murabitun Movement which consists 
almost exclusively of recent converts, 
mostly from European backgrounds. 
The Murabitun movement
The Murabitun Movement was founded in the 1970s by Shaykh Abd 
al-Qadir as-Sufi al-Murabit, a Scotsman also known by his former name 
Ian Dallas. It has since spread from its base at the “Norwich Academy” 
in Britain, to other parts of Europe, Africa, the United States, Southeast 
and Central Asia, and Australia. In Germany for example there are two 
groups in Freiburg and Potsdam, known as Islamische Gemeinschaft 
in Deutschland and linked to the Weimar Institut, which publishes the 
newspaper Islamische Zeitung.2 The principal aim of the Weimar Insti-
tut is to promote studies about the relations between Western cultural 
heritage and Islam—this also explains why Goethe is an important 
point of reference. 
The Murabitun belong to the Darqawi order founded in Morocco at 
the end of the eighteenth century. Their name alludes to the Almoravid 
dynasty which ruled the Maghrib and Spain in the eleventh century. In 
general, the Murabitun have a rather negative public image and have 
been accused of both fundamentalism and Nazism. It has been alleged 
that they want to re-establish the caliphate in Europe and recover al-
Andalus, that their “aggressive” missionary activities deliberately con-
centrate on regions with intense social conflict (e.g. Chiapas, Chechnya, 
and eastern Germany), that their shaykh has personal ties with neo-
Nazi groups, and that their ideology and discourse contain strong fas-
cist and anti-Semitic ideas.3 Their financial sources have been reported 
as being obscure and connected in 
some way to Malayasia and Dubai. 
On their own websites the Murabi-
tun themselves promote adherence to 
a lifestyle based on the rules by which 
the Prophet governed Medina as 
transmitted by Imam Malik, and, most 
important, autonomy from and boy-
cott of the capitalist banking system 
and its usurious practices which are 
held responsible for the fall of the last 
caliphate. This means that in the long 
run all trade should function on the 
basis of dinars and dirhams and correct 
zakat should be restored. Till then, they 
offer a system of e-dinars on the inter-
net (www.e-dinar.com), and within their 
communities try to avoid paper money 
which is considered haram (forbidden). 
Murabitun discourse, especially that of 
the shaykh himself, is often marked by 
a rather aggressive critique of Western 
hegemony, positivist science, and capi-
talism, and contains overtly anti-Semit-
ic expressions. 
The new Muslims of Chiapas
The Spanish Murabitun community, 
the Comunidad Islámica en España 
(www.cislamica.org)—based in Grana-
da, Spain, where it helped finance the 
Minorities & Migration
Conversion to Islam has been taking place in 
the conflict-ridden Mexican state of Chiapas 
for about ten years. Islam was introduced to 
the local indigenous population by members 
of the transnational Murabitun movement 
who founded a commune in the town of San 
Cristóbal de las Casas, governed by its own 
rules and protected strictly against outsiders.
Conversion & Conflict
Muslims in Mexico
Cathedral of 
San Cristóbal
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Minorities & Migration
Albaicín mosque inaugurated in July 
2003—has the strongest ties to the 
Mexican community. The Spanish mis-
sionary Mohammed Nafia, now emir 
of the Comunidad Islámica en México, 
arrived in the Mexican state of Chiapas 
shortly after the Zapatista uprising. 
After some unsuccessful attempts at 
converting members of the Zapatista 
movement, he managed to convince 
Domingo López Angel, the leader of a 
Protestant organization whose mem-
bers or their parents had been expelled 
from their homes in nearby San Juan 
Chamula by Catholic traditionalists, to 
convert to Islam and join the Murabi-
tun movement. Members of this com-
munity now live in the poorest areas of 
San Cristóbal.4 
Religious conflicts such as those that led to the expulsion of the 
Protestants of San Juan Chamula are unfortunately quite common in 
Chiapas—the least Catholic state of Mexico (only about 64% of the 
whole population) and the most religiously plural one. This pluralism 
is reflected in the life stories of many Chiapanecs who have already 
experienced various conversions, in most cases first from Catholicism 
to Protestantism and then to different denominations within Protes-
tantism. The Council of Indigenous Representatives of the Highland of 
Chiapas(CRIACH) was founded due to the vulnerability of the expelled 
Protestants in order to defend their rights, but it also plays a significant 
role in local politics. 
Although CRIACH now also includes people of mixed descent, the 
expelled Protestants are predominantly Tzotzils and Tzeltals. So too 
are those who have converted to Islam in San Cristóbal. The reasons 
for conversion to Islam are numerous: some converts reported the tax 
demanded by the Protestant churches as their motivation for conver-
sion. Others, in particular women, have noted the experience of com-
munal living (see below), especially the exclusive space for women, the 
feeling of protection provided by the headscarves, a more harmonious 
family life, mainly due to the prohibition of alcohol, a better economic 
situation, and a change in status relations among the Murabitun in 
which age is more important than ethnic group or gender. Family ties 
also play an important role as a motivation for conversion in the case 
of indigenous converts—frequently the conversion of the head of the 
family leads to the conversion of its other members, although some 
conversions have also led to the disruption of the family.
Today the Murabitun of San Cristóbal form a community of about 
200 indigenous and non-indigenous Mexicans as well as other Latin 
American and European (mostly Spanish) converts living together in a 
commune which includes a a Quranic school, a kindergarten, and work-
shops for carpentry and tailoring (www.islammexico.org.mx). They also 
own two pizzerias, one in the centre of town and the other in nearby 
Comitán, where the menu is tailored to the tastes of the (numerous) 
tourist clientele, with the aim of obtaining economic autonomy. The 
indigenous converts to Islam are expected to acquire Western food 
habits, adopt Muslim names, and, in the case of women, to wear head-
scarves. Polygamy is allowed and practiced by a few men, but only on 
condition that they can give all their wives equal economic and emo-
tional care. Linguistically, the Mexican converts are gradually switching 
from Mexican to Peninsular Spanish.5
Community conflicts 
The Murabitun community split in 1999 over the issue of disrespect 
for indigenous culture, authoritarianism of the leadership, the practice 
of polygamy, and pressures on families to give up their land and take 
their children out of school. The small number of families who aban-
doned the Murabitun, but maintained their allegiance to Sunni Islam, 
received some financial support from the aforementioned CCIM. Con-
flicts have also arisen with Mexican state authorities and the Spanish 
embassy, especially since 11 September 2001 and 11 March 2004 (date 
of the terrorist attack on the Madrid train), the main problems being 
the residence permits for the Spaniards and suspicions concerning 
money laundering and connections to the Zapatista liberation move-
ment in Chiapas and the Basque separatist organization ETA. The local 
and national media also criticize the 
Murabitun, accusing them, for exam-
ple, of exploiting the converts as un-
paid workers in their businesses. The 
emir Mohammed Nafia is said to have 
been imprisoned in Spain and the US 
for his alleged Islamist activities and 
to have offered money and weap-
ons to the Zapatistas in exchange for 
their conversion. At the same time the 
media provide the Murabitun with the 
opportunity to disseminate their views 
about, for example, the US war in Iraq. 
The community in San Cristóbal has 
been portrayed as suspicious, espe-
cially towards journalists, and of pros-
elytizing quite aggressively, urging in-
terested outsiders to say the shahada 
soon after their first contact with the 
community. After converting, the new members are said to be pressu-
rized to really give up every aspect of their pre-Murabitun life, includ-
ing contacts to non-Muslim family members, public school attendance 
of the children, and their Mayan culture in case of the indigenous com-
munity members. 
The radical attitude of the community as well as its closed nature 
are in sharp contrast to other Sufi orders, e.g. the aforementioned Nur 
Ashki Jerrahi, but fit well into the image of the Murabitun movement. 
On the one hand it seems to be attractive especially for Europeans pre-
cisely because of its Sufi teachings that focus on the spiritual awaken-
ing of the individual and the feelings of security, harmony, and peace 
which communal living seems to promise. On the other hand, the po-
litical nature of Murabitun ideology, observed mainly on their websites 
and in the discourse of the shaykh and other prominent figures, also 
seems to have consequences for local communities, precisely because 
their leaders implement this ideology through strict rules and try to 
protect their communities against outsiders. Of course this also has to 
do with the current hostility towards Islam in the West (and Mexico is 
no exception), but in the case of Chiapas the situation is further compli-
cated by the political and religious conflicts in the region. Explanations 
for the success of Islam in San Cristóbal and especially among indig-
enous people by social scientists working in the area mainly concern 
the favourable environment of San Cristóbal because of its high level of 
religious diversity—besides Catholics and Protes-
tants there are also Buddhists, Hindus, and differ-
ent New-Age-groups due to the influx of tourists 
and dropouts—and the high receptivity of local 
people to all forms of religion and communal liv-
ing. Their “conversion careers” are seen by some as 
a kind of natural evolution from their “polytheist” 
variant of Catholicism with its multitude of saints 
via Trinitarian Protestantism to monotheist Islam. 
But they might also point to a pragmatic attitude 
towards religious affiliation, leading to further 
questions about the advantages of conversion 
to Murabitun Islam especially for this section of 
Mexican society.
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It has been alleged that 
[the Murabitun]… 
deliberately concentrate 
on regions with intense 
social conflict. 
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Every fashion season, fashion catwalks 
in Paris reunite American and Middle 
Eastern clients. In January 2003, only a 
few months before the outbreak of war 
in Iraq, a surprise awaited them at the 
exit from the catwalks. An alternative 
catwalk was set up with four models 
wearing four Afghanian-inspired bur-
kas: the Power-burka integrating in its 
design the American flag, the Faces of Dictators displaying portraits of 
political figures of the moment from president Bush and Tony Blair to 
Saddam Hussein and the King of Jordan, the Trailed-dress in camou-
flage colours, and the Petition-dress inviting signatures for peace on its 
white surface. When asked about her choice, Majida said: “everybody 
knows that at the Chanel catwalk for example, many Middle Eastern 
and American socialites are present. So, if they can be together and get 
along on that occasion, why can’t they do it when it implies the lives of 
their own people?” 
In France, however, the law promulgated in February 2004 reduces 
the meaning of the veil to a unique interpretation: the veil is the osten-
sible sign of a religion (Islam). In October 2004 the communist mayor 
of Montreuil gave a municipal edict forbidding an announced fashion 
show reserved just for Muslim women. The reasons claimed were the 
following: the integration of the veil in a fashion discourse “presents 
the danger of banalizing” this object, and the proposed event is gender 
segregated, that is, against the principle of Republican inclusion. The 
first reason denotes the anxiety of some parts of the French public in 
facing the possibility of exploring meanings of the veil other than those 
assigned by the new law. The same anxieties were transparent in July 
2004 when Majida Khattari organized her latest exhibition “VIP (Voile 
Islamique Parisien)” at the School of Beaux Arts in Paris. The artist at-
tempted to “open an alternate venu in a conversation that has been ar-
tificially polarized towards the extremes. Both positions, that of Islamic 
fundamentalists and that of Republican integrationists, are damaging. 
There are no nuances allowed in this discussion.” Using the same artistic 
modes of expression, Majida Khattari organized a catwalk for both men 
and women wearing veils: a statement that subverted religion, gender, 
and fashion meanings. Thus, there were black chadors bearing the in-
scription “Tchador j’adore”—in refer-
ence to Dior’s publicity campaign—but 
also veils in silk printed with the VIP 
logo imitating LV (Louis Vuitton) logo 
and replacing the small characteristic 
signs with the crescent moon and the 
hand of Fatma. The enthusiasm of the 
host institution decreased in the month 
preceding the show (scheduled during 
the fashion week) to such an extent that they refrained from sending 
out the invitations. 
The gaze
It seems that the relation between the colonial powers and the colo-
nized Muslim territories are almost always intermediated by the veil. 
In France’s case, the veil was successively the obsessive object whose 
removal would mark the success of the “civilizing process,” the fetish 
of the colonial enterprise, and, later on, the apple of discord in metro-
politan France. On the streets of Paris, a woman wearing a headscarf 
attracts attention; the veiled woman leads one immediately to think 
about Islam. Majida Khattari’s artistic work makes visible this complex 
texture of significations intricately woven between fashion and the veil. 
Fashion catwalks are forms of expression that exemplify the ideal-type 
of the modern subject formation: the individual is presented as monad, 
displaying the marks of her/his possessive identity (gender, class, eth-
nic, or age-based, even if sometimes subverted). Fashion practices ap-
pear as the herald of the perfect modernity in which the individual is 
the product of her/his own (un-)informed choices displayed upon the 
body, while the body is the vehicle of this representation in the public 
sphere. The veil is a troubling discord in this logic since it indicates a 
presumed space of lack of choice (that is, an alternative mode of sub-
ject formation). 
There is more into the sidewalks of Paris than circulation of people. In 
fact, Paris as we know it emerged in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, the period of the consolidation of the secular state. The re-
construction of nineteenth century Paris was made possible by, and 
closely followed, the rules of visibility where the streets became the 
place of display of the newly established social order. The streets were 
enlarged and rebuilt in such a way that allowed the eye ac-
cess to every corner. They also allowed the better display 
and circulation of commodities, as well as that of the forces 
of order. The street space was invested with political symbol-
ism. In this manner secularism became engrained in and by 
a specific spatial (architectural) configuration that privileges 
flow, visibility, and transparency. Thus, the veil dispute in 
France is less about Islam, and more about the disruption 
of the seeming free flow of the gaze which thereby implic-
itly questions the underlying visual principle of citizenship 
formation. 
It is interesting to observe that not only Muslim women 
wear the veil. Islam in France, unlike fashion, is not a legiti-
mate instance of women’s control. The veil is perceived as 
re-instituting a private realm in the public, and a religious 
dimension in the secular space.
Minorities & Migration
This article explores the work of Majida 
Khattari, a Parisian/Moroccan artist whose 
fashion catwalks /performances challenge 
taken-for-granted assumptions about the veil. 
In the context of increased interest in Modern 
Islam, she proposes an aesthetic approach 
towards the intersection between Muslim and 
European forms of expression.
The Veil and Fashion 
Catwalks in Paris
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J’adore Tchador, 
a garment by 
Majida Khattari, 
was presented 
at the VIP 
catwalk in Paris, 
July 2004.
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Minorities & Migration
The islands of Hawaii are known for 
gathering people from all corners of 
the world who have developed an en-
compassing culture enabling them all 
to live in relative harmony. Japanese, 
Chinese, Hawaiian, Filipino, Indone-
sian, Malaysian, European American, 
Brazilian, African American, Samoans, 
and many other cultures intermingle in 
Hawaii through the media of language 
(English pidgin), food, and familiarity with each other’s history. Differ-
ent cultures accept a give-and-borrow attitude among each other with-
out necessarily feeling a loss to the essence of their own identity; this is 
what makes Hawaii’s culture appealing and workable for its residents. 
Muslims constitute part of that cultural mix: the Muslim Association of 
Hawaii estimates that about 3,000 Muslims live in the state of Hawaii. 
Visitors to the islands should not be surprised to find female Muslims 
wearing hijab while playfully snorkeling at Hanauma Bay, alongside 
their male Muslim friends who might be surfing on Waikiki beach, or 
watching an Army Muslim Chaplain running in the morning exercise 
at Schofield Barracks Army base with his platoon carrying a crescent 
flag representing Islam. The reason is that Hawaii’s Muslim community 
is truly ethnically diverse, evidence of which can be found at the state’s 
single mosque attached to the Manoa Islamic Center in a suburb close 
to the University of Hawaii’s main campus. Turks, Indonesians, Yemenis, 
Pakistanis, Palestinians, Indians, Egyptians, African Americans, Euro-
pean Americans, Chinese, Japanese, Tunisians, Moroccans, and Malay-
sians, among others, meet there for Friday prayers. Potluck meals pro-
vide a social occasion for additional, gender-segregated gatherings. 
While the women pray in a separate room from men they can still view 
the prayer leader (imam) through a closed circuit television. For some, 
this conservative atmosphere is welcome, while for others it reinforces 
undesirable cultural customs originating from some of the home coun-
tries rather than strictly Islamic requirements. 
Conflicts in community building
Hawaii’s Muslim community offers the perfect human lab to test the 
belief that the Muslim community (ummah) must be united regardless 
of individual ethnic background. Yet, based on the case of the single 
mosque in Hawaii, Muslims appear to have been unable to build a local 
umma within the larger Hawaiian social community. Many members 
of Hawaii’s Muslim community identify multiple conflicting cultures in 
the Islamic Center as one of the reasons they do not communicate ef-
fectively. Language serves as the principle initial barrier, as many Ha-
waiian Muslims choose to speak their native language, rather than the 
common language of English. Secondly, some fear that by interchang-
ing cultural traditions and customs they risk jeopardizing their closely 
held ethnic identity. While mosque members meet for social events 
such as potlucks, the unspoken norm is to stick to one’s own ethnic 
group; and there is generally a sense of individual members competing 
to maintain their own ethnic roots by refusing, or lacking the will, to 
learn the customs and traditions of others.
Members of the different ethnic groups also tend to hold strongly 
to their own “local” beliefs that may contradict another group’s be-
liefs. For example, Arab Muslims and Indian Muslims engage in eter-
nal disagreements about whether or not the hijab is a divine require-
ment or a personal choice, and whether men and women must be 
segregated in social events. This multicultural environment could 
have promoted healthy discussions, education, and learning among 
the different Muslim ethnic groups leading to bridges of understand-
ing; but it does not seem to happen. Instead, members get branded as 
either right or wrong, or conservative or liberal. Where is the midway? 
Why are Hawaii’s Muslims not able to 
surpass communicative difficulties for 
the sake of the umma, which suppos-
edly everybody has such a genuine 
desire to build? Perhaps they have 
conflicting definitions in the first place 
of what an umma is, or ought to be. 
For many of Hawaii’s Muslims, de-
veloping a sense of belonging to their 
community is important. Because of 
Hawaii’s geographic location, cost of living, and lifestyle, many of these 
Muslims do not settle in Hawaii permanently. Hawaii also has a relative-
ly large number of Muslims serving in the US military, whose members 
must periodically relocate to other duty stations. Muslim civilians who 
know that they are eventually moving back to the US mainland are not 
eager to invest considerable 
amounts of time and money 
into the community or its 
physical infrastructure. All 
of these factors contribute 
to a sense of fractured and 
apathetic community. One 
of the results of such apathy 
is the absence of a full time 
Islamic school,or an ongo-
ing youth program. Indeed, 
while some families are opt-
ing for assimilation, others 
prefer to move back to the 
continental United States, 
or respective homelands, for 
more spiritual and commu-
nal support. 
Muslim residents in Ha-
waii can learn from Hawaii’s 
historical lessons of accept-
ance. What makes the islands 
of Hawaii such a hospitable 
gathering place to many dif-
ferent cultures is the princi-
ple of cultural exchange that 
allows knowledge, under-
standing, and acceptance of 
difference. The Japanese, indigenous Hawaiians, Portuguese, Chinese, 
Filipinos, and many others achieved this communal spirit by creating, 
for example, an English pidgin language so as to communicate better 
with one another. Building cultural bridges over ethnic and linguistic 
divides promotes compassion towards each other. Accordingly, par-
ticular Muslim ethnic groups should not aim to impose their cultural 
beliefs on the others: intolerance within mosque communities creates 
in turn intolerant Muslims within the umma. Muslims in Hawaii would 
be better off understanding and respecting each other first before de-
manding to be understood and respected by non-Muslims. The same 
condition applies to Muslims worldwide. 
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One often reads about the larger Muslim 
communities in California, Michigan, and New 
York, but rarely has the opportunity to know 
about the Muslim community in Hawaii. Despite 
Hawaii’s rich cultural mix and accommodation 
of Asian and Pacific ethnicities, Hawaiin 
Muslims do not appear to have successfully 
built a harmonious community within  
the larger Hawaiian society.
Mona Darwich-Gatto is a graduate student in the Department of Sociology, University of 
Hawaii at Manoa.
Email: M_darwich@yahoo.com
Conflicts Among 
Hawaii’s Muslims
A family 
stationed in 
Oahu, Hawaii
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B E S H A R A  D O U M A N I Be careful what books you buy or bor-
row from the library. The Department of 
Homeland Security, under the terms of 
the Orwellian-named Patriot Act, could 
monitor you. A further provision of that 
law threatens criminal prosecution of 
anyone alerting you to government in-
spection of your selections. 
Be careful what readings you assign 
in your classes. The University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill was sued by the 
American Family Association Center for Law and Policy for assigning a 
brief introduction to Islam for incoming freshman students. Fortunately, 
the University held firm and the Court of Appeals dismissed the suit de-
spite additional attacks by local politicians and some university trustees. 
Be careful what articles you accept for publication. The U.S. Treasury De-
partment’s Office of Foreign Assets Control declared in February of 2004 
that American publishers cannot edit works authored in nations under 
trade embargoes which include Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Libya, and Cuba. The 
consequences are fines up to a million dollars and jail terms of up to ten 
years. 
Be careful what you teach. In the fall of 2003 the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives unanimously passed Resolution 3077 to establish an “Advi-
sory Board” to monitor area studies centers in order to ensure that they 
advance the “national interest.” While the law would apply to all centers 
funded under the federal Title VI program, the target is clearly the nation’s 
seventeen centers for Middle East Studies. The Association of American 
University Professors (AAUP), the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 
the Middle East Studies Association (MESA), and most professional organ-
izations have raised alarms about this unprecedented government inva-
sion of the classroom. Among their concerns are the Board’s sweeping 
investigative powers, lack of accountability, and makeup, as its members 
would be comprised, in part, from two agencies with national security 
responsibilities. If HR3077 is passed by the U.S. Senate a government-ap-
pointed investigative body would be allowed to police the classroom by 
deciding, for example, what constitutes a “diverse” or “balanced” lecture. 
This would effectively replace professional academic standards with arbi-
trary political criteria.
Be careful what you say in class or off-campus. The American Council 
of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA) founded by Lynn Cheney (spouse of Vice-
President Dick Cheney) and Joseph Lieberman (Democratic Senator and 
former vice-presidential candidate) issued a report entitled, “Defending 
Civilization: How the Universities are Failing America and What Can Be 
Done about it,” which accuses universi-
ties of being the weak link in the war 
against terror and a potential fifth col-
umn. A list of 117 “Un-American Profes-
sors” was posted on the organization’s 
website with the offending statements 
they allegedly made. 
Be careful if you apply for funding from 
the Ford or Rockefeller foundations. You 
will be asked to sign new standard grant 
letters which require you and your or-
ganization, in the case of Ford, not to 
promote or engage in “violence, terror-
ism, bigotry or the destruction of any 
state.” Those familiar with public debates 
on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict long 
before September 11 will instantly rec-
ognize the code of this new language. It 
should come as no surprise to them that 
those changes were made in response to 
criticisms from—and then in consulta-
tion with—several Pro-Israel Jewish or-
ganizations upset at the fact that some 
of the human rights groups that cen-
sured Israel at the Durban Conference 
in South Africa had received funds from 
the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. 
One of the problems with this language 
is that the terms are not defined. Would 
a lecture advocating the right of Islamist 
organizations, such as Hizbullah, to participate in the Lebanese political 
system be construed as promoting terrorism? Would research that argues 
in favor of the establishment of a bi-national state in Israel/Palestine in-
stead of a two-state solution, be accused of promoting the “destruction” 
of a state? Elite universities such as Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Cornell, Co-
lumbia, Stanford, the University of Pennsylvania, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, and the University of Chicago have objected to this lan-
guage, prompting some minor changes to it. So minor, in fact, that the 
ACLU, the major civil rights organization in the U.S., recently turned down 
a one million dollar grant from Ford and a $150,000 grant from Rockefel-
ler. The ACLU press release stated that it was “a sad day when two of this 
country’s most beloved and respected foundations feel they are operat-
ing in such a climate of fear and intimidation that they are compelled to 
require thousands of recipients to accept vague grant language which 
could have a chilling effect on civil liberties.”
Be careful if you criticize Israeli government policies. National “Take Back 
the Campus” campaigns by privately funded organizations are targeting 
students and faculty connected academically or culturally to Muslim and 
Middle Eastern countries. Some of these organizations openly recruit 
students to inform on their professors and fellow students who are then 
“outed” under the charge of anti-Semitism. This is not simply a rhetorical 
battle: many professors who have been falsely accused were subjected to 
humiliating and damaging investigations by their own universities and 
the media. Major donors have been mobilized to pressure university ad-
ministrators, leading the president of Harvard University, for example, to 
issue a statement that effectively equates criticism of Israeli policies with 
anti-Semitism. 
Be careful if you are a non-U.S. citizen who is going to the U.S. to teach 
or study. Your visa could be revoked if you have views critical of U.S. poli-
cies as illustrated by the case of Professor Tariq Ramadan. Barriers to the 
entry or re-entry of non-US citizens based on political “profiling” (selective 
implementation of new policies depending on one’s national/ethnic/re-
ligious background) have disrupted aca-
demic programs and sharply lowered 
the number of foreign graduate stu-
dents in the U.S. The home institutions 
of those who do get visas are required 
to monitor these students and submit 
regular reports to government agencies. 
All these policies put into question the 
entire international component of U.S. 
academia.
The meanings of academic 
freedom
Are the dark clouds hovering over 
academic life in the United States a 
passing storm, albeit with “Islamic ter-
rorism” replacing communism as the 
source of evil and danger, or are they 
harbingers of long-term structural 
Education
Academic freedom in the United States is facing 
its most important threat since the McCarthy era 
of the 1950s. In the aftermath of 11 September 
2001, government agencies and private 
organizations have been subjecting universities 
to an increasingly sophisticated infrastructure 
of surveillance, intervention, and control. In the 
name of the war against terrorism, civil liberties 
have been seriously eroded, open debate 
limited, and dissent stifled.1
Academic Freedom 
Post-9/11
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We are at a crossroads and 
need to think carefully 
about how to reconfigure the 
concept and praxis of 
academic freedom.
Education
changes in the political economy of the production of knowledge in 
the age of empire? And what are the best strategies for protecting and 
enhancing academic freedom? These two questions raise many oth-
ers such as: What are the legal structures, philosophical foundations, 
ethical practices, and political meanings of academic freedom? When 
and why did this concept emerge, and how have the ways it has been 
understood and practiced changed over time? How have institutions of 
higher education been transformed in terms of sources of funding, or-
ganizational structure, overall mission, academic programs, and social 
composition of the faculty and the student body? What is the relation-
ship between areas studies and language acquisition, on the one hand, 
and the perceived needs of government agencies, on the other? What 
organizations, groups, and political forces are behind the current at-
tacks on academic freedom and what are their goals? 
Developing the best strategies for defending academic freedom de-
pends on how this concept is understood and on what legal sources it 
draws. For example, is academic freedom primarily an individual right 
based, as most have come to believe and expect, on the First Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution which enshrines the right of 
free speech? Or is it an institutional prerogative of private institutions 
having to do with a specific understanding of employer/employee re-
lations? Robert Post, author of the Academic Freedom language for 
the University of California system and a leading member of the AAUP 
Committee on Academic Freedom, argues for the latter view. Just like 
justice is best advanced by judges who are employees yet have the 
right to freely exercise their judgment according to the law, not the 
whims of the government, knowledge as a public good is best served 
by the unfettered pursuit by faculty of three key areas of their work: 
research and writing, teaching, and to a lesser extent, extra-mural 
speech. In this scheme of things, professional academic standards and 
norms constitute the shield that protects this freedom while internally 
regulating and constraining it.
The invocation of professional norms may indeed be the most effec-
tive immediate defence, but what about public universities, students, 
the right of free speech outside of campus, and the epistemological 
problem of how norms are defined? If professional norms have a his-
tory, then academic freedom is the product of ongoing critical scru-
tiny and reinterpretation of the norms themselves combined with an 
ethical practice that negotiates between multiple norms in contesta-
tion with each other. As Judith Butler has argued, it is important to 
deconstruct and historicize the notion of professional norms in order 
to provide greater freedom for extramural political speech so that the 
lines between areas of expertise and political commentary, between 
individual rights and institutional prerogative, and between the public 
good and the institutional autonomy, are not too rigidly drawn. Under 
the pragmatic rational of “social benefit” of the free pursuit of knowl-
edge, the U.S. Supreme Court issued several decisions that have made 
academic freedom an important part of the First Amendment, but only 
when it comes to public institutions. Considering the fairly brief history 
of academic freedom in U.S. Constitutional law, the very conservative 
make-up of the current Supreme Court, and the increasing weight of 
“security considerations” during a time of war, the very same pragmatic 
bent can undermine hard earned freedoms.2 
Since the Second World War, institutions of higher learning have radi-
cally changed: universities are no longer the preserve of a tiny elite, 
nor limited to the classical curriculum of liberal arts and the sciences. 
The “multi-versity” of today is home to a much larger and more diverse 
student body and its mission has expanded to serve a stunningly wide 
range of intellectual, research, and service objectives. At the same time, 
universities have become much more dependent on donations from 
wealthy donors, on joint ventures with corporations, and on govern-
ment funds for research projects and academic programs. In the cur-
rent economic environment, most are starved for resources and ad-
ministrators are much more vulnerable to the myriad ways in which 
outside forces are reshaping the landscape of intellectual production. 
Political engagement by faculty and students is essential if they are to 
have a say in shaping the demographic, economic, and institutional 
transformation of higher education. 
Of war and peace
It is no accident that the issue of academic freedom was thrust into 
the limelight after 11 September 2001. The two authoritative state-
ments on academic freedom in the United States were both articulated 
by the AAUP one year after the outbreak of major wars. The first was 
the 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic 
Tenure. The second was the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic 
Freedom and Tenure. In the aftermath of 11 September the Bush admin-
istration declared a “war against terror.” Unlike previous wars, however, 
this one is not against specific countries or regimes, but against an ill-
defined enemy to be pursued everywhere with no end in sight. It is also 
the first global war in the information age, and a deeply unpopular one 
everywhere except in the United States and Israel. Consequently, it has 
to be discursively won and re-won on a daily basis by dominating the 
framing of debate and by stifling dissenting voices. 
We are at a crossroads and need to think carefully about how to 
reconfigure the concept and praxis of academic freedom so that it can 
serve just as well in a world where war and systematic misinforma-
tion campaigns are the norm and where peace and the free pursuit of 
knowledge the exception. At stake is the continuation of the academy 
as the bastion of informed, independent, and al-
ternative perspectives crucial to a better under-
standing of the world we live in. If teachers and 
students cannot think and speak freely, who can?
 Notes
1. This article is based on issues raised at a 
University of California, Berkeley conference 
in February 2004 under the title “Academic 
Freedom After September 11.” See the 
forthcoming edited volume by B. Doumani, 
Academic Freedom After September 11 (Zone 
Books).
2. This and the following paragraph are based 
on Philippa Strum’s legal history of First 
Amendment cases and Kathy Frydl’s study 
of the institutional transformation of the 
University of California system, both of 
which address in very concrete terms the 
theoretical and legal issues raised by Post 
and Butler (in Doumani, forthcoming).
Beshara Doumani teaches history of the modern Middle East 
at the University of California, Berkeley. He is the editor of Family 
History in the Middle East: Household, Property, and Gender (State 
University of New York Press, 2003). He would like to learn more 
about academic freedom issues outside the U.S.
E-mail: bdoumani@berkeley.edu.
Free speech 
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N A B I L  A L - T I K R I T I Times are hard for professors in Iraq 
today—very hard. Since the US/UK “co-
alition of the willing” invaded the coun-
try in March 2003 and forcibly evicted 
the country’s sovereign government, 
an estimated 10-15% of Iraq’s 16,500 
instructors spreads across some 20 uni-
versities have left the country. In addi-
tion to facing bitterly disappointed ex-
pectations of US institutional support 
in the past 20 months, professors have 
been forced to cope with widespread 
looting, targeted violence, campus 
politicization, and institutional uncer-
tainty. Although some actors remain 
optimistic about a future for a higher education sector liberated from a 
stifling and highly centralized state control, most remain apprehensive 
about the same sector liberated from sources of funding, professors, 
and campus civility.
Times were not always so bad. Iraq’s universities were a proud part of 
the national patrimony from the 1950’s to the 1980’s, and were widely 
considered among the region’s best throughout this period. Observers 
recall a vibrant and exciting 1970’s, when the university sector engaged 
in international research ventures, published top-flight in the humani-
ties and the sciences, surveyed the country’s unrivalled archaeological 
sites, catalogued Iraq’s impressive manuscript holdings, and sent its best 
graduates to earn Ph.D.’s at the foremost research universities in Europe 
and North America. Many of those internationally educated graduates 
returned home in the 1980’s and provided the scientific expertise need-
ed to build the state’s advanced arms programmes in that time of war. 
Although the growth and elaboration of higher education continued 
through much of the 1980’s, the twin effects of state Saddamization 
and compulsory fiscal restraint during the long and difficult Iran-Iraq 
War began to sap the energy and vibrancy of the universities. By the 
end of the decade, the good times had clearly passed as state monitor-
ing of campus politics began to negatively affect retention of academic 
talent. Yet, by the war’s end education professionals could still hope to 
be optimistic about a long-waited post-war future.
The beginning of the end for Iraqi higher education dates to the gov-
ernment’s ill-advised hostile takeover of Kuwait in 1990. After the in-
ternational community mobilized to enforce the illegality of an unpro-
voked and unsanctioned invasion of one sovereign country by another, 
Iraq found itself facing a crushing sanctions regime and hefty reparation 
requirements vis-a-vis Kuwait. Iraqis initially expected to endure a few 
months of financial difficulty until the UN Security Council disarmament 
protocols could be carried out. Instead, the sanctions regime continued 
for nearly thirteen years, primarily due to US and UK insistence. 
Trapped in a formerly affluent society now forced to prioritize pro-
curement of basic necessities, Iraq’s universities faced gradual decline 
throughout the 1990’s. Higher education suffered not only from inter-
nationally enforced neglect, but the sector also found itself physically 
and intellectually cut off from the rest of the world. Under sanctions, 
international exchanges ended completely, journal subscriptions were 
prohibited, high technology purchases were forbidden, and spare 
parts for previously purchased equipment were halted. Famously, even 
pencils were embargoed due to the “dual use” capability of lead. Com-
bined with the continuing strictures on intellectual curiosity spring-
ing from an increasingly apprehensive 
and insecure authoritarian ruling elite, 
many of the country’s most talented 
academics found the situation un-
bearable and emigrated. An estimated 
10,000 instructors left the country in 
the 1990’s.1 In spite of such adversity, 
those professors who remained man-
aged to maintain academic standards 
through increasingly desperate forms 
of improvisation. For example, in order 
to keep up with scientific advances, 
medical school instructors annually 
obtained from Jordan a single copy 
of relevant medical textbooks, which 
were then provided to photocopiers for class distribution. Although 
scientific research ground to a halt, university instruction continued. 
Looting strips the campuses
The final coup de grace for Iraq’s academe occurred in the chaos 
which followed the fall of the Ba‘athist government in April 2003. Ex-
pressing anger, frustration, and consternation about a suddenly fallen 
state sector, various elements took privatization of government insti-
tutions—like universities—into their own hands with a wave of mass 
lootings. It has been suggested that officials carried out some of the 
looting to erase a contentious past. Although that may be true for sev-
eral sensitive state facilities, the university looters seem to have largely 
consisted of urban poor. While the effect of the looting was spread 
unevenly throughout the country, the damage to many facilities was 
devastating. Various library facilities were looted and/or burned, as 
were much of the holdings of such cultural repositories and research 
institutions as the Baghdad Museum, National Archives, Awqaf Library, 
Iraqi Academy of Sciences, and Bayt al-Hikma. The looting of campus 
offices destroyed much of the institutional memory of Iraq’s universi-
ties. Student records, personnel records, faculty files, and many other 
sorts of records which provide the “nuts and bolts” of education admin-
istration were lost — as they were in so many other sectors.2 To Iraqis, 
the looting of April 2003 was only the most recent act of a long-term 
conspiracy to “keep Iraq down” rather than an unfortunate example of 
“stuff happening” when an authoritarian regime collapses. As one Iraqi 
saying had it when the government fell and the former president dis-
appeared, “now the student has left—and the master has arrived.”
University life in occupied Iraq
Iraqi professors, students, and administrators had reason to hope that 
their situation might improve. Unfortunately, the period following the 
establishment of the US/UK occupation can largely be characterized as 
“one step forward, two steps backward” and has only served to confirm 
Iraqi suspicions concerning US motives. The anticipated reconstruction 
support from US institutions never materialized on a scale capable of 
restoring the tattered glory of Iraq’s universities due partly to policy 
choice, and partly to circumstance. 
The Iraqi Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research has cal-
culated that $1.2 billion is needed for university rehabilitation. Against 
that need, the ministry has been allocated approximately $20 million in 
benefits from USAID contracts awarded to American universities, and 
$20 million from other international donors.3 Not only is that amount 
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face an uphill struggle to maintain standards 
following years of sanctions and months of 
social chaos. Although some may remain 
optimistic about a future free of centralized 
ministerial oversight and autocratic 
governance, many more feel bitterness for 
the lack of international support offered since 
the beginning of the US/UK invasion and 
subsequent occupation. As with so much of 
post-war Iraq, the higher education sector is 
yet another area where US military, political, 
and bureaucratic intervention has proven more 
damaging than revitalizing. 
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tiny compared to the estimated required amount, it is also a drop in the 
bucket against the $18.6 billion total funds approved by the US Con-
gress for Iraqi reconstruction in November 2003. In one sense, it has 
made little difference—only an estimated 20% of such reconstruction 
funds had been disbursed by June 2004 in any case.4 
From the beginning, US administrators allocated funding in accord-
ance with short term US interests rather than long-term Iraqi interests. 
The Republican party apparatchiks sent by the Bush Administration 
to staff the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) did the best they 
could, but the strictures of neo-conservative policy goals designed to 
“spread democracy” seriously undermined any efforts to remedy the 
situation at hand. For example, it was felt to be of the highest priority 
to ensure that every primary school student in the country received 
new textbooks, complete with USAID-approved re-interpretations of 
Iraqi, Arab, and Islamic history. Combined with a widely-advertised 
initiative to leave no primary or secondary school unpainted, the pre-
university sector received an estimated 7-8 times more funding sup-
port than higher education from the US government and the World 
Bank—betraying a prioritization of the mass indoctrination of Iraqi 
youth through new textbooks over the restoration of Iraq’s regional 
pre-eminence in higher education.5
As with other Iraqi state assets, there was briefly some discussion of 
setting up private “international” educational institutions to compete 
with, and perhaps supplant, state higher education facilities. How-
ever, like so much else that has been envisioned since the spring of 
2003, this idea has yet to materialize beyond a couple of pilot efforts. 
These institutions, the “American Liberal Arts University of Iraq” in Arbil 
and the “College of Democracy,” are both located in Northern Iraq and 
are closely identified with former CPA Higher Education Advisor John 
Agrestos. 
Another priority of US administrators appears to have been provid-
ing corporate welfare to US companies in the form of reconstruction 
contracts. This mode of funding has so far led to a uniquely American 
brand of corporate corruption, whereby US taxpayers pay top dollar 
to US companies for basic jobs like painting primary schools. In turn, 
the US companies hire local subcontractors at pennies on the dollar 
to physically fulfill the contracted work. The leakage implied in such a 
contracting protocol would rival any patronage system of the type rou-
tinely condemned by World Bank and IMF investigators in less wealthy 
societies. Although this sort of structure has been somewhat less in 
evidence in the higher education sector than in other sectors, the over-
all effect has been to bleed the US economy while robbing Iraqis of 
sovereignty over their own institutions. 
One of the most damaging CPA decisions concerning the universi-
ties sprung from the wider US goal of “de-Ba‘athification.” In May 2003, 
newly-appointed CPA head Paul Bremer announced a comprehensive 
policy of de-Ba‘athification for state employees above the middle 
ranks. Even prior to Bremer’s announcement, Iraqi public opinion—and 
a couple of targeted assassinations—forced many unpopular campus 
Ba‘athist apparatchiks into hiding. However, after this wide-ranging de-
cree, public education institutions found themselves robbed of much 
of their best talent, as CPA advisor and education commissar Andrew 
Erdmann oversaw the expulsion of an estimated 1,400 university in-
structors for Ba‘ath party membership.6 Although many of these pro-
fessionals were later rehired, the institutional damage has been con-
siderable.
Research professionals associated with the former government’s 
weapons development programme found themselves detained by US 
officials in prison camps. The most notable example is Amer al-Sa‘adi, 
an Iraqi scientist who became famous before the war for denying, ac-
curately, that Iraq had any weapons of mass destruction (WMD). An-
ticipating a quick release once Iraq’s lack of WMD became known, Dr. 
al-Sa‘adi turned himself in to US forces immediately after Baghdad’s 
fall. He remains in detention, and repeated calls for his release through 
an international petition drive led by his German wife, who survived 
the August 2003 Canal Hotel bombing while arguing his case to UN 
officials, have to date failed to sway US authorities. 
In addition to the physical damage endured in the wave of looting 
and the staff depletion caused by Bremer’s decree and other US ac-
tions, the universities have faced serious issues of campus and personal 
security. Since March 2003, at least 200 academics have faced violent 
attacks, the fate of 75 kidnapped instructors remains unknown, and at 
least 14 professors have been murdered in a targeted fashion. In light 
of such danger, it should come as no surprise that an estimated 1,600- 
2,000 university instructors have left the country.7 Those professors re-
maining behind have been obliged to face the inevitable politicization 
of campus life that followed the collapse of a system designed to care-
fully channel political energies towards centrally-mandated goals for 
more than a generation. Campuses quickly became arenas for intense 
political competition between groups affiliated with various factions of 
the Iraqi political scene. While public political discussion was a welcome 
change for many in the new order, such politicization has proved dis-
ruptive to campus civility and intimidated many. A recent academic visi-
tor from Jordan was warned against visiting campuses because there 
were “spies” who might inform on the stranger’s presence. 
Against all odds, Iraq’s university staff carries on: physical plants have 
been repaired, new structures of institutional 
governance have been established, and library 
collections have been re-organized with the addi-
tion of some book shipments. However, such ac-
tivities continue in the face of a shoestring budg-
et, meagre international support, and a myriad of 
security problems. The combination of staff short-
fall and financial constraints has grown so dire in 
recent months that 134 Ph.D. programmes have 
been eliminated throughout the university sys-
tem.8 As a sign of just how precarious the security 
situation has become for government officials, 
the Ministry of Education was hit by a car bomb 
in the first week of November 2004. In light of all 
the obstacles, in some sense it is remarkable that 
higher education continues at all in Iraq. The fact 
that it does is a tribute to the courage and pride 
of Iraq’s educators.
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 J O H A N N E S  G R U N D M A N N Since 9/11 the United States has put 
pressure on several Muslim majority 
states to introduce extensive curricu-
lum changes to prevent the further 
spread of extremist Islamist ideas. In 
2003 Donald Rumsfeld spoke of a “war 
of ideas” and connected this expres-
sion with his perception of religious 
schools in the Islamic world as hot-
beds of Islamist terrorism. In addi-
tion, the US administration criticized 
official school and university cur-
ricula as being partly responsible for 
the spreading of radical ideas among 
Muslim youth. Some observers argued that this line of criticism was 
far too general because it ignored that the role of religion in the ed-
ucation system varies from country to country. Others pointed out 
that the most extremist ideas are circulated by writings available in 
bookshops found almost all over the Islamic world while normally not 
included in official curricula.
Arab responses to American demands
Official reactions to American demands were crystallized by the Direc-
tor General of the Islamic Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisa-
tion (ISESCO) Abdalaziz al-Tuwaijri, who admitted certain shortcomings 
in policies on education, but rejected any link between the present school 
curricula and terrorism.1 But this position did not reflect actual political 
practice. Although it would go beyond the scope of this article to offer a 
detailed explanation of the complex connection between curricula and 
extremism, it is certainly true that states such as Yemen, Egypt, Jordan, 
Saudi Arabia, and most other GCC member states started to work on the 
assumption that a direct link actually existed. These states had realised 
that future economic aid and/or cooperation in other important fields 
would depend on their willingness to reform their curricula. Those states 
that dealt with moderate Islamism through integration (Jordan, Kuwait, 
Yemen) were aware that such measures 
would have a negative impact on their 
relationship with Islamist opposition 
groups. Curricula had been an issue of 
internal controversies in several Islamic 
states before 9/11, but the pressure the 
US now put on national governments 
led to an increased public interest in 
educational reform within the Islamic 
world. Moreover, the unexpected West-
ern attention to school curricula added 
an almost global visibility to these con-
troversies.
The Arab world responded in vari-
ous ways to the American demands. 
In 2001, Yemen began to supervise the 
subjects taught at religious schools of 
the Islamist Islah party. At the same time, the government refused to 
restrict the autonomy of al-Iman University which had aroused Ameri-
can suspicion. All proposals to replace the curricula in use at al-Iman 
University by those of sharia departments at national universities were 
consequently blocked. In Kuwait, the government presented a strategy 
to reform the national education system in 2004, which involved a new 
structure of primary and secondary education. The Islamist opposition 
viewed this project as a prelude to even more fundamental changes, 
which would massively reduce their influence on schools, universities, 
and ministries. As a result, the mere suggestion to integrate faculties of 
Sharia into faculties of Law was enough 
to create a storm of indignation. The 
most extensive public discussion so far 
has taken place in Saudi Arabia where 
almost all sections of society have 
participated in a debate about the 
pros and cons of educational reforms. 
While many voices support the idea of 
educational reforms in principle, and 
acknowledge that new methods of in-
struction are absolutely inevitable, the 
American demands are seen as an at-
tack on national sovereignty.2 
Islamists and educational reform in Jordan
In Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing, the Islamic 
Action Front party, quickly lead the opposition to a project known as mas-
fufat as-salam3 (an educational plan to promote peace) which had been 
prepared by the Ministry of Education and was put before the Jordanian 
parliament in the spring of 2004. According to state officials, the masfufa 
was meant to bring the Jordanian educational system into line with glo-
bal trends that encourage the spread of justice, tolerance, and equality of 
opportunities. Over a period of several years, concepts and ideas concern-
ing topics such as human rights, civil society, and inter-religious dialogue 
would be inserted into textbooks dealing with Arabic language and lit-
erature, Islamic education, national culture, and contemporary history. 
Whereas many teachers either welcomed or prepared to accept the 
planned changes, Islamists categorically rejected them, citing as their 
reasons aversion to external interference in Jordanian life in general 
and disapproval of foreign influence on the national education system 
in particular. Using the masfufa to propagate their political message, 
they equated the concept of thaqafat as-salam (culture of peace), 
which is of crucial importance to the masfufa, with thaqafat al-istislam 
(culture of surrender). The masfufa as a whole was presented as the 
result of foreign interference aimed at the consolidation of the Ameri-
can and Israeli positions in the region 
by undermining the religious identity 
of Middle Eastern Muslims. The Islam-
ists put forward that the liberation of 
Palestine was not explicitly mentioned 
in the new curricula and that some 
contents were in contradiction to the 
basic principles of Islam. Some Islam-
ists also pointed out that textbooks 
had already been changed more than 
once since the signing of the peace-
treaty between Israel and Jordan in 
1994. Moreover, the American criticism 
was perceived as part of a globaliza-
tion process exclusively shaped by 
the West. In this context, the UNESCO, 
which had helped to realise a number 
of educational reform projects in the Islamic world long before 9/11, 
was presented as a key element of American and Israeli foreign policy. 
From the very beginning the Islamists sought to co-operate with other 
political forces such as nationalists and traditionalists. Ishaq al-Farahan, 
one of the leading moderate Islamists and a former Minister of Education, 
proposed that the curriculum be modified to reflect thaqafat muqawa-
mat al-ihtilal (a culture of resistance to occupation) rather than thaqafat 
as-salam (a culture of peace). Although terms such as thaqafat muqawa-
mat al-ihtilal and manahij al-muqawama (resistance curricula) unques-
tionably lack substance, some nationalists joined in and proposed the 
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of education systems in the Islamic world. 
The US government, in particular, has strongly 
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control and national educational curricula as 
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national governments and Islamist opposition 
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curriculum changes and educational reform.
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liberation of Palestine as a basic theme in any revised curriculum. At the 
same time, they used the debate to denounce what they described as 
thaqafat as-sulta (state culture/culture of power). Politicians, scholars, 
and intellectuals who supported the ideas behind the masfufa were 
thereby effectively subsumed under the banner of those in power. 
Despite their warning that the masfufa implies grave dangers for 
Jordanian society, Jordanian Islamists seem convinced they can at 
least partially counter its effects. In their opinion, identities cannot be 
changed by means of deleting or adding certain words and expres-
sions in the curriculum. Replacing a passage from the works of Maw-
dudi with a paragraph on Islamic art, for example, will not achieve the 
intended goal. The influential Egyptian Muslim Brother, ‘Isam al-‘Iryan, 
likewise stated in an interview with a Jordanian Islamist weekly that 
family and mosque were as important to a true Islamic education as 
the school, and emphasized that they needed further attention in the 
light of current events.4 Jordanian Islamists also compare the present 
situation of external interference and internal opposition to the con-
text which led to the anti-normalization campaign directed against all 
efforts to strengthen political, economic and cultural co-operation be-
tween Jordan and Israel. Despite the existence of a ratified peace treaty 
most contacts have been reduced to a minimum. 
At the same time, Jordanian Islamists share the fears of their counter-
parts in Kuwait. The Muslim Brotherhood’s decision to cooperate with 
the state in most areas, which has characterised domestic politics since 
the foundation of the Hashemite Kingdom, definitely paid off in the 
field of education. They were allowed to establish their own schools 
and managed to occupy important posts at the faculties of Sharia. In 
addition, they placed their members quite skilfully inside the Ministry 
of Education so that they were able to influence the development of 
official curricula. Members of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood also 
worked as advisers to ministries of Education all over the Gulf region. 
But in the nineties some Islamists occupying important positions in the 
field of education were replaced due to conflicts between the govern-
ment and the Islamist opposition. Most of these conflicts were directly 
related to the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel. Jordanian Islam-
ists are now in great anxiety that their influence will be systematically 
reduced in the course of the anticipated reforms. The public debate on 
curricula changes is obviously far from over. The Jordanian Ministry of 
Education indicated that the implementation of the masfufa would not 
start before 2005/2006 so as not to obstruct the current debate which 
is intended to bring about a national consensus. 
Educational reform in Jordan and much of the broader Arab world is not 
only about the future contents of textbooks, but also about those who 
teach the texts and, above all, about those who define the basis of educa-
tion policy. Faced with the current situation, the states concerned have 
to think about the future role of moderate Islamists in national educa-
tion systems as a whole. As a result internal opposition will increase even 
further, whereas external pressure will not stop until new strategies and 
plans are actually implemented. National governments find themselves 
in a dilemma. On the one hand, it is true that the integration of moderate 
Islamists has often served as an element of political and social balance 
in periods of crisis. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the current 
debate on educational reforms is directly linked with Western interests 
and to a number of Middle Eastern Middle trouble spots, which leaves 
national governments little room for manoeuvre. 
Although there is no indication that the strategic 
choice of integration will be completely revised 
in the light of the current controversies, it is hard 
to imagine that a national consensus on new cur-
ricula is still within reach. The question is whether 
effective educational reforms can do without such 
a consensus.
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A S H W A N I  S A I T H They can’t break or occupy my words!
We do not seek to be victims, nor do we 
seek to be heroes — all that we want is 
to be ordinary.
Mahmoud Darwish is a poet, the na-
tional poet of the non-existent state of 
Palestine, and the voice of a silenced 
people who are homeless at home and 
refugees in their own country. He also has the unquestioned stature of 
an Arab poet of the first rank. “Many people in the Arab world feel their 
language is in crisis; and it is no exaggeration to say that Mahmoud 
is considered a saviour of the Arab language,” says Subhi Hadidi, the 
Syrian poetry critic. At his readings in Cairo or in Damascus, Darwish 
draws people in the thousands, though he has said, “I like being in the 
shadows, not in the light.” At one recent reading in Beirut, over 25,000 
people turned up in a football stadium. Inevitably, the audience includ-
ed doctors and workers, housewives and professionals, taxi drivers and 
academics. This wide appeal and intense bond between the poet and 
his people goes beyond ephemeral politics or literary fashion, and is 
rooted in the ongoing upheavals, exclusions, and oppressions that are 
being so widely experienced in contemporary times in the region, but 
above all, in occupied Palestine.
Fiercely independent, Darwish has continually struggled for the Pales-
tinian homeland. He remains an implacable opponent of the Israeli oc-
cupation. But he, like the late Edward Said, is also scathingly critical of 
an Arab continent “fast asleep under repressive regimes,” where soccer 
seems to have replaced Palestine as the Arab passion.2 As a poet, he is 
critically acknowledged for the sheer beauty and technical virtuosity of 
his work. Its power lies in its lyrical simplicity, musicality, beauty, and liter-
ary quality. Although recognised as a Palestinian poet, he does not wish 
to gain praise arising from any motive of solidarity; even in the late 1960s 
he wrote, “we want you to judge us as poets, not as resistance poets.”
The identity of a poet
The identity of Darwish as a poet, however, is inextricably entwined 
with that of the struggles of the Palestinian people. Living as a poet in a 
state of human bondage, his creativity, his imagination, and the images 
and meanings that his words carry, are all mortgaged to the reality of 
Palestinian “unfreedom.” His poetry, with its inseparably interwoven 
themes of love and struggle, is itself manifestly a hostage to this incar-
ceration. When I first read his justly famous gentle lines to his mother, I 
must confess that each thought, phrase, string of words, came to me as 
a yearning for the caressing embrace of Home.
With a thread that trails from the back of your dress
…
I am old
Give me back the star maps of childhood
So that I
Along with the swallows
Can chart the path
Back to your waiting nest.  
[extract]
And so it surely must have spoken to 
every Palestinian, or any other of a 
mother born. Ironically, in contrast 
to the feelings his words evoke, Dar-
wish laments: “Sometimes I feel as if I 
am read before I write. When I write a 
poem about my mother, Palestinians 
think my mother is a symbol for Pal-
estine. But I write as a poet, and my 
mother is my mother. She’s not a sym-
bol. “Mother” was a poet writing a simple confession that he loves his 
mother, but it became a collective song. All my work is like that. I don’t 
decide to represent anything except myself. But that self is full of col-
lective memory.” For Darwish, the search is for freedom from this hand-
cuffing of the poetic imagination as much as his life: “The subject of 
occupation itself becomes a burden,” he says in anger. “I want, both as 
a poet and as a human being, to free myself from Palestine. But I can’t. 
When my country is liberated, so shall I be.”3 
His poetry gives power to the tired and forlorn, to revive, restore, and 
relive the imagined mobile space called home; to feeling the pain of 
being cut to the quick by the jagged mirrors of memory, to excavating 
emotions put away and buried in long-locked caskets. It is a poetry of 
loss, of desolation, of doomed efforts, but significantly also of truth, hope, 
reconciliation. On an open palm, Darwish offers a key. The dehumanizing 
of the other in the imagination can perhaps be all too easily explained 
or condoned in the context of the lives that are being sucked into the 
vicious vortex of violence. But even while Darwish recognises the long 
roots of anger, irrigated red by each new cycle of suppression, he also 
transcends these barricades, without denying them or making them in-
visible, through a simultaneous recognition of the mutuality of traumas, 
confusions, as also of mutual aspirations of coexistence and peace.
In bidding farewell to Edward Said, his age-long friend, fellow travel-
ler, and visionary, Darwish returned to the early days: “time was less 
wild then … We both said: if the past is only an experience, make of 
the future a meaning and a vision … Let us go into tomorrow trusting 
the candour of imagination …”4 The idealism persists. Darwish takes a 
brave stand for dialogue—for standing up, facing, engaging, embrac-
ing the understandings, perceptions, perspectives of the other—for 
the washing away of the gruesome grime of violence and the now-
blackened congealed stains of hurt through a mutual recognition of 
truths in the full glare of the denied rights and recent history of the 
Palestinians. The case for the Palestinian homeland must be compre-
hended and accepted through such osmosis. Not many have walked 
this difficult path. 
Several of Mahmoud Darwish’s books have been translated into He-
brew, and he has written several tender nuanced portraits of his Jew-
ish friends and lovers. In March 2000, the Israeli education minister 
proposed that some of his works be included as an optional part of 
the multi-cultural school curriculum—but Israeli polity was adamantly 
hostile and apparently not ready to open Israeli youth to the words of 
the other. When Israeli occupation forces ransacked the Sakakini Cul-
tural Centre, from where he edits the highly regarded quarterly literary 
review Al-Karmel, his and his fellow poets’ manuscripts were trampled 
under foot. “I know they are strong and can invade and kill anyone. But 
they can’t break or occupy my words.” His is the defiant voice of the 
silenced that can be heard above the chatter of politicians and the clat-
ter of gunfire.
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Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish was the 
recipient of the Prince Claus Fund Principal 
Award for 2004. The ISIM, in cooperation with 
the Prince Claus Fund, Bak, and the NCDO, 
organized a poetry reading in Amsterdam at 
29 November 2004. Indian economist Ashwani 
Saith introduced Darwish and pondered on 
the meaning of his poetry to migrants and 
people everywhere.1
Mahmoud Darwish
Hope as Home in the Eye 
of the Storm
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I long for my mother’s bread
My mother’s coffee
Her touch
…
And if I come back one day
Take me as a veil to your eyelashes
Cover my bones with the grass
Blessed by your footsteps
Bind us together
With a lock of your hair
been wrenched from their roots and thrown one way or another and 
the upheavals continue apace. The African continent, alas, illustrates a 
parallel experience on a panoramic scale. New places become, or must 
become, home; and old homes become, or must be made to become, 
memories like fading, cherished photographs. But few of these trans-
formations have been voluntary. Violence, homelessness, the loss of 
identity, the struggle for survival where life is demolished and has to 
be reconstructed each day in the eternal quest for the holy grail that 
is dignity: unfortunately but unquestionably, this condition of denial 
afflicts large swathes of populations. Darwish speaks of, to, and for, this 
lost estate of humanity. “Exile is more than a geographical concept. You 
can be an exile in your homeland, in your own house, in a room. It’s not 
simply a Palestinian question.” 
Mahmoud Darwish, you are right! Eternal exile, 
who ticket-less travels the worlds, your imagina-
tion your wings, invisibly defying fortified bor-
ders, with no identity card, no gleaming polymer-
ized passport, with little more than your scribbled 
verse as your visa—Mahmoud Darwish, you are 
so right!
I come from There and remember…
I have learned and dismantled all the words 
to construct a single one: Home
Recently, Mahmoud Darwish organ-
ized a delegation of eminent writers, 
including some Nobel laureates such 
as Wole Soyinka, to visit Palestine and 
see for themselves the realities of the 
occupation. This is how he ended his 
welcome address to them in Ramallah: 
“We have an incurable malady: hope. 
Hope in liberation and independence. 
Hope in a normal life where we are nei-
ther heroes nor victims. Hope that our 
children will go safely to their schools. 
Hope that a pregnant woman will give 
birth to a living baby, at the hospital, 
and not a dead child in front of a mili-
tary checkpoint; hope that our poets 
will see the beauty of the colour red in 
roses rather than in blood; hope that 
this land will take up its original name: 
the land of love and peace…”
 
The universal appeal of 
the poet and Laureate
The Prince Claus Fund in the Nether-
lands bestowed their Principal Award 
for 2004 on Mahmoud Darwish. In se-
lecting Asylum and Migration as the 
theme for year 2004, the Prince Claus 
Fund expressed its desire to draw pub-
lic attention and reflection to the positive contributions of migrants to 
host societies. Underlying its choice, perhaps, was a latent motivation 
to challenge the negative labels and images that have recently been 
imposed by parts of the media and political spectrum on migrant com-
munities in Europe, including the Netherlands. At present, xenophobic 
and Islamophobic prejudices are increasingly being purveyed as pseu-
do political commentaries. In parts of Europe girls wearing headscarves 
can with impunity be denied entry into a restaurant, shameful targets 
are being set by governments for the annual deportation of asylum 
seekers and illegal immigrants whose cheap labour is openly exploited 
in the economy in full public gaze, and politicians who declare Islam to 
be an intrinsically retarded faith are lionized and have their statues put 
up in city centres.
In words which could well reflect the sentiments of Prince Claus him-
self, the Prince Claus Fund declares that in making its awards, “special 
attention is paid to what are called zones of silence, areas where people 
are deprived by political or economic circumstances of the opportunity 
for free cultural expression.” The hapless Palestinian people are trapped 
in such a zone of silence; a silence broken only by the spiteful spitting 
of guns that kill, by the snarling of tanks that crush, by vengeful slo-
gans for mutual retribution, and by the refrain of mourning mothers 
and the wailing of fresh widows. In this deafening, despairing zone of 
silence, to what does one turn for recovering the self and re-human-
izing the other? To poetry, says Mahmoud Darwish: “Poetry and beauty 
are always making peace. When you read something beautiful you find 
coexistence; it breaks walls down…”5 
Yet who am I to write about Mahmoud Darwish, this poet of the first 
rank? What temerity, what presumptuousness from one who has not 
published a single line of verse. I speak with the soul of one about 
whom Darwish writes, to whom his words come alive as if he were 
whispering them in my ear, notwithstanding that irrelevant geographi-
cal detail that I am an Indian, not Muslim, and illiterate in Arabic. The 
Palestinian camps are as old as I, and I wonder how, and how long, I 
might have survived there. My parents were themselves refugees, 
subjects of an early episode of ethnic cleansing, so I was conceived in 
Lahore in Pakistan but born in Delhi, one of midnight’s children. They 
were in the prime of their youth then. Now they are fragile octoge-
narians, still hankering, moist-eyed, after that Lahore that they loved 
and remember, and that was and remains “home” to this day. Likewise, 
nearly half a century later, my Kashmiri wife, her elderly parents, and 
family have all been cleansed out of their home and homeland, the 
valley of Kashmir, that heaven on earth that daily endures unearthly 
forms of hell. Since that time, the countries and peoples of the sub-con-
tinent have not been kind to each other, and whole populations have 
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29 November 
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Ashwani Saith is Professor of Economics at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, and 
Professor of Development Studies at the London School of Economics.
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 Notes
1. A slightly different version of this article was 
published under the title, “Hope as Home in 
the Eye of the Storm: A Tribute to Mahmoud 
Darwish Recipient of the Prince Claus Fund’s 
Principal Award for 2004,” in Prince Claus 
Fund Journal, no.11:37-42.
2. Maya Jaggi, “Poet of the Arab World: 
Mahmoud Darwish,” Guardian, June 8, 2002. 
3. Spoken to William Dalrymple, see Guardian, 
G2, October 2, 2002.
4. In one of their conversations, Said exhorts 
Darwish: “Now, don’t forget: If I die before 
you, my will is the impossible!” in Mahmoud 
Darwish, “Edward Said: A Contrapuntal 
Reading,” trans. Mona Anis, al-Ahram Weekly, 
September 30, 2004, http://weekly.ahram.
org.eg/print/2004/710/cu4.htm.
5. Says Darwish, who advocates dialogue 
with Israelis, “I always humanize the other. 
I even humanized the Israeli soldier. I will 
continue to humanize even the enemy …,” 
cf. “A Soldier Who Dreams of White Lilies,” 
written just after the 1967 war.
L I L A  A B U - L U G H O D A good deal of literature, before and 
since the publication of Edward Said’s 
Orientalism and then Covering Islam, 
has taught us the myriad ways in which 
Islam has been represented negatively 
in the West. But long before the spec-
tacular and specular violence of the 
exploding World Trade Center in New 
York City, many countries in the Arab 
Middle East had within their midst Is-
lamist political groups that were op-
positional to the regimes in power. In 
Egypt during the 1980s and 90s, for example, there was a sharp sense 
in elite circles and a widespread discourse disseminated through popu-
lar media that the nation was in danger of being torn apart from within. 
The state was portrayed as facing a political-cultural crisis, one that it 
dealt with mostly by force—through arrests, executions, and the arbi-
trary powers of a continually renewed state of emergency. The problem 
was represented publicly as religious extremism. The villains were the 
members of Islamic groups.
In the early 1990s I embarked on an ethnographic project to under-
stand television’s place in the Egyptian national imagination and in 
the everyday lives of people who are somewhat marginal to the na-
tion—people who are neither middle class nor urban. I focused on the 
most popular genre of television programming, one for which Egypt is 
justly famous across the Arab world: the dramatic serial. Unlike soap 
operas, Egyptian serials are finite, consisting of 15 or 30 episodes, 
shown on consecutive evenings. And, because until well into the 1990s 
there were only a few television channels and first-run serials aired on 
only two of them, they were watched by a majority of the population 
and were often the subject of discussion in homes, and in the public 
sphere—in newspapers, magazines, and elsewhere. I was intrigued to 
find that television serials were often the vehicles for national debate. 
One of the big debates that television became part of in the mid-1990s 
was about what was called “extremism” or even “terrorism.” 
Television drama in Egypt in the 1990s reflected, if unevenly and 
with certain lags, concerns about the place of religion in society and 
nation. In keeping with its self-consciously pedagogical mission, it 
condemned, preached, and offered alternative models for the future. 
Accordingly, this research raised questions such as: Were television se-
rials effective in their missions of smoothing over the divisions that, 
in the name of religion, threatened the Egyptian national body? Did 
media management of religion help create national community? Did 
mass media participate in the configuration and reconfiguration of “re-
ligion” and “nation” in Egypt? How did media representations of Islamic 
groups and “terrorists” operate in a Muslim majority context where, un-
like in the West, the civilizational discourse of West and East could not 
be mobilized, Islamists or terrorists could only partially be represented 
as an outside enemy, and Islam could never be the alien other? 
Good and bad Islam
Beginning in the late 1970s the rising visibility on the streets of 
Cairo and provincial cities and towns of a self-conscious Islamic iden-
tity represented a phenomenon that was noticeable to everyone and 
troubling to some. The movement ranged from increased piety among 
educated youth to some more sensational acts of violence committed 
by militant Islamic groups. The broad piety movement and the wide-
spread feeling against cordoning off 
religion as a private matter of faith led 
television to capitulate to the desire for 
more religious programming and to try 
to appropriate for itself the role of sup-
porter of a legitimate Islam. 
In 1994, just after a new policy of 
confronting terrorism with media was 
announced, the serial The Family (al-
A’ila), was produced to great fanfare, 
and some controversy. Written by 
Wahid Hamid, it showed, in its assess-
ment by critics, how educated youth from disadvantaged backgrounds 
were drawn into terrorism, and how corruption was rife in these 
groups. Public opposition to the serial, not surprisingly, came from 
well-established moderate Islamist thinkers. In their jockeying in the 
press, both the moderate Islamist thinkers and government and televi-
sion officials tried to align themselves with the religious authorities of 
al-Azhar. The Islamists stressed the number of letters and phone calls 
al-Azhar had received, urging them to take action to get the serial off 
the air. Controversy over a scene in which the enlightened modernist 
protagonist challenged the extremist on the doctrinal basis of certain 
beliefs had led to calls to halt broadcast of the serial. The Mufti, the 
leading government religious authority, used the press to clarify doc-
trine and offer a set of phone numbers for the public to use if they had 
questions about religious matters. The Minister of Information, how-
ever, speaking about a television broadcast that followed the serial (a 
documentary in which Islamist prisoners spoke about the error of their 
ways), responded with a statement that points to the heart of the of-
ficial construction of religion. He said, “[T]here are repenters who speak 
with remorse and … discuss how it was that they came to …lose their 
faith in those erroneous ideas that led them to commit deviant terror-
ist activities…” Serials like The Family contrast the good, correct, and 
reasonable Islam of the people, the cultured and educated, al-Azhar, 
the state, and television with that of the bad, violent, misinformed, and 
twisted Islam of the extremists. 
Many television writers claim to be secularists—that is, to believe in 
a separation between personal piety and the state, a legacy of their 
intellectual and political formation in the Nasserist period of the 1950s 
and 1960s that pushed secular ideals. Yet, despite the objections of 
such prominent television personnel and their own relative silence on 
religion in their serials, Egyptian television continued to increase reli-
gious programming in the 1990s, adding to the popular shows featur-
ing Quranic exegeses by religious authorities big budget serials about 
the history of the Arab-Islamic world. These were broadcast alongside 
many more serials with plots or subplots about violent militants and 
serials explicitly about terrorism. There was good Islam and bad Islam 
and these judgments were made, ultimately, on the basis of how Islam 
related to the nation and social responsibility. They were not, as they 
might have been in the past, part of the struggle among religious au-
thorities. 
Restoring the honour of Upper Egypt 
For more than half a century, revenge killing, or the vendetta, has 
been in the national imagination the cultural trait most associated with 
Upper Egypt. The obsession of northern, urban, educated people with 
the horrors of honour feuds and their condemnation of Upper Egyp-
Arts & Media
Professor Lila Abu-Lughod delivered the ISIM 
Annual Lecture on 17 December 2004 at the 
Spiegelzaal, Utrecht University. She analyzed 
media portrayals of Islamism and religious 
extremism in popular Egyptian television 
dramatic serials and suggested that new media 
representations of Islamists, and the debates 
they sparked nationally, have contributed to 
reconfigurations of current notions of “religion” 
and “nation.” Below is an abridged version 
of her lecture.1
Local Contexts of
Islamism in 
Popular Media
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tians as backward and unenlightened 
can be found everywhere, from film 
to social science. Without denying the 
existence or importance of this prac-
tice to communities in the region, one 
must still be suspicious whenever a 
cultural trait is singled out and made 
to stand for a whole region or commu-
nity and one must be even more sus-
picious when such a region is mapped 
as a place of new forms of violence: in 
the 1980s and 1990s Upper Egypt was 
linked to religious extremism. 
However, a major shift occurred in 
the second half of the 1990s in televi-
sion representations of Upper Egypt. 
The most popular of the serials to 
represent Upper Egypt balanced the 
theme of revenge with that of authen-
tic values such as honour and integrity. 
The recent spate of serials set in Upper 
Egypt that depict positive qualities of 
the region are mostly the work of one 
writer, himself originally from Upper 
Egypt. Although based in Alexandria, 
Muhammad Safa’ `Amir makes much of 
the fact that he was born in an Upper 
Egyptian town not far from Luxor. 
Even those from the south single out 
his work as not stereotyping them negatively, describing his serials as 
realistic because they focus on their “true” characteristics: generosity, 
courage, honesty, and valour. What these serials suggest is that Upper 
Egyptians are part of the nation; they do not live in a closed society 
and do not constitute a backward or frightening “other.” The most im-
portant message is that they are by no means all religious extremists. 
Upper Egyptians, on the other hand, are being told through the serials 
that they have within their own traditions important values worth pre-
serving and nurturing, values that are social, cultural, and regional, not 
particularly tied to religion. In other words, their true identities are not 
as Islamists but rather as people with an indigenous regional nobility 
and code of honour. 
The attempts of the media to promote a culture stripped of religion 
may be even less healing of the torn civic body than its attempts to 
turn religion into a cultural system linked to the nation. This is because 
it bears little resemblance to local experiences. But insofar as regional 
values are offered as cultural ideals, the serials invoke a national frame, 
since regions are primarily defined by national territory. Upper Egypt 
only has meaning as a distinct region if understood as part of a larger 
Egyptian nation. And so again, the serials offer support for a united na-
tion and a placing of religion within that nation. 
Religion in a national public sphere
Recent work on Islamism and the history of Muslim reform in Egypt 
reminds us that mass media, from the press that flourished in the late 
nineteenth century to the television of the late twentieth century, is 
part of a distinct public sphere in which public intellectuals could de-
bate and discuss norms, policies, and the future of the community and 
civilization. Scholars have been concerned about what the outlines of 
this public sphere are and how the changing terms of debate and dis-
cussion are set.
The Egyptian intelligentsia who produce television, film, theatre, and 
literature must be understood as having a certain independence from 
the state and labouring to a large extent in their own cultural fields. 
Yet there are significant points of collaboration and convergence be-
tween intellectuals and the state today. Nasserism had contributed 
to the doctrine of a demarcation of separate spheres of religion and 
state, even if Islamic ideals were never completely purged from mo-
rality, pious practices continued in all classes, and various accommo-
dations were forged between state and religious institutions. What 
seems to be one of the outcomes of the debates in which television 
programs of the 1990s participated, is that religion has become once 
more an ideological hub of the public sphere, but now with a certain 
form of the modern nation-state so entrenched and established that 
“the nation,” and what is good for the nation, forms the only legiti-
mate ground for debates about religion. This is even so when viewers 
explicitly disagree with or criticize the representations of Islamists, or 
religiosity, that they watch. 
The airing of these serials ends up, in a variety of ways, revealing and 
exacerbating social cleavages, perhaps undermining the government’s 
and some secular intellectuals’ intentions of creating national commu-
nity by trying to discredit Islamists. This is mostly because television’s 
enthusiasm for circumscribing religious sensibilities in its serials rubs 
up against widespread convictions. However, one should not infer 
from these failures that television does not foster national community 
through its treatments of religious extremism. It does so indirectly, 
though, by appropriating for itself the role of a charged and popular 
arena for public discussion of and debate about Islam. The arena is na-
tional and in this way contributes to an ongoing sense of the nation as 
the critical frame for all aspects of life, including the religious. 
Even Egyptian television’s negative stereotyping of Islamists, however 
accepted or refused by the public, operates within and reinforces the 
frame of the nation. It never places the Muslim outside the frame; in-
stead it makes and sustains distinctions between good and bad Muslims. 
It also reflects on what place religious identity and observance should 
have in daily life and asks what role Islam should have in society at large. 
Even though some of the negative imagery used to represent Islamists 
in Egyptian television may be eerily similar to that which is becoming 
numbingly familiar in the West, the contexts of reception and the import 
of this imagery give it a fundamentally different meaning. 
Lila Abu-Lughod is Professor of Anthropology and Gender Studies,  
and Director of the Institute for Research on Women and Gender, Columbia University. 
E-mail: la310@columbia.edu
Filming of 
Egyptian TV 
serial, Al-Khalas
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 Note
1. The lecture by Lila Abu-Lughod was 
derived largely from Chapter 7 of 
her most recent book, Dramas of 
Nationhood: The Politics of Television in 
Egypt (University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
The full text of the lecture will also be 
available as an ISIM Paper.
K A M R A N  A S D A R  A L I In spring of 2003, the new private tele-
vision channel in Pakistan, Geo TV, cre-
ated some controversy by telecasting 
with much fanfare Mirza Hadi Ruswa’s 
early twentieth century Urdu novel, 
Umrao Jan Ada as its first serialized tel-
evision play. Umrao, one of the most ex-
pensive TV series produced in Pakistan 
with lavish sets and costumes, depicts 
the life and times of a mid-nineteenth 
century courtesan in Lucknow which was the seat of power for the Na-
wabs of Awadh in North India. Courtesans in Lucknow were recognized 
as the preservers and performers of high culture of the court.1 Courte-
sans held respect within the Nawabi court and young men of noble 
lineage were sent to their salons to learn etiquette, polite manners, and 
the art of literary appreciation. Yet they also provided sexual services, 
albeit to specific patrons, and were, therefore, not entirely considered 
part of the ashraf, the Muslim respectable gentry. 
The politics 
The courtesan (tawaif) has been a stock character in popular South 
Asian literature and movies. Indeed the “fallen woman” is universal in 
its appeal among readers of pulp and highbrow fiction. Yet in Pakistani 
films and literature the courtesan’s character remains intertwined in a 
morality play and almost always achieves a tragic end (mostly commits 
suicide), repents for her “wayward” behaviour or, extremely rarely, be-
comes a sharif bibi (respectable woman), which for a courtesan may be 
akin to a social death. In contrast, in Rusva’s novel the protagonist not 
only survives, but becomes a respectable poet and a wealthy patron of 
art without renouncing her past profession. In this sense the novel is 
unique in its empathetic treatment of courtesan culture. 
The last few years have seen the proliferation of several texts and 
documentaries that relate the stories 
and condition of courtesans and sex 
workers in present day Pakistan. Two 
among them are noteworthy: Taboo, 
a detailed ethnography of sex work-
ers in Lahore’s red light district by 
Fouzia Saeed (2002), and Tibbi Gallii, a 
documentary about the same district 
produced by Feryal Gauhar. Both are 
sympathetic portrayals and explicitly 
expound a feminist sensibility in their 
handling of their subjects. To allow for 
a wider readership, Taboo was recently 
translated from English into Urdu. Yet 
it primarily remains an academic text. 
Gauhar’s film has, however, not been 
widely distributed and has only been 
shown at select gatherings. These in-
terventions do put forward an argu-
ment for re-evaluating the space of sex workers in contemporary Pa-
kistani society; Geo TV’s initiative can be understood as an extension 
of this thematic interest in courtesan life by liberal intellectuals. This 
opening allows Geo to produce Umrao in a country where extra mari-
tal sex legally remains a crime against the state and where memories 
of severe punishment for sexual liaisons under the Hudood Ordinance 
of the Zia-ul Haq era in the 1980s still resonate among the populace. 
Unlike the modest reach of the above-mentioned academic works, 
Geo’s production brought courtesan life into domestic spaces (50 mil-
lion of 150 million Pakistanis have access to TV) as it also intervened 
into a debate on morality, sexuality, and gender politics in present day 
Pakistan. Why, one might ask, have Pa-
kistan’s liberal intelligentsia and femi-
nists chosen at this juncture to depict 
the life-world of the prostitute and the 
figure of the courtesan as metaphors 
to argue for sexual freedom and wom-
en’s autonomy?
The narrative
Umrao, set in mid-nineteenth century 
northern India, is the story of a young girl who is kidnapped and sold 
to a kotha (lit: roof or household, the courtesan’s salon) in Lucknow. 
Umrao grows up learning the skills of the trade with rigorous training 
in music, singing, dancing, poetry recitation, and the various etiquettes 
and idioms of courtesan life. The novel is written in the first person to 
create the illusion of an autobiographical narrative. This technique is 
retained in the TV serial by the director Raana Sheikh, a veteran TV pro-
ducer and ex-managing director of the state owned Pakistani TV, and 
the script writer Zehra Nigah, a famous poet and literary personality. 
As Umrao grows up accomplished in the various skills of courtesan 
life, she is much sought after by many members of the elite that fre-
quent the kotha. She is eventually “given” for the first time to a respect-
able Nawab who retains the exclusive right to her company and main-
tains her through gifts and cash. This man becomes the first of many 
with whom Umrao is shown to, within the parameters of Pakistan’s cen-
sors, have a sustained sexual relationship. There are many twists and 
turns in the story, but Umrao is always characterized as an extremely 
sympathetic person—a victim of circumstances beyond her control—
with whom the audience can empathize and identify. Periodically the 
play does remind us that Umrao is a courtesan (with its contemporary 
connotation of a prostitute) and hence allows for the audience to cre-
ate a distance from her guilt-free sexual relationships. Yet despite the 
techniques that the director uses to 
distance us from the protagonist’s as-
sertive sexual practices—perhaps to 
satisfy the censor—the audience is 
constantly exposed to and remains 
engrossed in Umrao’s various relation-
ships. 
In addition, life in the kotha itself is 
portrayed in extremely women friend-
ly terms. There is camaraderie among 
the younger women in the household 
and the audience gets the sense of a 
caring family. The strongest person 
in the entire household is the chief 
courtesan, Khanum, who rules over 
the household as a deft diplomat who 
has the power of coercion always at 
her disposal. The interesting aspect of 
this household is the secondary and 
dependent nature of the men. In traditional kothas, as depicted in the 
serial, men occupied the more subservient roles of servants, doormen, 
musicians, and instructors. Men, of course, were also wealthy patrons 
and benefactors. But even they, within this domain, deferred to the 
immense power that these women wielded in their own space and 
treated the courtesans as equals. 
Further, in contrast to Pakistan’s recent history of rising Islamic radi-
calism and the Islamization process of the Zia era, the play seeks to 
display a much more tolerant atmosphere not only in terms of gender 
relationships, but also in its depiction of Islamic authority. There is a 
retainer in the kotha, Moulvi Saheb, who is married to the main female 
Arts & Media
The courtesan has been a stock character in 
popular South Asian literature and movies. 
The popular Urdu novel, Umrao Jan Ada, was 
recently made into a lavish serialized television 
play in Pakistan. It raises questions about how 
popular television performances create a space 
for a discussion on gender politics in a rapidly 
changing cultural, social, and economic milieu 
of present-day Pakistan. 
Courtesans in 
the Living Room
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The creators of this play…
use the mid-nineteenth century 
milieu…to make a more 
contemporary case for women’s 
emancipation and equity.
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servant in the household. Moulvi Saheb teaches Umrao the 
Quran and religion, literature, and morals. He is portrayed as 
a man of religion, yet accepts the lifestyle of his surround-
ings with ease and grace. Similarly, in one episode Umrao 
runs away with her paramour and ends up in an unknown 
village after being abandoned. Here she finds the shaykh 
of the local mosque who generously gives her shelter and 
then helps her to establish herself as a local courtesan with 
her own kotha and clientele. These portrayals use the mid-
nineteenth century Muslim society in North India, and its 
imagined tolerant social space where religious leaders and 
courtesans could co-exist, to implicitly critique the moral 
and theological extremism of contemporary life. 
Gender, religion, and ethnicity
The choice of Umrao Jan Ada to argue for women’s libera-
tion and religious tolerance is an intriguing one. Historically 
modernist Muslim reformers of late nineteenth century op-
posed Nawabi culture, of which courtesan life was an inte-
gral part. Post-1857 Muslim reformers like the author Nazir 
Ahmed, Sayed Ahmed, the founder of Aligarh Muslim Uni-
versity, and the poet Altaf Husein Hali (inlcluding Deobandi 
religious reformers) in their writings argued against the ex-
travagance, impiety, and ignorance of the Nawabi era, which 
according to them was the cause of Muslim backwardness. 
In contrast they advocated the pursuit of knowledge, piety, 
and restraint. Describing this transformation among the 
late-nineteenth century Muslim middle class households, 
Gail Minault rightly points out that the emphasis was on 
being noble rather than high born. A sharif gentleman was 
“pious without being wasteful, educated without being pe-
dantic and restrained in his expression of emotion.”2 This 
ideal was in sharp contrast to the Mughal Nawabs and the 
wealthy land owning aristocracy, those that are depicted 
in Umrao and who sustained the lifestyle of the courtesans 
themselves.
It appears that the female director and script writer of 
Umrao sought to make an implicit argument against those 
tendencies of Muslim reformist thought, whether secular or religious 
(Deobandi), that asked women to distance themselves from the realm 
of custom which was deemed superstitious, un-Islamic, and irrational. 
This reformism indeed aided some women to gain more rights with-
in the emerging middle-class household. For example, literacy skills 
along with modes of reformed behaviour did open spaces for women 
to articulate their rights in marriage and property. Yet, these gains 
were at the cost of losing separate spheres of female activity that were 
condemned by the modern reformists as the realm of the nafs, the 
area of lack of control and disorder.3 The creators of this play through 
their depiction of female spaces, use the mid-nineteenth century mi-
lieu to invoke this sense of disorder/sexual themes and link it to an 
older oral tradition of women’s narrative construction and other forms 
of popular performances—the arena of reformist attack—to make a 
more contemporary case for women’s emancipation and equity. 
In invoking this past the producers present an alternative narra-
tive of custom, traditional space, and Muslim religious practice. This 
move to reinvent the past as tolerant and inclusive is linked to a lib-
eral political agenda that is in opposition to an earlier generation of 
modernist thinkers. Using late-nineteenth century North India as a 
backdrop, this serial confronts the more homogenizing elements of 
Islamic politics in Pakistani society; a major political task for liberals 
in present day Pakistan. The play’s implicit portrayal of a more tol-
erant and inclusive national entity interestingly enough also relates 
to President General Musharraf ’s propagated rhetoric of a modern, 
moderate, and Muslim Pakistan. This resonance perhaps allows liberal 
intellectuals the space to use media outlets to promote agendas of 
diverse freedoms and tolerance without the fear of state censorship. 
The long-term implications of this tentative cultural alliance be-
tween liberals and the Military junta require a detailed discussion and 
analysis that cannot be provided here. However, in conclusion I would 
raise another politically important question that the liberal intelli-
gentsia rarely confronts. As issues of gender equity and tolerant Islam 
are emphasized in the play, the idiom of this discussion remains within 
the parameters of high Urdu culture. In this play as in others, the de-
piction of late nineteenth century North Indian life is depicted as Pa-
kistani Muslim culture and in doing so remains oblivious to extremely 
vital issues of cultural and linguistic diversity within Pakistan.
Since Pakistan’s independence in 1947, Urdu’s dominance of the cul-
tural center has bred a sense of exclusion among other linguistic groups 
(Pashtun, Sindhi, Punjabi, Baluch, among others) hindering the emer-
gence of a national culture that democratically includes the diverse 
voices and languages present in Pakistani cultural spectrum. Where 
Geo’s Umrao Jan Ada tackles the issue of female emancipation using 
North Indian ashraf (respectable Muslim elite) culture, it addresses an 
audience that is also culturally steeped in other traditions, vernaculars, 
and cultural ethos. The imposition of nineteenth century high Urdu 
culture, though in this case ostensibly well meaning, retains within it 
the hegemonic aspect of centralizing state projects of cultural homo-
geneity which have continued to undermine the rights of the various 
linguistic and cultural groups that constitute Pakistan. In this sense the 
liberal feminist agenda in its attempt to re-interpret “tradition” and Mus-
lim social practice in South Asia, may still be entangled in modernist 
projects where experiences of specific linguistic 
groups who have a longer urban history (as in the 
case with Urdu speakers) takes precedence over 
practices of other ethnicities. A more inclusive cul-
tural politics may yet require a sensitivity toward 
the diverse histories of the various peoples who 
inhabit Pakistan. 
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S A M I A  M E H R E Z The recent Egyptian controversial film 
Bahibb Issima (I Love Cinema) directed 
by Osama Fawzi and written by Hani 
Fawzi (two young and already dis-
tinguished Coptic filmmakers) has 
triggered an ongoing heated debate 
of national proportion. The film pro-
pelled the Egyptian Coptic commu-
nity, the largest religious minority 
who make up anywhere between 6%-
10% of the population, into the very 
heart of the public sphere. It has also 
confirmed the Coptic community as 
a new player in the cultural politics 
in Egypt, a challenging new force for 
the Egyptian State to contend with in 
the latter’s balancing act of secularism and religious nationalism.
Many elements have converged to re-orient and perhaps re-define 
both the relationship between the Egyptian state and the Coptic commu-
nity since the 1990’s, as well as the marginal space that the Coptic com-
munity has traditionally occupied in the Egyptian public sphere. The rise 
of Islamic fundamentalism was accompanied by Coptic fundamentalism 
during the Sadat era. The ensuing, and perhaps unprecedented, bloody 
clashes during the 1980’s and 1990’s between Mus-
lims and Copts (with the latter paying the highest 
toll in lives and persecution), together with the 
state’s repeated and scandalous mishandling of 
these crises, have totally exposed the dangers of 
the Egyptian state’s practices towards the Coptic 
community. The regime’s inadequate responses to 
sectarian violence has also called into question its 
long standing and flimsy official banner of national 
unity “yahya l-hilal ma‘a ssalib,” (Long live the Cres-
cent alongside the Cross) and exposed to public 
scrutiny its attempts to cultivate a dual image of 
secularism (for global consumption) and religious 
nationalism (for the local one). All this coincided 
with the birth of the human rights movement in 
Egypt that started in 1982, as well as the Egyp-
tian state’s increasingly compromising economic 
and political dependence on the blessings of the 
United States. 
In response to this complex situation, the Egyp-
tian state stepped up its efforts to appear con-
ciliatory towards the Copts; it has remedied the 
representation of Coptic history in educational 
curricula, accorded a national holiday for Coptic 
Christmas, and more importantly, but with more 
contentious and controversial results, has taken 
upon itself television and film representations 
of the Coptic community. Most, if not all, such 
representations have been didactic and aimed at 
propagating “national unity” to the detriment of 
a realistic non-stereotypical image of the Copt. 
The irony remains, however, that it has been pre-
cisely the State’s anxious intervention to control 
the kind of image produced of the Copts that has 
enabled the Coptic community to become a real 
and active participant in the public sphere. 
Bahibb Issima is by far the most radical example 
of the Coptic community’s engagement in and 
with the public sphere. Its audacious realism was 
met with contestation from the more or-
thodox factions within the Coptic com-
munity. Bahibb Issima has also entered 
the labyrinth of State censorship and 
has ended up in the Egyptian courts for 
“contempt of religion.” Based largely on 
autobiographical elements, Bahibb Is-
sima focuses, in an unprecedented way, 
on the daily life of a Coptic middle class 
family from the point of view of Naeem, 
the youngest child in the family. Naeem, 
like one of his young uncles, loves cin-
ema but is deprived of it because of his 
father’s fundamentalist religious views. 
Naeem rebels against his father and 
ends up blackmailing the adults into 
taking him to the movie theatre. Bahibb Issima opens with a highly dra-
matic scene in which Adli, the fundamentalist Coptic father who reviles 
all forms of art, threatens little Naeem with Hell for his love for cinema. 
This initial patriarchal image that condemns the freedom of the artistic 
imaginary is juxtaposed against Naeem’s imaginings of cinema, in an 
equally dramatic and phantasmagoric scene, where the child imagines 
cinema as the gateway to Heaven through which he enters and is greet-
ed by many loving angels. Similarly, the father’s cowardly relationship 
to God that is based exclusively on fear, is juxtaposed against his child’s 
subversion of that constraining relationship, symbolically rendered 
through Naeem’s deliberate public pissing in different authoritarian 
contexts: at home, in his doctor’s clinic, and in the Church. Adli simi-
larly oppresses his wife Nimat whose self-realization is doubly crushed. 
As a painter, Nimat’s artistic talent is thwarted within her marriage as 
well as within her public role of headmistress in a primary school. As a 
wife, her physical and emotional desire is thwarted by a fundamentalist 
orthodox husband who imposes a relationship of chastity within the 
marriage leading Nimat to “fall” for an extramarital relationship. 
As the film progresses, we begin to make links between Adli’s oppres-
sion of his family in the private sphere and his own oppression in the 
public one. Set in 1966 during Nasser’s increasingly paranoid era, and 
on the eve of the Arab defeat of 1967, Bahibb Issima translates private 
oppression into a national one. Adli is denounced to the state authori-
ties as “a communist” by his superior for having dared to expose the 
corruption that he witnesses in the school where he is a social worker. 
Adli’s torture at the hands of the state becomes the moment of revela-
tion and reversal in his life. It all culminates in one of the film’s most 
powerful, moving, and loaded scenes: Adli’s monologue with God 
where he tells Him, in his drunken stupor: “I do not love you. I want 
to love you, not fear you.” Adli’s discovery of his heart condition finally 
brings about a total transformation in his relationship with his family: 
he buys a television set and takes Naeem to the cinema; he makes love 
to his wife and dismisses her attempt to confess her betrayal. Adli fi-
nally dies, in another highly charged scene, as the sun sets, on the very 
day that Nasser delivers his abdication speech after the Egyptian de-
feat against Israel in June 1967. 
The makers of Bahibb Issima have described their film as one that is 
against all forms of oppression where “cinema” in the title is synony-
mous to “freedom.” Such a declaration represented, from the outset, an 
open invitation to read the life of the Coptic family on the screen as a 
national metaphor for all Egyptians, both Copts and Muslims, not only 
during the sixties (when the film is set) but also in present day Egypt. 
Moreover, the tyranny that Adli exercises over his young son Naeem 
who loves cinema but is denied it because it is haram i.e. prohibited by 
religion, is the same tyranny that the Nasser regime exercised over him; 
the censorship the young child faces at home is simply a reflection of 
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Egypt’s Coptic community emerged 
dramatically onto the public sphere with 
the release of the film Bahibb Issima in the 
summer of 2004. The film’s depiction of 
Copts has created a national conversation 
between Copts and Muslims with the latter 
realizing not only how little they know about 
the Copts, but about how strikingly similar 
the two communities actually are. The film’s 
realism has been met with contestation 
from orthodox factions within the Coptic 
community while the State’s ability to 
control the representation of Copts in the 
public sphere has been challenged by the 
filmmakers themselves. 
Bahibb Issima
Copts & the Public Sphere
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It is precisely 
the State’s anxious 
intervention to 
control the kind 
of image produced 
of the Copts that 
has enabled the 
Coptic community 
to become a 
real and active 
participant in 
the public sphere.
ade have conducted endless battles against both the religious and 
political authorities to safeguard the receding space accorded them 
within the public sphere. Finally, these young filmmakers could count 
on the new rules governing the visual sphere, ones that are above 
and beyond the immediate control of the State. The film negatives 
for Bahibb Issima, like many other films in the industry today, were 
developed abroad. Creating a scandal for the Egyptian State was defi-
nitely a card to be played in the case of severe censorship especially 
that the director, Osama Fawzi, repeatedly announced that he would 
not accept the massacre of his film. In this particular instance, the 
State had limited leverage especially that Bahibb Issima is made by 
two Copts, about the Coptic community whose situation in Egypt is 
already under global scrutiny. Last but not least, Bahibb Issima is after 
all a post 9/11 film that came to light at the same time as the ongo-
ing US plan for the “Larger Middle East,” “democratization,” “reform,” 
and “good governance” in the Arab world. Given the Egyptian state’s 
keenness on a good record, it would have been unwise to be heavy 
handed with a film that can be used by the State as proof of its open-
ness, secularism, and democratic practices. 
But the real victory for Bahibb Issima lies with the film’s audiences, 
Coptic and Muslim alike, for whom this magnificently conceived film 
has placed the question of representation squarely on the table. The 
new realistic image of the Copt in Bahibb Issima has actually created a 
national conversation between Copts and Muslims with the latter sud-
denly realizing how little they know about the Coptic faith, traditions, 
and values. Furthermore, Bahibb Issima succeeded, in many instances, 
in being read as a national metaphor, not just a film about them (the 
Copts), but about us, all of us Egyptians who identified totally with the 
freedom loving, mischievous child, Naeem, in his small, daily battles 
against the father simply because he loves cinema. 
wider forms of institutional oppression: religious, political, social, and 
cultural. 
Because of its unprecedented audacity—social, religious, and po-
litical— Bahibb Issima was subject to both official State censorship as 
well as street censorship. As the last of four censorship committees de-
manded scene cuts before the film’s release, a public boycott of the 
film was orchestrated by members of the Coptic religious authority 
and the objecting faction within the Coptic community; a campaign 
that spilled over into the Muslim conservative one. A close look at the 
scenario of the long-winded censorship procedures undertaken in the 
case of Bahibb Issima is proof enough of the Egyptian State’s ability to 
manipulate and control both the secular and the religious wings of the 
public sphere. However, the role of the State as the guardian of public 
morality was contested when 40 Coptic priests and Christian and Mus-
lim lawyers wrote a statement to the General Public Prosecutor on July 
5, 2004 protesting the release of Bahibb Issima and demanding that 
legal action be taken against not only the director, the scriptwriter, the 
actors, the producer, but also the Minister of Culture, the Censor, and 
the Minister of Interior for “contempt of religion.” 
The State’s ability to control the representation of the Copts in the 
public sphere was equally challenged by the filmmakers themselves 
who played a crucial role in defining the parameters of the debate 
surrounding their film. Bahibb Issima aspires to a national, not a sec-
tarian or historically bound, representation. By setting the film in the 
1960s and focusing it on an oppressive Coptic father, the film was 
able to neutralize the State by not representing it in the present, 
thus winning its silence, if not its support. In addition, the film’s at-
tack on Coptic fundamentalism and its ridicule of religious authori-
ties (in one scene a Protestant pastor is beaten during a rowdy family 
fight in a Church wedding celebration) are complementary to a larger 
catalogue of State sanctioned attacks on Muslim fundamentalism 
in the public sphere (TV serials, films, and plays). Furthermore, the 
filmmakers knew that they could count on the support of the secu-
lar cultural players, both Muslim and Copt who, over the past dec-
Arts & Media
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Scene from 
Bahibb Issima. 
Adli (actor 
Mahmoud 
Hemeida) with 
his son Naeem 
(actor Yusuf 
Osman)
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In 1999, a Chinese Muslim (Hui) woman 
who lived in the old Muslim district 
(Huiminfang) in the city of Xi’an, North-
west China, showed me an outfit she 
had asked a local tailor to make for her. 
The long green robe and white head-
scarf closely resembled the Middle 
Eastern women’s dress known as hijab. 
My friend, whose name was Lanlan, 
was very excited about the robe and 
veil. Lanlan said that she wore the robe 
and headscarf when she went to pray 
in the mosque, and when she attended 
Quranic study classes. 
When I first met Lanlan in October, 1994, she dressed in western-style 
blouses, trousers, and sweaters, and kept her head uncovered. She had 
recently permed her hair, which preoccupied her because she believed 
that perms were un-Islamic. “Young women have to be fashionable,” 
Lanlan said to me, justifying her choice. “I’m not even forty.” Lanlan 
felt more secure about her hairstyle after she learned that a daughter 
of a local ahong (imam) had also permed her hair. In 1999 the clothes 
that Lanlan wore at home were not much different than what she had 
worn in 1994, but she was engaged in new religious activities and had 
adopted new Middle Eastern-style clothing to wear when she went to 
the mosque. How should we understand these developments?
New consumption among Chinese Muslims
When I arrived in Xi’an to conduct research among urban Chinese 
Muslims (Hui) in January 1994, residents of the Muslim district were 
experiencing economic success as private entrepreneurs. An abun-
dance of new consumer goods were available, and local Muslims were 
enjoying them. They spent substantial sums of money renovating and 
constructing mosques, building private homes, and hosting expensive 
rituals. They purchased new foods, clothing, furniture, vehicles, elec-
tronics, dinnerware, and videotapes.
Eighteen months of fieldwork showed me that the consumer prac-
tices of local Hui fell into three main categories. First, locals produced, 
bought, and rented goods that resonated with traditional culture. They 
rebuilt some mosques in traditional Chinese architectural styles, and 
made, ate, and sold traditional Hui foods. They also wore certain types 
of traditional clothing. For example, many elderly women wore Chi-
nese-style tunics and trousers with black knit caps as their daily dress. 
Second, Xi’an Muslims consumed or 
imitated goods from North America 
and Europe. Families built new houses 
to resemble western apartment build-
ings and bought new American-style 
sofa sets. Parents in their mid-forties 
and older were not likely to follow 
western fashions or eat western foods 
themselves, but they bought Nestle’s 
chocolate bars, Coca-cola, and Ameri-
can-style T-shirts for their children. 
Locals considered these goods to be 
modern. Consuming them was a way 
of “catching up” with such “advanced” 
societies as the United States, Hong 
Kong, and Europe.
The third category was numerically 
less significant than the other two, but 
visually and symbolically striking. Chi-
nese Muslims also consumed and imi-
tated goods from the Middle East. They 
built new mosques with green onion 
domes and white tiles. They purchased 
religious videos and audiotapes from 
Saudi Arabia. Pilgrims brought dates 
back from Mecca and distributed them 
to relatives and friends. A small number 
of those who had made the hajj wore 
long robes when they prayed at the 
mosque. A few female pilgrims and 
some young girls associated with Wah-
habi groups (about 20 percent of resi-
dents were Wahhabi) wore headscarves 
with their blouses and trousers. 
In 1994 and 1995, residents called the headscarf gaitou, literally “head 
covering,” the same name given to a local hood worn by some Chinese 
Muslim women. When pressed by me to make a distinction, residents 
called the headscarves “Arab gaitou.” The Arab gaitou occasioned much 
debate. Several men in their fifties and older told me that the new 
scarves were less preferable than the traditional hoods. A woman in a 
Chinese style hood, as one 70 year-old Salafi adherent put it, was “truly 
beautiful.” Many locals also frowned upon the long robes, which they 
referred to as “desert dress” and “not suited to Chinese conditions.” They 
found the hijab too “extremist” and associated it with Wahhabism. 
Chinese Muslim women’s clothing styles, including the adoption of 
Arab dress, are best understood in the context of Chinese moderniza-
tion. Chinese intellectuals and reformers have debated women’s ap-
pearance, status, and social roles for more than a century. Photographs 
from early twentieth-century China show that Chinese Muslims and 
non-Muslim Chinese shared ideas about proper dress. Men wore long 
robes. Women wore trousers with tunics and added a skirt if they were 
from the wealthy classes. All properly dressed men and women, wheth-
er Muslim or non-Muslim, covered their heads. Chinese Muslims often 
wore head coverings resembling those worn by non-Muslim Chinese, 
which were typically hats. In northwest China, young Chinese Muslim 
women wore the gaitou. 
Fashion trends in modern China
In the early twentieth century Chinese women strove for gender 
equality and modernization by adopting men’s dress and leaving their 
feet unbound. Radical female students wore men’s long robes and left 
their heads uncovered. The next step in modernizing women’s costume 
was the qipao (or cheongsam) of 1920s 
Shanghai, which derived from the garb 
of elite Manchu women and the male 
scholar’s gown. Modern young women 
during the twenties and thirties wore 
qipao with high heels and nylon stock-
ings, and curled their hair in perma-
nent waves. The third option was to 
wear knee-length skirts with a tunic-
like side-fastening top. The latter was 
first adopted by Chinese women who 
studied abroad in the West. During the 
1920s and 1930s most Chinese found 
women’s short skirts scandalous. 
The Chinese Communist Party pro-
moted gender and ethnic neutrality in 
dress after coming to power in 1949. 
Standardized costume was part of the 
party’s efforts to modify the patriarchal 
social order, minimize ethnic and class 
Consumption
Economic prosperity among Chinese Muslims 
in Xi’an, China, has led to new forms of 
consumption. Locals consume goods and 
fashions that point in three directions: towards 
traditional China, the modern West, and 
the modern Arab world. In the past decade 
some Chinese Muslim (Hui) women have 
expanded their wardrobes to include Arab-
style headscarves and robes. These new clothes 
allow these women to experiment with creating 
new public identities as modern Muslims in a 
country where religion has been associated 
with backwardness. 
Fashion among 
Chinese Muslims
Imitating the costume, 
architecture, and eating practices 
of Arab Muslims has become 
an important way for local 
Hui to show their authenticity 
as Muslims.
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differences, and expand production by incorporating more women 
into the work force. For the first thirty years of Communist party rule, 
men and women usually wore trousers and long-sleeved jackets or 
shirts. Skirts were rejected as bourgeois, decadent, and demeaning. 
After 1958, when the party implemented policies to “modernize” reli-
gion, head coverings other than workers’ caps were castigated as “feu-
dal.” In Xi’an the majority of local Muslims quit covering their heads at 
this time. At most, men and women wore head coverings for worship, 
removing them in public to avoid censure. 
After Mao died in 1976, the Chinese government abandoned col-
lectivization and radical socialist politics and promoted internation-
alization as the best way to modernize. Chinese women, emulating 
American and European women’s costume and reacting against the 
enforced gender neutrality and standardization of the Maoist era, 
quickly adopted skirts. Many young Chinese, including Chinese Mus-
lims, equated wearing skirts with being modern. Nevertheless, most 
Xi’an Hui Muslims felt that local women should wear trousers, which 
were thought to be more in accordance with codes of Islamic modesty, 
and also conformed with traditional and Mao-era practices. 
The post-Mao “reform and opening” included an official tolerance of 
Islam and minority traditions. Some Xi’an Muslims, especially men, the 
middle-aged, and the elderly, started covering their heads in public. 
Most Chinese Muslim women did not cover their heads most of the 
time. This was especially true of working Hui women, particularly those 
who did not work in a Muslim run business. A number of Hui told me 
that a head covering would “inconvenience” them at work. Some said 
that head coverings would make their non-Muslim co-workers uncom-
fortable. One young working woman claimed she “did not have time” to 
cover her head. Some young women considered covered heads a sign 
of how Chinese Muslims were more “feudal” than non-Muslim Chinese. 
In 1994 and 1995, Xi’an Hui women and men agreed that a white cap 
was the most convenient and easiest way for a Muslim to cover her (or 
his) head. Locals said that women borrowed the practice of wearing a 
white cap from men’s worship hats (libai maozi), small round caps that 
were usually white. Women who planned to visit a mosque or attend a 
religious ritual carried a white hat in their purses, to put on when the 
need arose or to lend another woman. When young women wore white 
hats, as for example at a funeral, they preferred to let some of their hair 
show underneath the cap. 
The class of women most likely to cover their head all of the time was 
post-menopausal women. Elderly women covered their heads at home 
and in public, and they covered all their hair. Usually elderly women 
wore black knit caps or black or brown scarves wrapped tightly around 
the hair. Those who went often to the mosque wore the gaitou. Post-
menopausal women’s practice of covering their heads conformed to 
a general view shared among Chinese Muslims that religion was the 
provenance of the old. This view was also reflected in those who made 
the hajj: the vast majority of Hui pilgrims were over fifty.
The Arabization of dress
When Lanlan had her hijab made in 1999, Xi’an Muslims no longer 
called this kind of veil “gaitou.” Their new name was shajin or “Saudi ker-
chief.” Over the next five years, the number of women wearing Arab 
style headscarves increased slowly but steadily. When I revisited the 
Xi’an Muslim district in September of 2004, the young women who 
covered their heads almost all wore “Saudi kerchiefs.” Veils were almost 
as common as white caps among women who chose to cover their 
heads. 
One reason that helps explain why more Xi’an Muslims were wearing 
the Saudi headscarf was the increase in the number of locals who made 
the pilgrimage. Between 1994 and 2000 the number of pilgrims from 
the Muslim district doubled, and the numbers have continued to rise 
each year. Imitating the costume, architecture, and eating practices of 
Arab Muslims has become an important way for local Hui to show their 
authenticity as Muslims. The Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia, car-
ries a special significance as the originating point of Islam, and many 
locals conflate contemporary Arab practices with the Islam practised 
by the Prophet. Xi’an Muslims also admire the prosperity and techno-
logical advancement of Saudi Arabia. Locals who made the pilgrimage 
came home with tales of six lane highways, skyscrapers, and air-condi-
tioned tents. 
By wearing a Saudi-style veil, a Xi’an Hui can express a Muslim iden-
tity without carrying connotations of being “feudal” or “backward” that 
a traditional hood might imply. Women who chose Arab-style veils also 
present themselves as more “authentic” Muslims than Chinese Muslim 
women who wear white hats or leave their heads uncovered. Lanlan’s 
consumer choices illustrate how local Hui experiment with being mod-
ern and Muslim. Lanlan followed new trends whenever she could. She 
permed her hair as soon as permanent waves were available in Xi’an. 
She bought new western foods as soon as they appeared on the mar-
ket, such as the Del Monte creamed corn that she served in 1999. When 
historic reproductions of late-imperial Chinese style furniture became 
popular, Lanlan bought a set for her living room. Lanlan’s decision to 
wear the hijab when she prayed must be viewed in relation to these 
other consumer choices. An Arab-style long robe and veil was another 
venue for Lanlan to experiment with her (modern) identity. 
Over the decade that I have known her, Lanlan has struggled to show 
that she is a proper Muslim woman by becoming more interested in 
religion as she ages, and to remain young and participate in Chinese 
cultural displays of modernization. In 1999, Lanlan chose the “Saudi 
kerchief” as a way to be simultaneously religious, youthful, and trendy. 
However, by 2001 Lanlan had stopped studying the Quran and spent 
less time at the mosque. Busy working in her husband’s butchery, she 
again spent most of her time wearing western-style dress and left her 
head uncovered. Her decision to wear the hijab was no more and no 
less enduring than her other consumer choices.
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M O N A  A B A Z A For those of us who grew up in Egypt 
during the era of Gamal Abdel Nasser 
in the sixties, we can still recall seeing 
in our households locally produced 
consumer durables from the Ideal na-
tional company. The stoves, refrigera-
tors, metal cupboards, beds, and desks, 
while aesthetically unattractive, were 
functional. In keeping with the princi-
ple of functionality, the ruling regime 
adapted Bauhaus architecture, a Ger-
man invention born out of a situation of scarcity, to solve the hous-
ing problem for Egypt’s needy. As for cars, middle class families drove 
locally assembled Fiats. The few who possessed rare imported luxury 
goods were looked upon as the elite of the sixties. The socialist ori-
ented Nasser regime had led to the creation of middle classes with con-
sumerist attitudes that were somehow fulfilled by the expansion of a 
bleak local market. During those long years of Nasserite ideology, the 
middle classes learned frugality as they joined long queues in front of 
the government co-operatives which distributed oil, soap, rice, meat 
and chicken, whenever these goods were available. 
Sadat’s shift of alliance from the Soviet Union to the Western world 
in the early seventies was followed by the policy of the “open door,” or 
privatization at the expense of the “public sector” state monopolized 
large-scale industries. The shift from the Nasserite “state capitalist” era 
to full integration into the world capitalist system went hand in hand 
with encouraging consumerism and new lifestyles among Egyptians. 
Despite major changes in consumer habits, consumer studies are still 
mistakenly considered as a trivial field 
by most Arab academics. South Asian 
and Southeast Asian social scientists, 
in contrast, have developed a much 
more sophisticated understanding of 
the interactive processes of consumer-
ism which could inform the research of 
Arab social scientists.1 Gendered spac-
es, youth and religious activism, the 
problem of scarcity of, and constant 
struggle over, space in the metropolis 
of Cairo are issues that have been under-researched. An understand-
ing of how these gentrified and newly constructed spaces are reshap-
ing life-styles of Egyptians, especially middle-class Egyptians, is crucial. 
The emerging new lifestyles and consumerism in post-Nasserist Egypt 
demand attention.
Globalizing Egypt
Cairo alone boasts twenty-four shopping malls, all of which were con-
structed since 1989, Yamama Center being the first. They have even 
appeared in the most remote villages of the Egyptian Delta. Cairo´s su-
permarkets such as the French mega-store Carrefour, offer everything 
one can imagine, from household items, food, beverages to ready-
made home-delivered meals. ATM cards, almost unheard of some ten 
years ago, are becoming popular and ATM users are expected to reach 
around 10, 000 in the next ten years.2 The acquisition of mobile phones 
has risen significantly from 200,000 in 1999 to 4.9 million subscribers 
today, spurring increasing numbers of thefts and pickpockets of mo-
bile phones. The newly created shopping malls, super hy-
permarkets, and mega-stores in Egypt are indicative of the 
dramatic transformation of consumption habits.
Fancy restaurants and bars carrying ostentatious names 
like: La Bodega, Le Morocco, Le Peking, The Cellar, Justine, 
Villa Rosa, Cortigiani, Le Bistro Provencale, Sangria, Blues, 
and Casablanca are also multiplying. For the special occa-
sion of Ramadan international five-star hotels like the Hilton, 
Marriott and Sheraton compete to offer the best iftars (the 
meal signifying the breaking of the fast) and traditional Ram-
adan evenings with oriental cuisine buffets, patchwork tents, 
shishas (water pipes) and entertainment that might even 
include whirling dervishes. The coffee shop culture has also 
become popular for middle class Egyptians. It would be erro-
neous to believe that this emerged only in the last decade. In 
fact, the sixties’ bourgeoisie had already adopted the café cul-
ture of the pre-Nasserite elite. Simonds of Zamalek, an Italian 
inspired coffee shop, had been the “in” place during the six-
ties competing with downtown cafés like Groppi, Lapas, the 
Indian Tea House, which were frequented mainly by Cairo’s 
elderly. These spaces were typical beau monde for parading 
and showing off. Today, the new coffee houses—and they are 
plenty—offer a mid-way solution for the younger generation 
of yuppies who can afford to pay for an over-priced drink, 
croissant, or a sandwich. Middle class Egyptians have in re-
cent years been exposed to the culture of breakfasting on cr-
oissants, espresso and cappuccino’s, just as they have learned 
to eat Japanese, Italian, Thai, Indian, Iranian, and Lebanese 
food, thanks to the proliferation of restaurants that serve in-
ternational cuisine. 
Hybridized architecture and youth leisure
Leisure resorts, secondary residences, and walled and 
gated communities, such as Qattamiyya Heights and Bev-
Consumption
During the last decade Cairo has witnessed 
a flowering of shopping malls, ATM and 
mobile phone use, resort-style recreation, and 
fast-food consuming, all of which represent 
a radical departure from previous Egyptian 
consumer habits. These new behaviours 
symbolize Egypt’s increasing integration into 
the world capitalist system, if not its growing 
participation in multiple dimensions 
of globalization.
Today’s Consumption
in Egypt
Talat Harb 
Shopping Mall, 
Cairo
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Consumption
erley Hills, have multiplied in Egypt. Advertisements sell a 
simulated dream of grandiose villas located in new, mainly 
desert, communities outside the city. They are incorporat-
ed in larger condominium complexes that might include a 
swimming pool, a fitness centre, and, the ultimate, a golf 
course. In other words, everything that leads to a healthy, 
luxurious, and suburban life, the counter image to the rot-
ting polluted old Cairo. But the fantasy comes with a hefty 
price tag! For example, the “de luxe” compound “Star Liv-
ing” in Nasr City’s mega project, Citystars, offers model 
apartments which sell for $1500-2000 per square metre 
with the average size of 317 square metres. The two-level 
penthouses with an area of 1250 square metres sell for an 
incredible $2.5 million.3
Most fascinating is how hybridization in design and ar-
chitecture is being experimented with in the new gated 
communities and beach resorts. Al-Gouna resort at the Red 
Sea, for example, was constructed by the Orascom group, 
one of the most powerful financial groups in Egypt. The 
man-made al-Gouna lagoon consists of both an assort-
ment of five-stars hotels and privately owned villas. In a 
brochure for al-Gouna, the architecture gets advertised as 
“the blending of tastes, where West meets East.” Advertise-
ments display the stylish and sophisticated interiors of the 
villas which might be decorated according to exotic motifs 
from India, Indonesia, and Thailand, or to western styles. 
Architecture, like other aspects of consumer changes, is undergoing 
global influences in Egypt, but do they represent an emulation or a 
blending of styles? 
At al-Gouna the villa shopper can choose from Italian Tuscany imi-
tations designed by Alfredo Freda to villas with Arab-Islamic accents 
inspired by the internationally acclaimed Princeton Architect Michael 
Graves, or pseudo Greek style villas. The “White Villas,” designed by the 
prominent Egyptian architect Shehab Mazhar, emanate a Mediterra-
nean flair. The late Egyptian architect 
Hassan Fathi, known for his theory of 
“construction for the poor” advocating 
the use of authentic traditional designs 
and local materials such as mud brick, 
has today been embraced by the new 
leisurely Egyptian class. Fathi’s work 
had been tremendously inspired by 
long years spent in studying Nubian 
art and architecture. Domes, arches, 
and vaults which were trademark of 
Fathi’s genius revival of traditional ar-
chitecture are consciously re-popular-
ized in the new resorts and five stars 
hotels as part and parcel of what Sami 
Zubaida has called the “folklorization 
of culture.” With a recession taking 
place and the recent deflation of the 
Egyptian pound, resorts such as al-
Gouna are experiencing real transfor-
mation. Large numbers of the new wealthy Russians are purchasing 
much of the real-estate all along the coast.
Youngsters now have a number of affordable ways to spend time. 
They could go to the numerous internet cafes, bowling alleys, cinemas, 
or air-conditioned fast food chains, which are available both, in shop-
ping malls, or as independent spaces. Discotheques and night clubs 
cater largely to the richer strata. Travel to the Far East has become an 
exotic tourist destination for the Egyptian rich who discover Thailand, 
Malaysia, and Singapore; international music is widely available, and 
Arabic music video-clips are becoming increasingly hybridized. Popu-
lar satellite channels transmit programs with a “mixing” of, for instance, 
Indian and Thai dances and landscapes, Egyptian and Gulf young sing-
ers, and European and North American tastes and music. Professional 
belly dancing has attracted a large foreign contingent of Russian, Ar-
gentinian, Scottish, Austrian, and American dancers. A local newspaper 
estimates that nearly 5,000 foreign belly dancers are in Egypt. Curious-
ly, the Russian nationals have the lions share in this profession today. 
As a result, the government has attempted to nationalize belly dancing 
by restricting the work permits of foreign dancers.
Fulfillment or frustration?
Does intruding consumer culture, together with its simulative aspect 
for the poor, serve as an accommodative element with the galloping 
inflation and growing poverty? Would window shopping and aimless 
flanerie be sufficient replacements for consuming? Does window shop-
ping, in other words, fulfill dreams or increase frustration? Or, as many 
have asked, can new consumer possibilities lead to forms of democra-
tization? For example, do mobile phones carry a democratizing effect 
since, after all, “everybody” can own 
one? Today porters, maids, cooks, lower 
grade employees, and taxi drivers carry 
mobiles. Admittedly, mobile phones 
have facilitated communication and 
made life easier for the lower classes 
who might not even have home phone 
lines in their shanty housing areas. Mo-
biles are no longer a luxury item.
After the Egyptian pound was floated 
in 2003 and led to a nearly 40% infla-
tion, many ask for how long more can 
the government hold power? One 
could argue that these sanitized and 
modern spaces, like shopping malls, 
serve merely as “clean air conditioned” 
spaces for escaping the crowded 
streets of Cairo, flirting, time spending, 
and possibly, shop lifting according to 
the recurring complaints of the manag-
ers of these malls. But today more than ever, the distinction between 
the haves and have-nots is flagrantly displayed; the boasting of wealth 
through consumerism can only sharpen class differences. 
Observers acknowledge that the main opposition and forthcoming 
actors in the political arena will be the Islamists. Would these rising so-
cial actors adopt an accommodative attitude towards consumer cul-
ture or reject it as a form of West-toxication? The example of the young, 
new-age style preacher Amr Khaled4 reflects rather that for young mid-
dle class Egyptians most likely, a happy marriage 
between religion and consumer culture is in the 
making. 
Today more than ever, 
the distinction between the 
haves and have-nots is flagrantly 
displayed; the boasting of wealth 
through consumerism can only 
sharpen class differences.
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M O H A M M E D  A .  B A M Y E H The vast majority of works containing in 
their title the term “civil society” or other 
related items, such as the “public sphere,” 
date from the latter part of the 1990’s. 
The intellectual genealogy of such 
concepts as “the public sphere” or “civil 
society” are rooted in European social 
history, thus they need to be adjusted 
somewhat when applied to other parts 
of the world to allow for local and regional histories and experiences. One 
approach would be to begin with a survey of the subject in question, not 
with the concept itself. Through such an approach one may reconfigure 
the concept of “civil society” in ways that are at once appropriate to local 
circumstances and informed by global patterns and trends. What would 
such a survey look for? 
If we think of civil society, in its most general sense, as society organ-
ized outside of the state, we can readily identify various corresponding 
historical lineages and categories of social organization in the Muslim 
world. Many of those lineages may have little to do with “Islam” as an 
idea or even as social practice. Rather, they exist in a discursive con-
text where Islam operates generally as a namesake of collective cul-
ture. These lineages may include, for 
example, “tribe,” “millet,” “family,” “urban 
notables” (ayan), “merchants,” “colonial 
bourgeoisie,” or the “learned networks” 
(ulama). Despite overlaps in member-
ship to a given group, each category 
presupposes a quite distinct social 
worldview, rules of membership, and 
patterns of relations to the outside—
i.e. to other groups as well as to the state. 
An approach of this kind possesses many advantages. First, it frees 
the very concept of civil society from the specificities of the European 
bourgeois experience, making it possible to detect different permuta-
tions and possibilities within the larger social environs of Islam. Second, 
it allows for a grounding of civil society in a rich historical matrix rather 
than positing it as a specific outcome of modernity and thus a mark of 
a break from the past. Third, it situates the study of civil society within 
a larger repertoire of existing scholarship which may not explicitly or 
consciously explore civil society as such. Fourth, it allows a proper ap-
praisal of non state-centred social formations and ideas, and as such 
detects civil society’s sui generis manner of life, away from the grip of a 
state-centred “oriental despotism” framework. 
Historical genealogies of civil society 
Historical categories embodied in such terms as “tribe,” “millet,” 
“ayan,” and “ulama” help to explain how mores and norms of civic cul-
ture evolved when states appeared to most of their subject popula-
tion as transient, half-legitimate, unpredictable, or self-serving. Under 
conditions typified by incomplete state diffusion into society—that 
is, for most of Islamic history—the civic mores governing social and 
economic life evolved out of patterns of everyday life and remained 
more negotiable than the usually distant or unaccountable state. Such 
mores of civic life included not simply minor everyday transactions 
but also larger questions of “moral authority” and “justice.”
Literature in the social history of Islam widely confirms that basic 
social structures of obligations and reciprocity tended to become less 
reliable once they reached the level of state politics. One general and 
persistent expectation was that the state transformed far more the 
personality of those who governed it than the culture and ethics of 
the population it governed. The expectation that rulers could not be 
counted upon to fulfil social obligations they otherwise would be be-
holden to, was basic to Ibn Khaldun’s theory of dynastic change. Like-
wise, the notion that governing was by its very nature “infertile” (al-
mulk aqim),1 flowed from the principle that a person could no longer 
be expected to act in accordance with ordinary ethics or rules of social 
obligations once he assumed the rule of a state. 
The Islamic “mirror of princes” genre confirms the notion that govern-
ing a state could not simply be informed by common ethical norms. 
Basing their work on the experiences of different Islamic states, such 
varied commentators as Nizam al-Mulk, Ibn al-Muqaffa, At-Tartushi, 
Ash-Shatibi, or Al-Muradi, all took for granted centuries before the writ-
ings of Machiavelli, a principle which in recent times has been traced 
by Michel Foucault only to Machiavelli, namely the “exteriority of the 
prince to the principality.” The common expectation was that the state 
had its own autonomous ethics, whose autogenesis lay in the logic of 
the state itself rather than in the prior ethics of any other social catego-
ry (e.g. tribe or class). The state thus did not flow naturally from social 
developments; it was parasitic upon society, and the role of religion 
was in effect to limit its despotism rather than justify it. Richard Bulliet 
has argued that “Islam” functioned historically in a manner equivalent 
to that of “the people” in the West, namely as a source of limitation on 
state power.2 In a more restricted sense, John Kelsay identified in the 
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activity of the ulama a means of limiting despotism—especially in their 
self-designated role as “heirs” to the prophet, in a different and some-
what balancing way to the idea of the “caliph.”3 
Indeed, the idea that Islam possesses an inherent civic character 
seems to be spurring a flurry of recent studies (e.g. Sohail Hashmi, 
Abdulaziz Sachedina, Ahmad Moussalli, to highlight just a few), which 
seek to articulate a theoretical conception of civil society on the bases 
of classical Islamic traditions rather than European theories. Such ap-
proaches are clearly illuminating. However, they frequently miss an im-
portant starting point, which involves identifying the basis of historical 
civil society not so much in “doctrines” as in social conditions, settings, 
requirements, and experiences.
Charting out such social foundations helps us approximate models 
and parameters of civil society in the Muslim world in ways that are his-
torically informed as well as relevant to the present. If the unrelenting 
authoritarian hold of the modern Arab state in particular is explained 
by the fact that the state itself remains contested from within and thus 
has a reason for paranoia, we may infer that such a state never man-
aged to replace social structures that had been built over centuries and 
in such a way as to outlast the contingency of states. The evolution of 
modern states in the Middle East required moving directly against three 
distinct historical principles which were essential to the civic culture of 
global Islam: namely, the principle of partial control; the principle of 
free movement; and the principle of cultural heteroglossia4. These were 
precisely the principles that had provided the supportive conditions in 
Islamic history for the networks, institutions, habits, and practices that 
at a later point in Europe would be captured as “civil society” by Locke, 
Hegel, and Tocqueville. Beyond the Islamic experience, these very prin-
ciples also seem to inform the organizational and ideational logic of 
the emergent global civil society today. 
Civil society groups and state building
Voluntary civic life is often deformed by states’ efforts at cooptation. 
An encounter between state and tribe, for example, almost always re-
sults in either endangering the existence of the tribe, or in distorting 
the character and function of the tribe.5 A revealing exception how ever 
is the case of Yemen, where the incomplete diffusion of the state in 
society meant that tribal life could adjust to the state through a gradual 
and lengthy process of mutual learning. In Hodeida, for example, the 
commerce-based, “modern” rationality of city governance emerged out 
of a “traditional” base rather than in opposition to it.6 The outcome was 
flexible tribalism in which the tribe functioned as a voluntary network, 
with tribal solidarity being exchangeable for, shared or coextensive 
with other types of group solidarity. This flexibility may in part account 
for the unique democratic development experienced by Yemen in re-
cent years, in spite of pervasive poverty and a heritage of civil wars. 
The surviving features of customary tribalism include voluntary asso-
ciation and coexistence of tribal identity with other forms of associa-
tion. Another includes the extension of tribal ethics of mutual help into 
diasporic Yemeni networks, stretching from Singapore to the suburban 
United States. These networks tend to revolve around extended kin, 
and owe their resilience, it seems, to the absence of obvious alterna-
tives, including state largesse. In many ways, therefore, Yemen exempli-
fies the path that has so far been most suitable for the maturation of 
the civic traditions of tribalism in particular into the fabric of modern 
society. 
Other categories provide us with different kinds of nuance. The millet 
system, for example, included features analogous to modern nationalism, 
notably the notion that certain additional rights could be guaranteed or 
claimed only through specific forms of association. As it morphed into 
the modern nation-state, one option for the millet was to seek to evolve 
into a nation. And at that point it ceased to be an element of civil society. 
The consequences of this transformation were usually highly unpleas-
ant, as evidenced in the Balkans and the Lebanese civil wars. 
The point is that exploring various historical social categories in 
terms of civil society always reveals dynamics that have great and un-
expected implications for public life, and especially regarding what tra-
jectory that category would follow once it is contaminated by statist 
logic. Some categories have an inherent propensity to remain resolute-
ly autonomous from the state, and it is in such cases that one may chart 
out the complex negotiations of ordinary social conservatism and the 
voluntary transformations of civic culture. As one such category the 
“family,” for example, while inhabiting the private sphere, also provides 
the building materials of the public sphere.7 Other historical examples 
include merchant communities, and Shelomoh D. Goitein’s seminal 
work A Mediterranean Society, showed how these provided a basis of 
civic public life. The same can be said of the role of the ayan, who are 
portrayed in recent studies of urban history to have played a central 
role in fostering public life, mediating between clients and state, and 
fostering the embeddedness of their cities in regional urban networks.8 
What is evident from these histories is that the attempted destruction 
of historic civil societies in the Middle East by modern states, whether 
through coercion or cooptation, has led to street level politics and vio-
lence as the only possible politics of opposition, as illustrated below.   
Civil society relates to the state in three basic ways: as an element in 
democratizing the state; as a support pillar of the state; and as an alter-
native to the state. Civil society can of course oscillate between these 
roles, even in the same environment and within a short period. But 
what long-term structures and attitudes survive temporary or contin-
gent oscillations? A survey of the genealogies of civil society in Islamic 
history would reveal, I suspect, that it was usually the third attitude 
that defined the long-range view of the state by the actors of civil soci-
ety. The fact that civil society is now being paraded as a foundation of 
the democratic state is probably more due to the need to reduce the 
heavy weight of the state itself rather than to a 
discovery of an old or natural dynamic. 
But once the state’s power over and reach 
within society become again limited—a de-
velopment that is also contingent on external 
geopolitical factors and not only on what civil 
society does—civil society will turn back in 
its historic form as the natural alternative to a 
state that can be expected to do nothing for its 
people and everything for its elites, as it had 
always done. It took only about three decades 
after the death of Muhammad for the early 
Muslim community to discover that harsh fact 
and readjust its civic life accordingly. When this 
very old fact regarding the externality of the 
prince to the principality is highlighted again, 
civil society in Muslim lands may respond 
by reasserting itself as a direct participant in 
world affairs, rather than delegate the task to 
states which can always be counted upon to 
act in their own interest and no one else’s. It 
is not government and rulers, but civil society 
that has always humanized our past, and now 
it appears, our future. 
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M O R A D  S A G H A F I From 11 January 2004, the day the list 
of acceptable candidates for the sev-
enth parliamentary elections was offi-
cially announced, until 2 February, the 
day that 126 legislators submitted their 
resignation to show their dissatisfac-
tion with the way these elections were 
taking place, the Guardian Council (GC) 
has taken the whole nation as hostage. 
The GC is a twelve-member body in charge of ensuring that laws voted 
in parliament are in accordance with the Constitution and Islamic prin-
ciples. Indeed, not only did the Council disqualify 44% (3533 out of 
8145) of the applicants, among them 80 incumbent parliamentarians, 
but it also effectively disregarded the intervention of the President of 
the Republic, the Speaker of Parliament, the National Security Council, 
and even the Leader. 
In effect, the intervention of the GC in the process of the elections 
constituted common practice especially after Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
passing from the scene. The height of these interventions however 
peaked in the last elections. In the past, the GC had disqualified 44% 
of the candidates during the 1996 parliamentary elections, and inter-
vened in the year 2000 elections by nullifying 700,000 voting ballots in 
Tehran, which corresponded to more than 20 % of the turnover in the 
capital. Thus, although the act in itself is not to be considered as an 
innovation, it could be seen, at least for three different reasons, as an 
original move. First is the extent of the disqualifications and the peo-
ple it concerned. Second, is the composition of the final alliance that 
made the disqualifications possible, and finally, the way the State was 
treated during the whole affair. How did a coup of this scale become 
possible? Who were its first and final protagonists? Finally, what are its 
consequences for Iran? 
Against all odds: the Guardian Council
The disqualification of a large number of candidates to the seventh 
parliamentary elections, including 80 incumbent legislators was im-
mediately followed by a sit-in by 140 legislators, and the threat of an 
election boycott by the two most important reformist political parties. 
The sit-in was also followed by the warning of resignation of all of the 
provincial governors (in charge of the organization of the elections in 
Iran), and few members of the presidential cabinet. 
To calm down the situation, the Security Council issued a commu-
niqué, announcing the creation of a three-member committee, com-
posed of the Defence Minister, the Information Minister and the Direc-
tor of Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is to find 
an honourable solution to the crisis.1 Unfortunately, neither the sit-in 
and the threats, nor the three-member committee were able to bend 
the GC’s decision. On 16 January, Ayatollah Khamenei, the Leader, con-
vened a high-level meeting to discuss the matter. The President, the 
Speaker of Parliament, and the Chairman of the GC participated in that 
meeting, the result of which seemed to be supportive of the reformists. 
The Leader pressed the GC to revise its position: “If you are in doubt, go 
by the previous decisions made in earlier cases by yourself and others. 
Assume the soundness and assume that those who had been elected 
previously were acceptable.” To make himself clear about the incum-
bent parliamentarians, he again came back on the issue and urged the 
GC to “act on what was previously accepted …the principle of accept-
ing the previous situation is correct. In my view, and as far as the Majlis 
deputies are concerned, it is possible 
to act on this basis.” Khamenei also em-
phasized that in any case the rejection 
had to be justified by proof.
Nevertheless, the GC did not entirely 
yield: although 1160 previously dis-
qualified prospective candidates were 
re-instated, only three incumbent leg-
islators saw their candidacy re-estab-
lished. Later on, in an open letter published in two daily newspapers, 
the parliamentarians whose candidacies were rejected questioned the 
council’s defiance of the leader’s order. The letter asked suggestively if 
the GC had not privately received from the Leader himself the authori-
zation to insist on the disqualifications.2 
While the existence of the Leader’s secret approval of the GC’s deci-
sion could provide the simplest explanation for the council’s insistence 
on its position, it seems rather improbable that the Leader would have 
accepted to ridicule himself publicly by making a clear proclamation in 
favour of the incumbent legislators as seen previously. Moreover, the 
Leader’s office has been particularly useful in Iran’s political arena in ar-
bitrating the controversies between different factions. By accepting—
covertly—the elimination of one faction, while publicly defending its 
existence he would significantly weaken his own political position. This 
is actually the reason he intervened so clearly on behalf of maintaining 
the incumbent legislators’ candidacies. Hence, the explanation for the 
council’s unyielding position has to be sought elsewhere.
Ending the reform and its legal basis
By disqualifying the candidacy of 80 incumbent legislators, the GC 
showed its will to put an end to the reform movement. This decision 
was most likely taken when the Iranian population showed its dissat-
isfaction with the reform movement by not voting for the reformist 
candidates during the second election for local councils, held less than 
a year earlier. In fact, at the opening of the seventh parliamentary elec-
tions campaign, the reform movement was at its lowest level of popu-
larity. The time was most favourable to put a conclusive end not only to 
the reform movement, but also to the electoral system that was respon-
sible for creating such a movement: an electoral system that although 
not fully democratic, but open enough to allow individuals from within 
the inner circle of the Islamic Republic to openly challenge it. 
In this battle there was no room for any arbitration: everyone had 
to choose the council’s side. For the same reason, a few days after the 
GC refused to acknowledge the Leader’s recommendation, the two 
most eminent chiefs of the reform movement, i.e. the President and 
the Speaker of the Parliament, went to the GC headquarter for a final 
round of negotiations. Though the content of the negotiations was left 
unknown, the declaration that followed the meeting showed that both 
sides stood by their respective positions. Ayatollah Jannati, the GC’s 
Chair declared that the President and the Speaker were convinced of 
the appropriateness of the GC’s disqualifications, a claim which the 
government denied immediately. The government in turn announced 
(via its spokesman) its refusal to organize a non-free election, and ac-
cordingly asked the Leader to intervene once again. While it was clear 
that both sides were bluffing, by deferring to the Leader, the govern-
ment showed its limitations in this last round of a seven-year struggle 
against the conservatives. On the contrary, by refusing the Leader’s de-
mand to reintegrate the incumbent legislators into the process of elec-
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tions, the GC showed its determination 
to overcome any obstacle along its way 
to achieve its end. 
Shall it be concluded that a blatant 
political error occurred on the part of 
the government? Was there a miscalcu-
lation as to who defines the rules of the 
game in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s 
political scene? By reviewing Khatami’s 
seven-year record, the answer to both 
questions is rather negative. Actually, 
what Khatami did in this final round 
was in full accordance with what he did 
during his previous two presidential 
terms, which was to abide by the Con-
stitution. The Constitution gives the 
highest responsibility to the Leader. For 
the same reason, after the resignation 
of 126 parliamentarians and when the 
two most important reformist politi-
cal formations declared their refusal to 
participate in the upcoming elections, 
Khatami did nothing but write a letter 
to the Leader, asking for the deferment 
of the elections. Again, in the same line 
of thought, when the Leader advised 
him not to postpone the elections, he 
yielded to the Leader’s will, giving the 
Interior Ministry the order to prepare 
the elections for 20 February.
The absence of reform supporters
Had the popular supporters of the reform movement stood up more 
determinedly than they had done during the 22 days of the parliamentar-
ians’ sit-in, the GC could not have stood so irrevocably in its position. In 
reality, despite several appeals from the parliamentarians who occupied 
the Parliament for more than three weeks, no serious backing came from 
the society. The day after the sit-in started, in a communiqué, the 126 par-
liamentarians joined by a few other well-known reformist figures called 
upon “the intellectuals, academics, students, teachers, and finally all the 
enlightened and clear-sighted people to understand the seriousness of 
the situation and to take the responsibility befallen upon them.”3 How-
ever, nothing happened. Even students who were in the forefront of the 
fight against the conservatives during the last seven years took their time 
in issuing a few ambivalent communiqués. 
The students of Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat (the most powerful student 
union and the closest to the reform movement) acknowledged the cour-
age of the parliamentarians, but also criticized them for having lost the 
confidence of the 30 million people who had brought them to power by 
waiting seven years before taking such brave actions.4 In fact, the eupho-
ria of the 1997 presidential elections was gone for good, and a bitter feel-
ing of having been betrayed had already replaced it. As one research has 
recently remarked, Khatami’s election was expected to turn the Islamic 
Republic’s adversaries into the loyal opposition, and the ongoing opposi-
tion was to be transformed into supporters. What happened after seven 
years of quasi-continuous setting back of Khatami in every subject that 
opposed him to the conservative forces? A large number of his support-
ers now oppose the idea of a possible reform from within the framework 
of the actual Constitution of the Islamic Republic, and political forces that 
wanted to act as the loyal opposition are now acting as open adversar-
ies.5 Indeed, the Student Union of Amir Kabir University (the second most 
important student union of the country), while praising the bravery of 
the parliamentarians, asked if the real point of debate is not whether the 
actual Constitution gives a real possibility of reform.6
The international dynamic
Contrary to the American Government which following the adoption 
of the “double containment (i.e. containing both Iraq and Iran) policy”, 
cut off its economic relations with Iran, the European Community de-
cided to follow on what they called the “critical dialogue.” In this re-
spect, the election of a reformist candidate—M. Khatami—in 1997 as 
President of the Republic became a blessing for the political line cho-
sen by European countries toward Iran. Seven years later, the reform 
movement was caught up in endless fights between factions and no 
significant progress was made neither on the field of civil liberties nor 
in the economic area. Moreover, there was no clarification regarding 
the responsibilities of the different government offices, preventing Eu-
rope from having a unique negotiating Iranian partner. The confused 
situation in Afghanistan and Iraq, created by the American invasion, 
and the world concern about the Middle East nuclear proliferation, 
convinced the European countries that having a unique negotiating 
partner in Iran is more important than standing up for the cause of 
reform in Iran. This is why after a few shy critiques addressed to Iran 
for holding non-democratic elections, the European community kept 
quiet and joined the ever-enlarging cluster of those who believe that 
the reform movement is not worth the backing.
While the reform movement which started with the 1997 elections 
that brought Mohammad Khatami to power did not fulfill any of its 
engagements, it however produced one big change in the way poli-
tics was practised in the Islamic Republic of Iran: elections became the 
most important place where the struggle for power had to occur. It was 
for stopping the expansion of the electoral process as the centre of 
Iran’s political system and thus preventing it from becoming the pri-
mary tool for the creation of political authority that the conservative 
forces, guided by the GC, disqualified more than 
40% of the candidates, among them 80 incum-
bent legislators. With a weakened reform move-
ment opposing them, and an international com-
munity urging to negotiate with a unique central 
authority in Iran, the moment was opportune to 
strike a fatal blow at the electoral system. 
By fiercely opposing the reform movement dur-
ing seven years, the conservatives reached their 
aim of annihilating it. The question is no longer 
whether the political situation of the country could 
be improved through a reform, or whether Iran will 
need a constitutional change. The answer is clear: 
nobody wants the reform anymore. With the blow 
struck at the electoral process, the question is now 
whether the agents of change will continue looking 
at it as a means to create change or whether they 
will seek other means to this end.
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P N I N A  W E R B N E R I first met Hajji Karim (a pseudonym) 
in 1987 quite accidentally, while re-
searching Pakistani community politics 
in Manchester, England. The Central 
Jami‘a mosque, a corporate institution 
built with voluntary donations in the 
days when the Muslim community of 
Manchester was still united, had wit-
nessed a series of factional conflicts 
over its leadership. A succession of dra-
matic and sometimes violent confron-
tations occurred as faction leaders mo-
bilized their supporters. There was no 
doubting the fierce passions aroused by this competition for honour 
and status in local diaspora politics. 
It was during these heady but often traumatic months of fieldwork 
that I first encountered Hajji Karim. What struck me from the very start 
was his air of calm tranquillity. As he began to tell me about his Sufi 
tariqa and its beliefs, I felt as though I had entered a world of peace 
and order, of voluntary altruism and deep faith. Unlike the factionalism 
and conflict-ridden relationships at the mosque, Hajji Karim’s universe 
was one of intellectual and aesthetic speculation and mystical experi-
ence, in which people sought transcendence rather than honour and 
instrumental gain. The order shared many similarities with other re-
gional and pilgrimage cults in South Central Africa and Latin America, 
in which disciples or adepts follow ritual practices focused around a 
sacred centre, shrine, or person. 
The term regional cult is a comparative, analytic term used to de-
scribe centrally focused, non-contiguous religious organizations which 
extend across boundaries. Regional cults are thus religious organiza-
tions built upon periodic ritual mobilizations of followers, in which 
cult branches, often located well beyond a central lodge or shrine, are 
linked in a sacred topography through flows of persons, goods, and 
tributes. Such cults are more far-reaching than any local, parochial cult, 
yet they are less inclusive in membership and belief than a world reli-
gion in its most universal form. The central lodge of the Sufi regional 
cult I studied in the North 
West Frontier Province, was 
connected to hundreds of 
widely separated branches 
located throughout Pakistan, 
from Kashmir to Karachi, and 
to dozens of branches in 
Britain and the Gulf, wher-
ever Pakistani migrants had 
settled.
As the research progressed 
over the next twelve years, a 
series of new and fascinat-
ing questions and observa-
tions emerged. For example, 
I discovered that the ‘urs 
(in Arabic, mawlid) celebra-
tions, which commemorate 
the birth of the Prophet Mu-
hammad and Muslim saints, 
was highly structured. It had a beginning, a middle, and an end. It ef-
fected, in other words, a sacred transformation and as such it was a 
transformative ritual, not merely a festival. The ‘urs, was also, it became 
evident, the organizational hub of a Sufi order, conceived of as a re-
gional (and now global) cult. Even beyond its centralizing role, I found 
that the ‘urs was also significant for understanding the way in which 
the saintly shrine system in South Asia 
was interpolated into the Barelvi move-
ment — a religious movement of ulama 
in South Asia that arose to defend the 
veneration of saints and their tombs. 
Barelvis foster extreme adoration of 
the Prophet Muhammad and advocate 
his continued “presence.” In Pakistan 
they have their own mosques, schools 
and religious seminaries for the train-
ing of religious clerics. The ‘urs helped 
to explain how, within a loosely inclu-
sive movement, connections between 
Sufi saints and Barelvi ulama are created and perpetuated. It is through 
the many thousands of ‘urs festivals held annually at shrines and lodges 
throughout Pakistan, as well as in England and elsewhere, that Sufi re-
gional cults are linked into, and sustain, the wider Barelvi movement. 
The transnational and transethnic dimensions 
of Sufism
Like other regional cults, Sufi cults are trans-regional, transnational, 
and trans-ethnic. They interpenetrate with one another rather than 
generating contiguous, bounded territories. They leapfrog across 
major political and ethnic boundaries, creating their own sacred to-
pographies and flows of goods and people. These override, rather than 
being congruent with, the political boundaries and subdivisions of na-
tions, ethnic groups, or provinces. 
The difficulty in trying to understand Sufism and comprehend its sys-
tematic ritual and symbolic logic and organization, is that in any par-
ticular locality, there is a wide range of Sufi saints, from major shrines 
of great antiquity, managed by descendants of the original saintly 
founder and guardians of his tomb, to minor saints with a highly local-
ized clientele. In any generation, only some outstanding living saints 
succeed in founding major regional cults which extend widely beyond 
their immediate locality. Such cult, or ta’ifas as Trimingham calls them, 
“undergo cycles of expansion, stagnation, decay, and even death,”1 but 
since there are “thousands of them…new ones [are] continually being 
formed.”2 Hence, to compare Sufi regional cults across different places, 
separated by thousands of miles of sea and land and by radically dif-
ferent cultural milieus, is in many senses to seek the global in the local 
rather than the local in the global. Either way, charting difference and 
similarity in Sufism as an embodied tradition requires attention beyond 
mystical, philosophical, and ethical ideas, to the ritual performances 
and religious organizational patterns that shape Sufi orders focused on 
a living saint or a dead saint’s shrine in widely separated locations. 
As the history of Sufism in South Asia and elsewhere (e.g. North Af-
rica, Senegal) shows, Sufi regional cults are inextricably intermeshed in 
regional politics. The cult’s key personnel seek recognition from politi-
cians and administrators while, in turn, they accord legitimacy to these 
temporal authorities. This dialectics between the political and the sa-
cred in Sufi cults arises because they are not inclusive in the same way as 
a world religion might be. They foster an exclusive membership based 
on personal initiation to a particular saintly order, and yet their sacred 
centres and the major festivals around them are open to all. Relations 
between initiates are said to be (generic) relations of love and amity, 
stripped of any prior status, idealized as beyond conflict or division, 
yet the organization of regional cults is based around the ingathering 
of elective groups from particular, defined political and administrative 
communities—villages, towns, city neighbourhoods—while cult rela-
tionships are often marred by interpersonal rivalries and jealousies. The 
egalitarianism between initiates comes alongside internal relations of 
hierarchy, and all disciples, whatever their rank, are subject to the ab-
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solute authority and discipline of the 
saint or his successors at the cult centre. 
Indeed, worldly status, class and caste 
are implicitly recognised at the central 
lodge, while saintly descendants often 
vie bitterly for the succession after the 
decease of the founder. If there is a mo-
ment of experienced communitas dur-
ing the annual ritual at a Sufi regional 
cult centre, it is the product of complex 
logistical planning, a highly disciplined 
division-of-labour, and constant vigi-
lance on the part of the organizers. 
The ‘urs is the organizational nexus 
of trans-local, regional and global Sufi 
cult. Such cults are inserted into the 
broader framework of Sufi orders, such 
as the Naqshbandi order to which the 
cult I studied was affiliated.The Sufi 
cultural concept which best captures 
the idea of a Sufi region is wilayat, a 
master concept in Sufi terminology, 
denoting a series of interrelated mean-
ings: (secular) sovereignty over a re-
gion, the spiritual dominion of a saint, 
guardianship, a foreign land, friendship, 
intimacy with God, and union with the 
Deity. As a master concept, wilayat en-
capsulates the range of complex ideas defining the charismatic power 
of a saint—not only over transcendental spaces of mystical knowledge 
but as sovereign of the terrestrial spaces into which his sacred region 
extends. The term regional cult, a comparative, analytic term used to de-
scribe centrally focused, non-contiguous religious organizations which 
extend across boundaries, seems particularly apt to capture this sym-
bolic complexity. 
Power, charisma, and authority
Unlike the sort of political conflicts that might emerge over leader-
ship of corporately owned central institutions such as the Manchester 
central mosque, Sufis recognise the absolute authority of a charismatic 
figure, a Sufi saint. The charismatic living saint at the centre of the cult 
I studied was known as Zindapir “the living saint.” He began his career 
during the final days of Empire in the British army, as a tailor contrac-
tor for the seventh Baluch regiment, and many of his disciples were 
army men. His beautiful little lodge is located in a valley near Kohat, an 
army cantonment in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. After 
establishing his lodge, he continued to recruit army personnel. Over 
time, as these soldiers retired to their villagers or migrated to work in 
England or in the Gulf, the catchment area of Zindapir’s regional cult in-
creased vastly. Moreover, he deliberately sent his vicegerents to estab-
lish branches of the cult in most of the towns and some of the villages 
of the Frontier, the Punjab, and Sindh. In his later years, he initiated new 
disciples from among the Afghans living in the refugee camp near the 
lodge, and thus he now has a following in Afghanistan as well. He pro-
vided a langar, a free kitchen distributing “pure” food, during the Hajj, 
organized by the English branch of the cult order, and this attracted 
additional international followers. He also has branches of the cult in 
South Africa. Like his murshid (Sufi guide), Baba Qasim of Mohra Sharif, 
located at Muree, north of Islamabad, in the foothills of the Himalayas, 
his faith was inclusive and trans-ethnic. He was a man of peace.
The love for him felt by his ordinary disciples was a deep wellspring, 
which supported them in their daily endeavours. Orthodox, reform Suf-
ism, of the kind I studied, which follows the shariah, and self-conscious-
ly avoids heterodox practices, is thriving in South Asia today: many of 
Zindapir’s present followers are prominent men in the civil service, 
the army, the police, and even the government. My meetings with the 
saint, which usually occurred late at night, resembled intense psycho-
analytic sessions in which it was never clear who the healer was, and 
who the patient. I had early on decided that I would not interrogate the 
Shaykh. He was far too big a figure and indeed, on the rare occasions 
when I was tempted to ask him a question, the answer was inevita-
bly aphoristic and enigmatic. Instead, the Shaykh talked and I listened. 
Now and then he would say something that clearly sparked my inter-
est and, lighting up, he would elaborate on this theme. My main hope 
was to communicate my friendship and admiration without overstep-
ping any boundaries. This seemed to work, because he called me to 
him again and again. He also allowed me to witness sessions with his 
female disciples, and with supplicants. Over time it became evident, 
however, that my role in the lodge as researcher was never quite clear. I 
was there to write a book, and the Shaykh supported the research, and 
yet the Shaykh did not want a book. He was a classic “directing” Shaykh, 
who wanted the people to come to him, to bask in his grace, not to 
read about him or admire his picture. 
The saint died in 1999, and I attended the first ‘urs commemorating 
his death in 2000. It was a sad event for me, though his followers cel-
ebrated his life in death with the usual devotion and pleasure. I missed 
his delightful, often mischievous, and invariably unpredictable pres-
ence. It was a deeply felt absence But I gained many insights from this 
last visit to the lodge about the cult, its organization, its khalifa, and the 
organizational continuity following the death of a saint.
The peace that first attracted me to the Zindapir’s order did not, to 
my disappointment, last forever. In particular, Hajji Karim and the or-
der’s mosque in Manchester came to be embroiled in internal conflicts 
of power and authority, which affected my own relationship as a field-
worker with the order’s living saint in Britain, the senior khalifa (deputy, 
vicegerent) of Zindapir. Yet Hajji Karim remains a faithful khalifa of Zin-
dapir’s son, now head of the order in Pakistan, and he continues to seek 
the divine revelation promised by Sufi mystics in their scholarly books, 
and to believe in the possibility of transcendence.
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On commence du zéro, a partir du 
11 Septembre on commence du zéro… 
c’est  la vérité! (Hamdan Ould Tah, 
LMU’s Chairman, February 2002) 
In Mauritanian television there is a 
weekly “seminar” (madarat) between 
members of the League of Mauritanian 
Ulama (LMU) and the so called “mod-
ernist professionals,” including doctors, 
engineers, and university professors. 
The LMU’s president, Hamdan Ould 
Tah, explains that these televised discussions represent “the meeting 
of modernity with traditionalism” at a time when “we are between two 
worlds, facing a modernity that doesn’t leaves us a very long time to 
make decisions….” It is no coincidence that such programmes in the 
mass media, and indeed the founding of the LMU itself, have occurred 
in a post-9/11 context. The ulama of the LMU are striving to build a 
religious discourse where the concept of “modernism” is made relevant 
to everyday life, if religiously rearranged. Although Mauritanian so-
ciety maintains deep Islamic roots, there are inescapable cultural el-
ements associated with a “foreignness” that are too significant to be 
overlooked by the ulama. These religious authorities acknowledge that 
they are not the sole producers and codifiers of knowledge and, in re-
sponse, acutely try to incorporate the “exterior” or “foreign influenced” 
elements within their eminent religious sphere, and by so doing re-
legitimizing their authority. This is probably one of the fundamental 
aspects that led to the creation of the LMU, and the justification for this 
innovative TV programme. 
Discussions between members of the ulama and non-religiously 
trained professionals are indicative of some theological changes taking 
place in Mauritania. The proposal the LMU is trying to see theologically 
implemented has to do with a project that the Ulama call “amended 
Islam,” or, an equally valid, “amended modernism.” The most visible re-
form made with this method is the recent “Code du Statut Personnel” 
(19 July 2001). This civil code which refers to all familial relations includ-
ing marriage and divorce, has been accepted by diverse social forces 
in the country whether religious, non-religious, or foreign NGO’s. The 
LMU has also initiated an intercultural 
discussion, or what might be called di-
alogues, with “the West.” Moreover, this 
organization has effectively made use 
of the technology of communications 
to promote Islam. 
Centralizing religion with 
the telephone
The LMU tries to unify the communi-
cation of its religious rulings through-
out the country. Religious offices were 
opened in each regional capital, with every office equipped with a tel-
ephone line so that people could directly contact their local faqih. The 
telephone also facilitated a quick distribution of the fatawa (s. fatwa), 
and for affairs of extraordinary complexity there is the “appeal” tele-
phone of LMU’s chairman in Nouakchott. Although the Chairman has 
an impressive library to draw on for study and reflection, it is actually 
the telephone that consumes most of his time. These ulama effectively 
and efficiently use the telephone and their “tele-fatwas” as a convenient 
means of transmitting their religious jurisdiction. Face to face meetings 
with the ulama are still valuable, and remain privileged territories, nev-
ertheless, other spaces for communication are becoming important, 
and this use of the telephone is a significant example. 
The LMU is now a nationwide organization, with a nationwide ulama 
membership. This might lead, for the first time in the history of Mauri-
tania, to a centralized religious structure capable of contouring tribal 
affiliation and significant differences in religious tradition. These ulama 
are now able to reach a major part of the population thanks to a strong 
financial capacity, and because they clearly profit from the utilization 
of state structures to promote their models. 
Alliances with power
The chairman of the LMU stated in 2002 that his organization was 
“neither outside, nor inside, the state’s government.” However, a strong 
association with state power was soon exposed when these ulama took 
the governmental side in the 2003 presidential campaign, touring the 
country with the victorious candidate. Earlier, the LMU was considered 
a powerful religious agent in the centre of political decisions, but not a 
direct supporter of the government. 
After three years of activities the LMU assumed a definitive link with 
the government and has been attempting to define a centralized reli-
gious authority. The LMU has composed a clearly structured Islamic dis-
course, associating determined religious dogmas (Malikite, Ash‘arite) 
with a declared “national Islamic tradition,” where the dialogue with 
“modernism” and the West are also included. A dual strategy is ap-
plied in this new religious mechanism: the use of innovative technol-
ogy (meant to give a fresh face to the traditional ulama), in addition 
to holding dialogues with non-religiously trained professionals and 
groups and organizations from the West. The activities of the LMU can 
be said to be contributing to a fundamental redefinition of Maurita-
nian nationality, as the LMU’s version of Islam is becoming the state 
endorsed version. Whether or not the LMU will be successful in associ-
ating nationality with its defined and fixed model of Islamic identity is 
a question still left open.
The “League of Mauritanian Ulama” (LMU) 
was established in the Islamic Republic of 
Mauritania in 2001. The period between its 
foundation and the presidential election of 
2003 delineates a definite change in the way 
Islam has been organized in Mauritania. It has 
become fundamental to incorporate actors 
not directly related with the official religious 
hierarchies in religiously focused discussions, 
and theologians have been approaching 
religious issues from a centralized state logic.
“Official” Islam in 
Post-9/11 Mauritania
Francisco Freire is a Ph.D. student at the Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Departamento 
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Religious Authority
The al-Ittihad al-Alami li-Ulama al-Mus-
limin (The International Association of 
Muslim Scholars, IAMS) was founded 
in July 2004. The founding conference 
of the IAMS in Dublin was attended 
by eminent scholars of different reli-
gious backgrounds, including Sunni, 
Shii, Omani Ibadis, and Yemeni Zay-
dis. Shaykh Yusuf Abdallah al-Qaradawi, the Azhar-educated Egyptian 
scholar and former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, was elected 
as president of the IAMS. Muhammad Salim al-Awwa, attorney of the 
Egyptian Wasat party, became the secretary general, with the former 
Mauritanian justice minister Abdallah Bayn Bihi, the Shii cleric Ayatol-
lah al-Takhiri, and the Ibadi Shaykh Ahmad al-Khalili as his deputies.
The principle aim of the IAMS is to serve the international community 
of Muslims and help them safeguard their cultural identity. It also aims 
to promote moderate Islam by offering an alternative international 
network to that of militant Islamists. Al-Qaradawi outlined the main 
characteristics of the new association as being Islamic (representing 
all Muslims), global (aiming to get its message across the entire world), 
people-oriented (sustained by the trust of Muslim peoples worldwide), 
independent (not connected to governments or political parties), sci-
entific (referring to ilm, i.e. an association of ulama), missionary (using 
communicative methods to promote Islam), moderate (eschewing ex-
tremism and bigotry), as well as energetic (translating its words into 
action). The association’s basic principle is to apply a “middle way for 
the Islamic community of the middle” (al-minhaj al-wasat lil-umma al-
wasat).1 The founding declaration of the association speaks out against 
undemocratic rule and calls for the enforcement of equal legislative 
rights for men and women.2
As yet the networking capacity and authority of this collective of 
ulama is unclear. The association seems to be mainly al-Qaradawi’s 
project and thus far all detailed information on the IAMS to date has 
been published only via al-Qaradawi’s private website. 
A global scholar
Clearly, the establishment of the IAMS would not have been possible 
without the commitment of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, born in Egypt in 1926, 
living in Qatar since the 1960s, and generously financed by the State of 
Qatar.3 The two basic ideas that characterize his work are that of balance 
(al-wasatiyya)—and unity of the umma. Based on the ummatan wasa-
tan concept of the Quran (2/143), al-Qaradawi argues for a balanced 
implementation of Islamic law, meaning both the balance between 
new and established views as well as between different doctrines. He 
believes that fatwas (legal opinions) should always be composed “ac-
cording to the spirit of mediation” and that in doing so one should re-
sort to all legal traditions within Islam. He describes his approach as the 
“method of the middle way” (minhaj al-wasatiyya) which goes beyond a 
mere juridical context.4 It implies that the ulama are responsible for the 
moral guidance of the Islamic community as only they have the neces-
sary expertise to properly interpret Islamic law. Al-Qaradawi stresses 
that it is the duty of the ulama to make their knowledge public. Con-
sequently, al-Qaradawi is committed through a series of projects for 
the umma, which he understands as a global Islamic community. Ever 
since new media allowed, he has been presenting his views to global 
audiences, accordingly he has been a regular guest on the programme 
al-Sharia wa ‘l-Hayat on satellite TV al-Jazeera since 1996, publishes in-
formation on his works and activities on his own website since 1998, 
and promotes the Islamic Internet site, www.islamonline.net, which 
has become the most popular of its kind. Also, he has been striving to 
bring together the representatives of Islamic learning worldwide and 
combine their capacities. He was involved in founding the European 
Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) 
in 1997 and holds it chairmanship. 
Hence, the establishment of the IAMS 
is the logical consequence of his vision 
and his work to date. 
Al-Qaradawi’s umma
But what connects Muslims to al-Qarad-
awi’s global umma of which the IAMS strives to be its institutionalized 
authority? What makes him attractive to scholars and lay people alike 
is his belief in gradual instead of radical reforms and his ability to take 
up issues of current interest and negotiate them within the scope of an 
innovative legal discourse delivered into everyday language. However, 
al-Qaradawi’s vision of a united global community of believers is a far 
cry from Muslim reality, with its myriad of dissenting voices and views. 
Some viewers of al-Jazeera programme al-Sharia wa ‘l-Hayat showed 
scepticism about the IAMS initiative, for instance, concerning the in-
volvement of the Shia and the fact the IAMS was 
founded in Europe and not in the Muslim world. 
It remains to be seen which functions the IAMS 
will take on and to what extent Muslims in the 
West and in the Islamic world will make use of its 
services and recognize the authority claimed by 
this new institution. Qaradawi’s global umma is 
primarily an imagined political space of scholar-
ship. This space gives Qaradawi and his associ-
ates—many of them Egyptians—the opportunity 
to develop an Islamic discourse of ulama focus-
ing on a non-governmental Islamic union which 
contrasts with the ideology of the Islamic state 
of radical Islamists. In addition, this discourse 
reaches beyond mere legal and religious issues 
and incorporates the debate on Muslim cultural 
identity.
 
B E T T I N A  G R Ä FThe newly founded al-Ittihad al-Alami li-Ulama 
al-Muslimin (The International Association of 
Muslim Scholars, IAMS) aims at establishing 
a “global Islamic authority.” The driving force 
behind the IAMS is Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Qatar 
based Egyptian scholar, and one of the main 
players in current Islamic debates.
In Search of a Global 
Islamic Authority
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A L E X A N D R E  C A E I R O One of the most remarkable develop-
ments affecting Islam in Europe are the 
efforts of secular institutions, state or 
other, to counter transnational beliefs 
and practices by promoting national-
(ized) forms of Islam. The move, which 
has parallels in many countries, has 
been epitomized in France by the fa-
mous call for an Islam “de,” rather than 
“en,” France.1 “French Islam” seems to 
be a cultural, linguistic, political and 
theological enterprise: Muslims are 
supposed to adopt French norms, i.e., 
they are expected to assimilate; Arabic will be stripped to the bare 
minimum, and Muslim actors and institutions in France will be con-
versant in Voltaire’s language; French Islam will be structured around 
a single organization, following the hierarchical pattern of the Cath-
olic Church; finally, it will be distinctively “liberal,” its Way or sharia 
“bien tempérée à la française,”2 and perhaps, like other things French, 
turn out to be an example to the world: La France, chance de l’islam. 
Muslim leaders have responded in different ways to these demands 
and expectations of the State and the wider society, often reproduc-
ing, instrumentalizing, or subverting them for their own purposes. 
The Union des organisations islamiques de France (UOIF), a loose 
franchise of some 200 Islamic associations promoting an orthodox 
Islam, is an example of a Muslim institution replicating the call for 
an “Islam de France.” Decried as fundamentalist and operating in a 
climate of public hostility, the UOIF is one of the few Muslim institu-
tions in France that positions itself as a religious authority, rather 
than a mere representative of Muslims. Following its policy of state 
recognition, the UOIF has tried to counter fears of its links to the 
Muslim Brotherhood by publicly distancing itself from Middle-East-
ern religious authorities, such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Faysal Maw-
lawi, and by promoting French-based scholars as its “spiritual refer-
ences”. 
Biography of Oubrou
One figure, which has emerged as one of the UOIF’s most visible 
intellectuals, is Tareq Oubrou. Born in Agadir, Morocco, in 1959, in an 
intellectual milieu distrustful of religious institutions, Oubrou discov-
ered “the intensity of faith” at 18; soon afterwards he came to France 
in order to pursue his university studies in medicine and biology. In 
spite of his lack of formal training in religious disciplines, the charis-
matic young man started officiating as an imam at an early age—in 
the cities of Bordeaux, Nantes, Limoges, Pau and—since 1991—full-
time at Bordeaux’s El-Huda Mosque. Now a French citizen, Oubrou 
leads the prayer, delivers the Friday khutbah, interrogates would-be 
converts, gives religious advice, organizes imam-training seminars, 
receives journalists and answers social scientists. Although the world 
Oubrou inhabits is a very different one, the classical description of 
an Islamic scholar—who “studied, taught, and gave advice”—seems 
wholly appropriate. 
Oubrou is almost unique in France in his attempt to rethink—in the 
French language—Islam from within. His most distinguished contri-
bution is the concept of sharia de minorité, rehearsed at conferences 
since the mid-1990s, first printed in 1998,3 and developed in a longer 
2004 essay.4 Three years ago Oubrou also published a series of lively 
e-mail exchanges with a secular Muslim intellectual, Leila Babès, on 
freedom, women, and Islam5—a rare example of a religious scholar 
leaving aside his traditional monopoly of interpretation to engage in 
a discussion with a Muslim social scientist who does not feel bound to 
the communities of meaning generated around the sacred texts. 
Relativizing the sharia
Oubrou engages in his work both the 
Islamic tradition and wider non-Mus-
lim debates. His starting point is the 
same as most French observers: is Islam 
compatible with a secular democracy 
like France? How can Muslims be inte-
grated? Oubrou’s answers seem to be a 
conditional yes: as long as Islamic nor-
mativity (sharia) is relativized. 
Oubrou’s construct could also be 
called sharia relative, unfolding as cir-
cles of variances and relativity. First of 
all, the importance of the normative dimension is minimized by sub-
ordinating sharia to theology. For the imam of Bordeaux, the norma-
tive approach is predicated upon a hermeneutical posture that tries to 
decipher the meaning of the Text, which lies hidden in the form of its 
manifestation during the “Quranic moment.” At each point in time the 
Muslim scholar must search for the adequate equivalence between “the 
historical destiny” and “the normative will.” Given the Quran’s “founda-
tional scriptural mutism,” Muslim scholars have constructed the science 
of usul al-fiqh. This science, according to Oubrou, is located between the 
reading of the names and attributes of God on one hand, and fiqh (law 
or jurisprudence) on the other. Since the sharia must “reflect the Legisla-
tor,” the sharia being “but one name and attribute of God,” one cannot 
know the Law if one ignores the Legislator. This is why, Oubrou con-
cludes, theology is the foundation of sharia. In displacing the normative 
question into the theological realm (apparently sidelining the tradition-
al fiqh schools), Oubrou argues for the pertinence of broader questions 
of free will and destiny in elaborations of the sharia: ideas about human 
freedom have thus consequences on the mechanisms of legal interpre-
tation, allowing for the departure from “the substantial textual limits” 
in order to achieve “the realization of trans-cultural and trans-historical 
permanencies.” The synthesis must be both intrinsic (“an unchanging 
Islamic reason, with universal principles”) and historical (“since Islamic 
knowledge renews itself, expands, but also invents itself, in disciplines, 
techniques, perceptions, processes, and new applications).6 
The second level of relativity concerns the “ethicization of sharia,” re-
ducing Islamic norms to the moral dimension and justifying recourse 
to French legal institutions. This is built on a distinction within sharia 
between law (fiqh), which necessitates an Islamic framework, and eth-
ics (akhlaq), which does not. Here Oubrou is drawing upon, and resist-
ing, contemporary Islamic thought on Muslim minorities. His carefully-
worded shari‘a de minorité is an implicit critique of the transnational 
construct of fiqh al-aqalliyyat (jurisprudence of minorities),7 which he 
considers “an inadequate description of the legal status of Muslims in 
Europe.” If the terminological difference may seem subtle, its applica-
tions—in terms of the relationship between Islamic normativity and 
French/European law—are important: whilst proponents of fiqh al-aqal-
liyyat call for the state recognition of Muslim personal law in Europe on 
grounds of legal pluralism, Oubrou rids Islam of its claims to legality 
by proposing to “incorporate French law into the metabolism and the 
economy of the sharia” through the means of juridical fictions (fiqh al-
hiyyal). Furthermore, Oubrou universalizes the term “minority”—disa-
greeable to orthodox French political discourse—by relating it not to 
a “demographic category” but to a “posture of spatio-temporal excep-
tion,” devised in France but (arguably) legitimate worldwide. 
Devising a “legal” practice of Islam
Given the wide French expectation of an Islamic aggiornamento (re-
newal), it is interesting to note that “reform” is a word virtually absent 
from Oubrou’s writings. Oubrou locates instead his thought firmly in 
Religious Authority
Muslim collective identifications in Europe 
are to a large extent shaped by national 
dynamics. In France, the call for a French Islam 
which dominates public debates has forced 
Muslim leaders to re-position themselves. 
One of the most intriguing responses has come 
from Tareq Oubrou. This self-learned imam 
has been working within the Islamic tradition 
to establish a sharia de minorité, building 
the premises of a “legal Islam” adapted to 
the secular context of France and the religious 
practices of Muslims.
An Imam in France
Tareq Oubrou
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the Islamic tradition. As a mufti, he reflects within limits imposed by his 
scholastic tradition: he is concerned with adapting Islam to the French 
context as much as with maintaining the boundaries of legitimate re-
ligious authority. 
The fatwa emerges as the central mechanism of Oubrou’s theory. The 
classical distinction between hukm and fatwa, situated at opposite ends 
of the Islamic normative spectrum, constitutes the third level of rela-
tivity of sharia. While the former enunciates the rule, the latter adapts 
it to the circumstances. In principle, for Oubrou, the fatwa is auto-bi-
odégradable, in that “it contains in its very formulation the ingredients 
and time-space criteria of its validity and life-length.” The fatwa adapts 
Islamic normativity to the social and cultural foundations of the French 
society. In contrast to some earlier descriptions of the muftiship, which 
emphasized retreat from the mundane world, the mufti according to 
Oubrou needs to be geographically and sociologically implicated in his 
environment, in order to mobilize the appropriate “normative subjectiv-
ity.” Among the criteria a mufti must fulfil beyond Islamic scholarship, 
Oubrou cites an accurate perception of the psychological reality of Mus-
lim individuals, a strong grasp of French laws, and an awareness of Eu-
ropean legal integration—conditions which would possibly disqualify 
most of the current practioners in the field. 
Contemporary muftis often take into consideration the media im-
pact of their work, choosing between targetting a specific individual 
and aiming at mass consumption. Oubrou partly echoes this distinc-
tion between private/individual and public/collective fatwas, but goes 
a step further, establishing an original typology of Muslim normative 
opinions. Oubrou’s fatwas are of two types: “positive by articulation” 
or “negative by omission.” Positive fatwas may be directed at a com-
munity, in which case they relate to an average level of religiosity—a 
community which, interestingly, Oubrou defines nationally: French 
Muslims, and the French [Muslim] national average religious practice 
(preferably, according to Oubrou, based on a scientific survey!). Or, 
alternatively, positive fatwas may be “situational,” enunciating a norm 
that takes into consideration not only legal but also social constraints, 
and is individual in scope. Oubrou elaborates this distinction between 
legal and social constraints in relation to the problems caused by the 
visibility of Islam when discussing the building of minarets (legally al-
lowed but sometimes socially rejected). He must also have had in mind 
the question of Muslim headscarfs in public schools. 
Negative fatwas, on the other hand, should be seen as Oubrou’s 
attempt to counter the proliferation of conflicting fatwas in the Eu-
ropean market. Driven by fierce competition between domestic and 
transnational producers, and enabled by mass media, this market has 
created the conditions for product diversification, with muftis market-
ing their—and each other’s—work as “authentic,” “moderate,” “easy,” 
“European.” Tareq Oubrou is worried the resulting fatwa wars may lead 
to a normative saturation and erode all forms of religious authority, in-
cluding “sincere and benign ones.” Negative fatwas seek to break the 
spiral by refusing to materialize under the pressure of demand or by 
articulating “anti-fatwas,” suspending norms in order to avoid burden-
ing a community of believers already fragilized by its socio-economic 
condition. This is Oubrou’s final degree of relativity of sharia. 
Fatwas are Oubrou’s tools in the elaboration of a minimalist ortho-
doxy (a “spiritual minimum wage,” as Oubrou puts it) that is sensitive 
to “the moral state of the local Muslim communities.” Hence to a non-
practising Muslim Oubrou recommends one prayer a day, while to a 
youngster who spends the day in worship at the mosque, Oubrou ad-
vises he find a job. The shari‘a de minorité allows the imam of Bordeaux 
to provide an Islamic cover for new and unorthodox Muslim practices, 
forging a “legal Islam” adapted to the current situation. This reordering 
of knowledge inevitably constructs a relation of 
discursive dominance: here, as in other theologi-
cal discourses, the aim is not only to reconcile Is-
lamic Law to the secular context, but also—and 
quite explicitly—to counter the secularization of 
Islam in Europe, ensuring Muslims remain con-
nected to Islamic normativity as enunciated by 
authority figures. Seemingly, underlying Oubrou’s 
work, is a much widely-shared distrust of the 
personalized—and therefore unmonitored and 
uncontrolled—religious practices of the Muslim 
individual. 
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T H O M A S  P I E R R E T  The Association of Islamic Charitable 
Projects (AICP) was founded in Beirut in 
1982 by a group of Sunni ulama who, 
together with their followers, were 
nicknamed “al-Ahbash” (The Ethiopi-
ans) after their Ethiopian-born spiritual 
leader, the scholar and Sufi Shaykh 
Abdallah al-Harari al-Habashi. Since its 
inception, the AICP has been backed 
by the Syrian regime, which considers 
its strong commitment to traditional 
non-political Sunni principles and its 
insistently anti-Salafi stance as a means 
to counter the rise of political Islam in 
Lebanon. However, this radical neo-
traditionalist ideology and the paranoid worldview it implies are not 
exclusively linked to the particular context of Lebanon but constitute a 
vehicle for an organization that has become transnational by establish-
ing branches in France, Germany, the United States, Australia, and even 
the Ukraine. 
As a global but numerically marginal network made up of small 
groups, often facing hostility of other Sunni communities, the Ahbash 
have been quick to take advantage of the Internet. The English speak-
ing—i.e. global-oriented—official website of the AICP (www.aicp.
org) is dedicated to conventional uses but is rather innovative from 
a technological point of view. Since the web makes religious material 
available worldwide at very low cost, the AICP’s website provides a 
wide range of exoteric and esoteric contents through written as well 
as audio resources, among which is a radio station broadcasting from 
the Beirut headquarters of the movement and daily interactive reli-
gious lessons. A look at the website’s Guest Book shows that visitors 
using this material to improve their Islamic knowledge are not neces-
sarily members of the AICP and sometimes live in regions where the 
association is not formally present (South Asia, Turkey, Nigeria, and 
Mindanao). Therefore, one may conclude that the website leads to an 
extension of the AICP’s ideological sphere of influence. However, we 
need to be somewhat more cautious than Olivier Roy who asserts that, 
thanks to the Internet, “one directly joins the Sufi neo-brotherhood 
[among which is al-Ahbash]” and “one can learn the thought of the 
Shaykh through its discourse and no longer [have to be] in [direct] 
contact with him.”1 As far as Sufism informs the content of this site, we 
would suggest that this kind of electronic material is basically more of 
a showcase for the brotherhood or an aid for the ritual-mystical prac-
tices of geographically isolated mem-
bers. Indeed, visiting a website does 
not replace the master-disciple rela-
tionship, which remains an essential 
part of Sufism, including that of the 
Ahbash. Strikingly, Shaykh Abdallah is 
only surreptitiously referred to on the 
AICP’s websites since, to use Michael 
Gilsenan’s words,2 the management of 
the physical absence of the founding 
saint—who is more than 80 years old 
and can only travel abroad occasional-
ly to meet his disciples—is still carried 
out orally by his deputies. 
The second function of the Internet for the Ahbash is to improve the 
global cohesion of the movement by weaving links between grass 
roots members of the different branches worldwide, all the more so 
since these branches are established in highly “connected” countries. 
Of course, such links are not really useful with regard to close and size-
able communities as in Lebanon or France, but they are of invaluable 
help for isolated individuals living in Australia or North America. It is 
certainly not a coincidence that the Ahbash’s website was the first in 
the Islamic cyberspace to provide 24-hour voice chat groups in differ-
ent languages. 
Ideological spider webs 
At first sight, devices such as live interactive lessons or voice chat 
groups seem to encourage debates within the movement, but, on the 
contrary, close examination reveals that these instruments are prima-
rily used by the leadership to increase its ideological control on their 
followers and to attract new devotees. Similarly, if one checks the AI-
CP’s unofficial e-forums (www.talkaboutislam.com), one discovers that 
they function as ideological spider webs. Nothing points to the fact 
that these websites, which only present themselves as being “Islamic,” 
are actually part of the Ahbash’s cyber network. For instance, they are 
not related to the official websites by any hypertext link. Therefore, the 
random visitor is normally unaware that he or she is exposed to a set of 
selected opinions through carefully controlled debates. Firstly, zealous 
participants frequently post chapters of books edited in Lebanon by 
the AICP, but without any reference to the author or the editor. Second-
ly, veteran members answer questions concerning fiqh (jurisprudence) 
and reprimand novices whose religious knowledge is considered “devi-
ant.” Thirdly, a team of regulators supervise the discussions and are in 
charge of censoring the Ahbash who are too keen to use takfir (excom-
munication)—since such a stance is considered a mark of extremism by 
most of the Sunnis—but above all of eliminating most of the messages 
posted by participants of Salafi persuasion. Ideological hegemony is 
thus achieved by the creation of a neo-traditionalist virtual space in 
which they assess very critically the ideas of leading Islamic personali-
ties such as Amr Khalid, Khalid al-Jundi and Yusuf al-Qaradawi. In the 
same way they reduce the Wahhabi doctrine to a mere “heresy” in line 
with the Ottoman scholarly tradition of which they consider them-
selves to be the inheritors. 
Religious Authority
The Lebanon-based al-Ahbash movement 
advocates a radical neo-traditionalist 
version of Sunni Islam. Although numerically 
modest, it has established branches in several 
Western countries, where it continues the 
campaign it started in the Middle East against 
the Salafi trend. The movement uses the 
Internet innovatively and demonstrates that 
the strategic use of web-based interactive 
communication tools does not necessarily 
lead to the reinforcement of a culture of 
dialogue; on the contrary they can also serve 
as a means to achieve virtual ideological 
hegemony.
Internet in a Sectarian 
Islamic Context
Thomas Pierret is a Ph.D. candidate in Muslim World Politics at Sciences-Po Paris.
E-mail: thomaspierret@yahoo.fr
 Notes
1. Olivier Roy, L’Islam mondialisé (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2002), 127.
2. Michael Gilsenan, Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt: an Essay in the Sociology 
of Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).
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Institutions
Timbuktu was declared a world herit-
age site by UNESCO in 1990. The city 
and its desert environs are a veritable 
treasure chest of Arabic manuscripts, 
produced at the pinnacle of intellec-
tual development between the thir-
teenth and sixteenth centuries, and is 
thus justifiably described as a refuge 
for righteous and scholarly folk.
Veneration of the written word had 
found a secure place in the hearts of 
Timbuktu’s inhabitants from very early 
on. Scholars and lay people alike held 
fast to whatever manuscripts they came to possess. Today, it is esti-
mated that there are about 300 000 extant manuscripts in circulation 
in Timbuktu and the surrounding areas. Locked within these pages is 
one of Africa’s greatest intellectual legacies. Fortunately, the keepers of 
this treasure are extremely committed to their culture of learning and 
sharing. Through the efforts of these Desert Librarians, this legacy is 
once again being rediscovered.
The government of Mali had instituted the Ahmed Baba Centre for 
Documentation and Historical Research, or CEDRAB, as it is generally 
referred to by its abbreviated French title, in Timbuktu in 1973. The 
Centre holds about 20 000 manuscripts, collected through the efforts 
of some outstanding individuals, including Dr Mahmud Zubayr, the 
Centre’s first director, and Abdul Kader Haidara, who started out work-
ing for CEDRAB before going on to establish his own private library.
A desert librarian
Abdul Kader joined CEDRAB in 1984 and Zubayr instructed him in 
the finer points of manuscript classification, cataloguing, and collation. 
He was later encouraged by Zubayr to travel to the surrounding areas 
in search of manuscripts. From 1984 to 1987 Abdul Kader spent time 
in the outer regions. His first destination was a village called Ghurma 
Rarus, which is about 175km from Timbuktu, deep in the desert. He 
collected over a thousand manuscripts from there and in 
most cases paid double the asking price, returning to the 
area several times thereafter. On every occasion he man-
aged to procure more manuscripts. In 1987 he travelled 
to Majakoue village and was able to collect about 2000 
manuscripts there. 
Abdul Kader continued working with CEDRAB until 
2002, collecting about 16 000 manuscripts for the centre 
in the process. He went all over Mali, to villages, towns, 
desert settlements, even as far as the borders of Maurita-
nia, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Guinea, Niger, Algeria, and the 
Ivory Coast. In spite of these tremendous efforts, the cen-
tre’s 20 000 manuscripts are still a conservative quantity, 
considering the estimated number of extant manuscripts 
in the region.
The Mamma Haidara commemorative 
library
Working for CEDRAB motivated Abdul Kader to start 
thinking about establishing a memorial library to hold 
his family’s private collection. After leaving the centre he 
devoted all of his time and energy to this project and was 
successful in setting up the Mamma Haidara Memorial Li-
brary, which was the first of its kind in Mali.
The Haidara family is renowned for its scholars and judges. Abdul 
Kader’s father, Mamma Haidara, was not only a Qadi (judge), but also a 
scholar who taught the classical Islamic sciences like Jurisprudence and 
Arabic grammar. His personal library 
dates back to the sixteenth century and 
is one of the largest and oldest collec-
tions in the city.
The library was established by Mam-
ma Haidara’s forebear, Mohamed El 
Mawlud, and was handed down to his 
descendents, generation after genera-
tion. Mamma Haidara added to it sub-
stantially, buying manuscripts while 
studying in Egypt and Sudan. He also 
studied under local scholars in the vil-
lage learning centres of Arawan and 
Boujbeyha, procuring manuscripts there as well. 
Abdul Kader began cataloguing his inherited collection and was as-
sisted by the al-Furqan Heritage Foundation in London. Currently four 
of a projected five volume catalogue of the material has been pub-
lished. 
The importance of the effort of preserving the Timbuktu manuscripts 
and its potential impact upon the fields of African Studies and African 
History cannot be over emphasized. Colonial historiography has always 
held that Africa had few written languages and as such, the only reliable 
sources of knowledge on the pre-colonial period were archaeology and 
oral history. However, even these sources were rather tenuous, since ar-
chaeological findings may date back thousands of years and oral history 
may only be able to stretch back about a hundred years. Therefore, the 
efforts of desert librarians like Abdul Kader Haidara are fundamental to 
the development of post-colonial historiography in Africa. 
Abdul Kader has recently embarked upon a collaborative project with 
researchers from the University of Cape Town who are studying his col-
lection and have also begun assisting him to digitally preserve it. The 
Timbuktu-UCT research project is attempting to initiate research that 
will hopefully transform the prevailing wisdom suggesting that there is 
no written record of African history on the pre-colonial period.
A S L A M  F A R O U K - A L L IThe importance of Timbuktu’s manuscript 
legacy for the articulation of a post-colonial 
African historiography cannot be over-
emphasized. This intellectual treasure is 
slowly being brought into the open through 
the efforts of local bibliophiles like Abdul 
Kader Haidara, the first person to establish 
a private manuscript library in Timbuktu. 
Haidara is keen to share the legacy with all 
who show interest in it, firm in the belief that 
the manuscripts belong to those who are 
dedicated to their study.
Timbuktu’s First Private 
Manuscript Library
Aslam Farouk-Alli is a researcher for the Timbuktu-UCT Manuscripts Project and lectures on 
Islamic studies and Arabic at the University of Cape Town (UCT).
E-mail: afarouk@humanities.uct.ac.za
Manuscripts 
from a private 
collection, 
Timbuktu
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P E N E L O P E  T U S O N In June 1920 a British Member of Par-
liament asked the Prime Minister in the 
House of Commons whether it was the 
Government’s intention “to withdraw 
its troops from Mesopotamia as soon 
as it has been developed as a self-gov-
erning state, able to stand by itself.” The 
brief and non-committal reply, careful-
ly drafted by government officials, was 
that troops would be withdrawn “as 
soon as the condition of the country 
permits.”1 A few months earlier the London Times had complained in 
an editorial that taxpayers’ money was being “squandered in the region 
of the Tigris and the Euphrates,” without any coordinated planning for 
the future of the country. It was time, said the editorial, for the Govern-
ment to give an account of its “stewardship,” not only in Mesopotamia, 
but throughout the Middle East.2
As a “counterblast” to these criticisms, the British Government decid-
ed to publish a thorough and “easy to read” review of their administra-
tion in Iraq, to “show the good work accomplished” during the British 
occupation since the capture of Basra in 1914. It would highlight civic 
achievements to counteract the bad news of the disastrous military 
campaign up to the fall of Baghdad in 1917. And it would clarify British 
intentions after the Armistice in Europe in November 1918. The review 
was compiled by British civil and military officials serving in Iraq but it 
was edited for publication by Gertrude Bell, then “Oriental Secretary” 
to the British Civil Commissioner and one of the few women ever to 
occupy such a position in imperial politics. Bell was widely travelled in 
the region and she was one of the most knowledgeable British officials. 
She was also to become the most sympathetic to Arab nationalist aspi-
rations. Her review was thorough and wide-ranging and it included a 
summary history of Iraq under Ottoman rule and an analysis of British 
policy on revenue, agriculture, irrigation, law, tribal affairs, and much 
else. The acting Civil Commissioner, Arnold Wilson, thought the pub-
lication would be useful for “moulding public opinion at home and 
abroad.”
The “Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia” was pub-
lished as a Parliamentary Blue Book in December 1920. Earlier in the 
year, at San Remo, Britain was assigned the Mandate to govern the 
newly-unified region of Iraq and the following March, at the Cairo Con-
ference, Faysal bin Husayn was appointed as the future King. Britain 
remained in Iraq until its independence in 1932.
Western involvement in the Muslim world
It is tempting and perhaps facile to talk about learning lessons from 
history. But it is sometimes hard to read archival sources and not won-
der whether history does indeed repeat itself. In 1919 and 1920 a vig-
orous and often acrimonious discussion took place within the British 
government about the future and political prospects of the new Iraq. 
Outside Whitehall there was also a vociferous and well-informed public 
debate. Much of this argument can now be read in the British Library 
in the archives of the former India Office.3 The public protests, politi-
cal responses and subtle interventions of officials and diplomats seem 
eerily resonant in the context of more recent events. British archival 
sources on the period after the First World War are full of arguments 
stemming from conflicting interests and attitudes towards the political 
and economic importance of the region and the cultural and religious 
consequences of Western involvement 
in the Muslim world. 
Over the past two decades colonial 
(or imperial) history and archives have 
rightly been reappraised as primary 
sources. We accept that colonial ar-
chives by definition reflect the inter-
ests and perspectives of the people 
who produced them. They are often, 
with some justification, dismissed as 
white, masculine, and militaristic. In a 
very important sense they present a skewed and limited vision of the 
past, silencing people and activities which were marginal to the colo-
nial project. Historians, however, neglect them at their peril. The India 
Office Records cover over three centuries, from the earliest East India 
Company trading contacts with Asia to the end of Empire in India in 
1947. They contain voluminous information on British interests in India 
and the wider world of Asia, encompassing a vast proportion of the 
Muslim world. They include files on British policy towards post-1918 
Iraq as well as on British involvement in the region during the previ-
ous three hundred years. More importantly, as Gertrude Bell’s Review 
illustrates so well, their very determination to exercise power and influ-
ence prompted colonial officials to gather, sift and record as much local 
information as possible. Working on the assumption that “knowledge is 
power” they were tireless in their acquisition of linguistic fluency, their 
intelligence gathering, and their attention to detail.
The archives of the British Indian Empire are unrivalled in their scope 
and detail as well as in the excitement, recognition and insight they 
can produce in the reader. They do not teach lessons. But it might be 
argued that the reports produced at the beginning of the last century 
contain a range and depth of knowledge which should be required 
reading for the twenty-first century. 
Institutions
It is sometimes hard not to read archival sources 
and wonder whether history does indeed repeat 
itself. In 1919 and 1920 a vigorous discussion 
took place within the British government 
about the future and political prospects of 
the new Iraq. Outside Whitehall there was 
also a vociferous and well-informed public 
debate. Much of this argument can now be 
read in the British Library in the archives of 
the former India Office.
Public Opinion on Iraq 
The Use of Historical 
Documents
Penelope Tuson is former Curator of Middle East Archives in the British Library. She is author 
of Playing the Game: Western Women in Arabia (London: I.B.Tauris, 2003) and Editor, with 
Anthony Farrington, of IDC Publishers collections of British Colonial Policy and Intelligence 
Files on Asia and the Middle East (For more information contact info@idc.nl).
E-mail: pjtuson@aol.com
I S I M R E V I E W 1 5 / S P R I N G 2 0 0 5
 Notes
1. British Library (India Office Records), IOR:
L/P&S/10/759
2. Times (London), August 14, 1919, IOR:L/
P&S/10/752
3. The India Office Records are now part of 
the Asia, Pacific and Africa Collections 
of the British Library.
ISIM/Conference
18–19 February 2005 
Workshop: 
“The Making of Muslim Youths: 
Youths Politics and Cultures in Muslim 
Societies and Communities” 
Venue: Leiden University
Organizers: ISIM and IIAS
Convenor: Asef Bayat
25 February 2005
 
ISIM/ IMES Lecture 
“Young Muslims in the Netherlands: 
The Search for a True Islam”
Lecture by Martijn de Koning (ISIM)
Discussant: Thijl Sunier (University of 
Amsterdam / IMES)
Chair: Lenie Brouwer (Free University 
Amsterdam)
Venue: University of Amsterdam
Time: 15:00-17:00 hrs
2–3 April 2005
Editorial Board Meeting of ISIM/ 
Rights at Home Project 
Venue: Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Convenor: Abdulkader Tayob
15–16 April 2005
Workshop 
“Muslim Fashions - Fashionable Muslims”
Venue: University of Amsterdam
Convenor: Annelies Moors
26 April 2005
Inaugural Lecture 
Prof. Asef Bayat (ISIM Academic Director 
and ISIM Chair at Leiden University)
Venue: Academiegebouw, Leiden University
Time: 16:00 hrs
27–28 April 2005 
Conference 
“Iran on the Move: Social Transformation 
in the Islamic Republic”
Venue: Leiden University
Organizers: ISIM, Oxford University, & University 
of Swansea 
Convenor: Asef Bayat
16 June 2005 
Workshop
“Islam as Religion in African Public 
Spheres” 
Venue: Leiden University 
Conv enor: Abdulkader Tayob
7–9 July 2005 
Conference 
“Dissemination of Religious Authority 
in Indonesia”
Venue: Bogor, Indonesia
Organizers: IIAS & ISIM
Convenor: Martin van Bruinessen 
and Nico Kaptein
For more information on ISIM events see  
www.isim.nl
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Mary Bakker will sadly leave the ISIM in March 2005. 
She has worked for the ISIM from the very start of the 
institute in 1998 as administrative coordinator, taking 
care of a wide range of organizational affairs. Mary 
Bakker studied Indonesian languages and cultures at 
Leiden University and coordinated the Indonesian-
Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies (INIS) be-
fore joining the ISIM. Her input has been vital in matters 
of personnel and budgets, but above all in receiving 
the many fellows and guests of the ISIM. Her keen sense 
of detail and warm collegiality will surely be missed. 
From March onwards Mary Bakker will run Chambres 
d’Hôtes in France (see www.laroseraiefrance.com).
M A R Y  B A K K E R  L E A V E S  I S I M
Rarely does one get the opportunity 
to hear three celebrated yet highly di-
verse speakers interact on a subject of 
such immense importance as religion 
and modernity. This full-day conference 
featured lively debates from the three 
recipients of the 2004 Erasmus Prize, Ab-
dulkarim Soroush, Iranian historian and 
philosopher of science and Islamic mysticism dubbed the “Erasmus of 
Islam,” Sadik Al-Azm, Syrian retired professor of Modern European Philos-
ophy and writer on Arab politics, and Fatema Mernissi, Moroccan scholar 
of political science and advocate of women’s rights. All three awardees, 
in addition to their considerable scholarly contributions, are well known 
for their roles as public intellectuals. Throughout the conference they 
ventured into the three general thematic areas: the relationship between 
Islam and democracy, the impact of the satellite and Internet culture on 
Islamic identities, and the relationship between secularization and mo-
dernity. While their focus was to a large degree on Muslim majority socie-
ties in the Middle East, they also raised questions about the position of 
Muslim and other religious minorities in Europe and the US. 
An illustration of the thought-provoking diversity of approaches to 
religion and modernity can be found in the topic of secularism.  Sadik 
Al-Azm addressed secularism through an analysis of political systems 
and nation-states.  In his discussion of democratization in the Middle 
East, for example, he pointed out the need for political reform in Arab 
states and noted that Turkey was the most successful model of a secu-
lar, democratic, and “reasonably free” state in the Muslim Middle East. 
He further underlined that by being granted EU-membership, Turkey 
would have the necessary support to further develop and mature. So-
roush, on the other hand, took a philosophy-centred approach to secu-
larism and social change. He argued that with the demise of rational 
philosophy in early Islam, Islamic civilization has leaned disproportion-
ately towards law, and has consequently lost its balance. He stressed 
the need for Muslims to accommodate new theories and ideas and to 
be flexible in their use of intellectual tools since, “tools are not holy or 
sacred.” Politics and philosophy respectively constituted the paths to 
democratic social reform. 
In her exposition on the potentials of new communication technolo-
gies, Fatema Mernissi drew attention to yet other means of democrati-
zation. She pointed out how Arab satellite television and the Internet 
are providing not only an increasingly wider platform for public de-
bate, but setting higher professional standards. She also drew atten-
tion to the paradox of how new media in the Arab world serves to forge 
an Arab identity on the one hand, yet contributes to a more universal 
or globalized identity on the other. 
The conference took an unexpected turn when Sadik Al-Azm, in the 
spirit of finding solutions to conflicts among Muslims, called for Sunni 
religious leaderships to apologize to the Shi‘a for “that mother of all 
crimes,” the murder of the Prophet’s grandson Husayn in Karbala in year 
61 (of the Muslim calendar). The distinguished Sunni discussant on his 
panel, Egyptian professor Nasr Hamid Abou Zayd, turned to his fellow 
panellist Soroush, a Shi‘a, and bowed in apology as they shook hands 
warmly. If only past wrongs could always be put right with such gra-
cious lightheartedness. 
L I N D A  H E R R E R A
On the occasion of the 2004 Erasmus Prize, 
the Praemium Erasmianum Foundation 
organized a one-day conference on Religion 
and Modernity in coordination with the ISIM 
and the Prince Claus Fund for Culture and 
Development. The conference was held on 
3 November in Park Plaza, Amsterdam.
Religion and Modernity
I S I M  E V E N T S I S I M / A U P  B O O K  S E R I E S
 
ISIM Series at AUP on
Contemporary Muslim Societies and Communities
The ISIM has launched a refereed monograph series 
with Amsterdam University Press (AUP, see www.
aup.nl) on social, cultural, and political trends and 
movements in contemporary Muslim societies and 
communities. The ISIM Editors invite authors to submit 
book proposals based on empirical research informed 
by theories and methodologies from the social sciences 
and humanities. Guidelines for preparing a book 
proposal and manuscript are available on  
www.isim.nl under Publications. 
For further information  contact the Editors at 
review@isim.nl.
Abdulkarim 
Soroush, 
Sadik Al-Azm, 
Fatema Mernissi, 
Amsterdam
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A B D U L K A D E R  T A Y O B
The overall purpose of the Rights at 
Home Project (R@H) training in Leba-
non was to rethink strategies, theories, 
and histories of human rights and Is-
lamic legal theory. The training con-
sisted of twelve trainers, 45 trainees, 
five translators, and support staff led 
by Mariëtte van Beek. At the helm, Cas-
sandra Balchin kept a close watch on the unfolding programme, and 
guided it with great sensitivity and firmness. The participants came 
from Tanzania, Yemen, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philip-
pines.
Among the most debated issue was the question of the compat-
ibility between human rights and sharia. Some participants felt the 
need to specifically announce this compatibility while others wanted 
more information to reinforce their conviction that human rights and 
Islam were not in conflict with each other. One way of going beyond 
the deadlocked debate in which Islam and human rights were placed 
in opposite camps was to find the meaning of both Islam and human 
rights in their contexts. A considerable looseness was employed in 
Muslim discourse about what Islam says on any given particular issue. 
Does Islam allow polygamy? Does it allow a husband to beat his wife? 
The question to be asked before such questions is who speaks in the 
name of Islam? How does Islam speak? Is this a convenient way of talk-
ing about the values that Muslims hold? Or does “Islamspeak” hide the 
real actors?
With respect to human rights, it is absolutely clear that subjective po-
sitions are imposed on the pronouncements of Islam. A husband may 
justify beating in the name of Islam. Such positions do not take into con-
sideration other opinions and related Quranic verses and hadiths that 
temper or condition such behaviour. Speaking in the name of Islam is 
a shortcut that conceals alternative viewpoints and deliberations. Our 
legal trainers, Ziba Mir Hosseini, Muhammad Khalid Masud, and Ebra-
him Moosa argued in different but complemen-
tary ways that the Islamic tradition provides some 
fundamental resources for thinking and acting on 
human rights. But accessing these resources in 
the formative texts like the Quran or legal theory 
would mean an excavation and reconstruction of 
previously accepted terms and values.
Trainers emphasized the need for a paradigm 
shift in how Muslims think about the sharia 
whose meaning has gone through a number 
of structural transformations in Islamic history. 
The latest such transformation was the reformist 
one (islahi) led by Muhammad Abduh and oth-
ers at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. Unlike the reformists, our legal trainers thought it was no 
longer sufficient to declare that Islam was compatible with human 
rights as it was with science, progress, and economic development. 
One critical example of rethinking raised at the meeting was the par-
ticular way in which marital problems were addressed in some Muslim 
contexts. Whilst women demanded their rights in the face of abuse, 
jurists worked with a model that gave absolute prerogative to the hus-
band. At the root of such a privilege lay a marriage contract in which 
the husband acquired the right of sexual favours for the exchange for 
maintenance. Such a formula completely ignored the mutuality and 
companionship of marriage that is emphasized in verses of the Quran. 
But many jurists and judges do try to resolve failed or dysfunctional 
marriages with this model. No less than a paradigm shift is essential 
for rethinking the approach of human rights in Muslim courts and in-
formal religious networks.
Participants also shared experiences 
and strategies regarding how laws 
were actually made and implemented 
in different national contexts ranging 
from Yemen, Tanzania, and Malaysia. 
In Tanzania, for example, most of the 
cases had some connection with the 
spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. To 
a large extent women contracted the infection from their husbands, 
or were left destitute and infected in the case of a unilateral divorce. 
The AIDS epidemic triggered and revealed the social structures and its 
problems.
A glimpse into law making revealed how values and juridical opin-
ions may or may not become part of a legal heritage. The writing of 
codes presented lawmakers with the power and the opportunity to 
include their prejudices and interests into the law. Contemporary legal 
systems do not simply import verses, hadiths, and legal opinions into 
legal codes. These have to be reworked into a form that judges and 
administrators can apply to actual cases. Such reworking provides 
opportunities for ignoring the rights of women. Thus, for example, 
rape was unfortunately placed within the ambit of Pakistan’s Hudood 
Ordinance (criminal codes based on the sharia), imported wholesale 
without critical reflection on the formulations in early sharia. Inflexible 
legal codes and rigid understandings are often to the detriment of the 
suffering victims.
The group similarly debated the question of whether there was a 
chance for implementing “universal” human rights at home whilst po-
litical rights were being violated at the local and regional levels? It was 
almost impossible to talk about rights of individuals in homes without 
tackling the selective use of human rights as an instrument of political 
control and interference. The point was forcefully brought home by the 
fact that the most gruesome violations of rights were being perpetrat-
ed on the pretext of a global war on terror in occupied Palestine and 
Iraq whilst the meeting was being held. The participants highlighted 
and contemplated the connectedness of all rights, from a woman’s in-
dividual rights in her home, for example, to her right to a fair trial in a 
government court.
Despite differences of opinions, interpretations, and priorities, the 
basic spirit at the meeting where each persons dignity was respected, 
ensured a successful training programme. The human rights trainers, 
with little or no background in Islamic legal training, should particular-
ly be credited with nurturing this spirit from the first day. Toni Kassim, 
Salma Maoulidi, and Suad al-Qadasi with their co-facilitators ensured 
that human rights were not understood exclusively as social, political, 
and intellectual goals. They gave us a taste that living human rights 
demanded, above all, a personal transformation. Legal codes would 
go a long way to ensure rights in social and political contexts, but it 
was the appropriate disposition and mindset that could turn societies 
around. The Rights at Home programme at Zahle touched on some key 
aspects of human rights in Muslim societies: it stressed the necessity 
of unmasking tangible and intangible powers behind social, political, 
and religious structures in societies, and argued that a paradigm shift 
in thinking about sharia was absolutely essential.
ISIM/Rights at Home
The Rights at Home Project (R@H) held an 
Advanced Training Programme (ATP) in Zahle, 
Lebanon in June and July of 2004. The training 
focused on challenges and opportunities facing 
human rights activists in Muslim societies and 
communities. Trainers and trainees rose to the 
challenge in an inspiring way. 
Challenges Facing 
Activists
Abdulkader Tayob is ISIM Chair at Radboud University Nijmegen and Project Director of 
the Rights at Home project. 
E-mail: a.tayob@let.ru.nl
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From 28 January till 28 February 
2005 Salma Maoulidi and Nahda 
Shehada will be assisting the RaH 
Project in building materials on 
the issues of domestic violence, 
early marriage, inheritance, and 
women in public life with a special 
focus on materials in Swahili and 
Arabic for the Rights at Home 
website (www.rightsathome.org).
R @ H  N E W S
ISIM/Conference
The conference “Islam and Public Life 
in Africa” was convened by Abdulkader 
Tayob of the ISIM, in coordination with 
Karin Willemse of Erasmus University, 
Benjamin Soares of the African Studies 
Centre in Leiden, and José van Santen 
of Leiden University. It focused on Is-
lamic discourses of marginal and dominant groups in various parts of 
Africa. The conference aimed at building on previous meetings sup-
ported by ISIM dealing with cross-regional experiences of Muslim 
societies in different contexts. The various presenters confirmed that 
religious discourses are an inescapable facet of public life in Africa that 
reflects varying local and global social and political contexts. 
In an early session dealing with publics, Goolam Vahed looked at 
Muslims in post-apartheid South Africa. He explained how the “rain-
bow nation” concept put forward by Nelson Mandela in the first dec-
ade of the post-apartheid era encouraged Muslim communities to seek 
their own identities and rights. He raised questions about who—in a 
still racist context—has control over Islam and whether young active 
Muslims are part of the older conservative forces, or whether they rep-
resent new forms of progress. Switching the context to Senegal, Cheikh 
Anta Babou examined the originally rural Murid movement as it adapt-
ed to urban landscapes, both at home and internationally in Dakar 
and Saint Louis. Roman Loimeier, with the expressive title “Sit Local, 
Think Global,” described the baraza, a veranda or parlour for receiving 
visitors, of which a second meaning may also be council, reunion or 
assembly, in public spaces in Zanzibar. Though physically situated in 
the public space the baraza are in actuality only semi-public because 
they are defined by informal membership and not automatically open 
to everyone. Loimeier argued that “membership” of a baraza was the 
precondition for any convincing political programme.
The following session focused on types of reform. Shamil Jeppy and 
Mohammad Bakari highlighted reformist individuals, respectively Omar 
Abdullah, a Muslim humanist of the Comores, and Dr. Daoud Mall alias 
Joseph Perdu. The latter was a Baha’i missionary whose national iden-
tity though unknown, nevertheless, was considered an erudite and cos-
mopolitan Muslim intellectual preacher of Muslim modernism in South 
Africa. Both presentations, by demonstrating that single individuals can 
bring together diverse traditions of learning, raised awareness about 
how Islamic knowledge is promoted, who is allowed to produce such 
knowledge, and how discourses in particular regions are shaped. For his 
part, Hassan Mwakimako examined the social and political participation 
of Muslim women in Kenya. He showed how they entered the public 
sphere and contributed to the configuration of not just Muslim politics, 
but also national constitutional discourses through their participation in 
a process of constitutional review popularly known as Bomas.
In a subsequent session focused on conflict, Amidu Sanni presented a 
paper on “The Role of Youth in the Resurgence of Sharia in Nigeria.” He 
showed how a campaign for the restoration of sharia authority in 1999 
was mainly organized by youth from various associations and pressure 
groups, many of whom had agitated through violent means for sharia 
implementation. Hamza Mustafa Njozi examined other dimensions of 
conflict in his paper entitled, “Power and Public Policy in Tanzania from 
1964-2004.” He raised questions about how pubic policies addressed the 
“Islamic threat,” and whether those policies actually served to deepen 
not only Muslim resentment and opposition towards the government, 
but historical discriminatory policies against Muslims as well. 
The final session dealt with public communication. Cheich Gueye ex-
amined the Muride brotherhood and convincingly argued that the New 
International Communication Technology (NICT) is, on the one hand, an 
instrument to integrate Touba as the “ideal” Muride city with the rest of 
the country, yet on the other hand it serves as a means for gaining broad-
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er international presence. The impor-
tance of NICTs in the Muride capital, and 
within the brotherhood, makes it a ba-
rometer of social change in Senegal. In 
another presentation, Hamadou Adama 
looked at how Islamic communication 
was institutionalized in post-colonial 
Cameroon. As Cameroon had inherited a secular order from the former 
colonial powers, communication over the radio had to be conducted 
only in official languages. Adama described the tension between those 
Muslims who were educated in the schools of the colonizers and those 
who were trained in Islamic sciences in indigenous institutions. The latter 
were handicapped by their inability to communicate in European lan-
guages. In the 1990’s the new Islamic organizations had to come up with 
radically different approaches in terms of how media could be positively 
used to serve Islamic interests and a wider Muslim community. 
Most papers contradicted the often-expressed assumption that Af-
rican Muslim politics follow models developed in Asia and the Middle 
East. The conference made it thus once more clear that the African public 
space is filled with multiple Islamic voices, cultural practices, and iden-
tities that are continuously influenced and (re) constructed by national 
and trans-national movements and various means of communication. 
N E W  F E L L O W S
Junior Fellows: 
– Na’eem Jeenah 
 Political Islam in South Africa and 
its Contribution to the Discourse 
of a Fiqh of Minorities
15 January 2005 – 1 April 2005
– Hameed Agberemi 
 Islamism in Southern Nigeria
31 January 2005 – 1 April 2005
– Saeid Golkar
 Roots of Islamists’ Perception of America 
1 February 2005 – 1 May 2005
– Cristina Maria de Castro
 (CAPES Fellow)
 The Brazilian Muslim Community:  
A Study of its Identitity towards  
the New World Reality
1 March 2005 – 1 September 2005
– Eva Fachrun Nisa 
 Politics, Religion, and Muslim 
Women’s Identities: Niqâb and Islamic 
Fundamentalism in Western Europe
1 March 2005 – 30 April 2005
Senior Fellows:
– Ali Saeidi
 The Development of Islamic Charities 
in Modern Iran
1 May 2005 – 1 August 2005
– Wang Jinglie
 (KNAW/China Exchange Programme)
 Socio-religious Movements and Social 
Change in Muslim Societies
1 January 2005 – 1 June 2005
– Dorothea Schultz
 Islamic Revival, Mass-Mediated Religiosity 
and the Moral Negotiation of Gender 
Relations in Urban Mali
1 February 2005 – 1 August 2005
– Nahda Shehada.
 Iraqi Family Law under Shifting 
Conditions: Political Contestation and 
Legal Practices
1 March 2005 – 1 August 2005
The ISIM welcomes the following new visiting fellows:
On the occasion of the inaugural lecture 
of Professor Abdulkader Tayob as ISIM Chair at 
Radboud University Nijmegen, the ISIM held 
a conference from 11-12 September 2004 on 
“Islam and Public Life in Africa” in Berg en Dal, 
the Netherlands.
A B D U L K A D E R  T A Y O B The “religious” has been a largely ne-
glected dimension of modern Islam. 
Earlier studies by H.A.R. Gibb and W.C. 
Smith had explored this aspect to 
some extent, but a sustained debate 
had been rendered almost impossible 
by the sheer vastness of the field, and 
by the even smaller number of special-
ists in religious studies. Some persist-
ent dismissals by Muslims of religion as an accurate category for Islam 
have also hindered such a discussion. And yet, particularly in the last 
two or three decades, the proliferation of religious codes of behaviour 
in dress, music, and rituals, has been increasing in almost all Muslim so-
cieties. Political mobilization in the name of Islam has stepped up, and 
seems set to continue in the near future. While the form and motivation 
for turning to Islam might be changing and highly varied, the religious 
turn itself remains unmistakable.  
Recent developments deserve some critical reflection by those in the 
field of religious studies. Creative applications of the tools of religious 
studies are needed to highlight dimensions that have been otherwise 
neglected or marginalized by the perspectives of other social sciences. 
A close reading of relevant texts and contexts reveals the usefulness 
of religion as an analytical category. Looking at Islamic developments 
through the prism of religion would help, in other words, to reveal the 
particular transformation of Islam in modern societies and also make 
possible a positive and critical intervention in political and cultural de-
bates in many parts of the world. 
Muslim modernists interpret social transformation
From the nineteenth century to the present, Muslim modernists and 
reformers have tried to develop a contemporary approach to Islam. 
Whatever the particular position they finally adopted, they had, in one 
way or another, tried to make sense of the transformation of their socie-
ties and the modern world by engaging in a reappraisal of the meaning 
of Islam as religion. For almost all of these figures, from Sayyid Ahmed 
Khan to Afghani to Shariati to Soroush, Islam as religion has been a 
prominent dimension of this rethinking. Readings of Khan and Afghani 
suggest that at least two well-established approaches were applied 
to religion. Khan posited an enduring essence of religion together 
with changing and dispensable characteristics, while Afghani focused 
on the social and political pragmatics of religion. In their theories of 
change, religion played a crucial role. Conscious of the need for reform, 
the need to respond to European political powers and new intellec-
tual challenges, they both used religion in the abstract as a powerful 
instrument to think through change. Religion created an opportunity 
for Khan to posit a new foundation for Islam, and for Afghani to justify 
revolt.
The study of religion has been divided between those who define re-
ligion from essentialist and functionalist perspectives. Similarly, Muslim 
reformers have been divided between those who view Islam as a func-
tion for social and political forces, and essentialists who posit a specific 
value at the heart of religion. However, what is particularly striking about 
Muslim reformers is their use of these categories not to understand 
Islam, but rather to transform it. And this points to the fascinating dimen-
sion of modern Islamic reformist discourse: in two different ways, the so-
ciological category of religion has been incorporated into the religious 
discourse. Khan, who represents the essentialist camp, redefined Islam 
as essence in the context of a scientific 
paradigm that included immutable laws 
and careful observations. Afghani’s func-
tionalist approach, in contrast, emerged 
from his political goals and his debate 
with the critical French public intellec-
tual, Ernest Renan.
The incorporation of religion as a con-
cept into modernist Islamic discourse 
cannot by itself determine whether Islamic practice is either essential-
ist or functionalist. But the very presence of these models in religious 
(in this case Islamic) discourse helps us to appreciate the nature of 
modernist Islamic discourse itself. Interestingly, religion as a category 
has not only served reformers keen on transforming Islamic thought 
and practice; ordinary Muslims as well have made use of the idea of the 
secular to redefine the meaning of the Islamically religious. Talal Asad 
has argued convincingly that the “secular” has been an inseparable 
twin of religion in modern cultural discourse.1 Thus, it is feasible that 
the religious-secular pair provides an analytical category for appreciat-
ing the particular division of social life. Modern Muslim discourse usu-
ally posits the secular as the antithesis of the Islamic.2 It is within this 
framework that many Muslims have responded to the secularization of 
social life. By presenting and stressing the secularist as the polar op-
posite of the Islamic, the secular has come to occupy a key antipode in 
the Islamists discourse. However, Asad’s thesis of the religious and the 
secular in a mutual embrace, allows a perception of the secular beyond 
Islamist discourse. 
Ulama and the secular
The ulama organizations have also contributed largely to the forma-
tion of this bi-polar discourse. The meaning of the specifically religious 
has been important for ulama in at least Indonesia, India, and Egypt. 
In Indonesia and India, they used the idea of the “religious” to articu-
late their particular role in the society and their particular expertise.3 
In Egypt, however, their approach has been more subtle but worth 
some reflection. Over a period of a hundred and fifty years, the Egyp-
tian ulama presented themselves as a bulwark against harmful mod-
ern influences. Over time, they have redefined their role in society and 
become moral watchdogs over as many aspects of society as possible. 
Today, this particular form of Islamization of social ethics is regarded 
as a reversal of the course of secularization in Egypt, but there is more 
than meets the eye.
Egypt has experienced some major social transformation during 
which al-Azhar has had to cede its hegemony in the production of 
knowledge. Through successive phases of reforms, al-Azhar has had to 
make space for experts in law, modern science, and education. All at-
tempts to transform al-Azhar to respond creatively to these changes 
have failed in one way or another. But al-Azhar and its chief representa-
tives managed to reconstruct another role for themselves. As the insti-
tution ceded more space to secular experts, it maintained the convic-
tion that Islam as a complete way of life could make a contribution to 
all fields of life. And the only way that al-Azhar ulama could contribute 
to society in general was to become its moral guardians. The idea of 
morality was thus both pervasive and limited; nevertheless, it created 
an aura through which wholesale secularization and secularism were 
contained. But the moral voice was clearly a religious counterpart of 
the secular within society. Al-Azhar experts could only make a contri-
ISIM/Lecture
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ISIM Chair at Radboud University Nijmegen, 
presented his inaugural lecture in Nijmegen 
on the religious dimensions of modern Islam. 
By looking at religion and the religious, 
he provided a framework for understanding 
transformations of modern Islam in all sectors 
of Muslim societies.
Reading Religion 
and the Religious
in Modern Islam
I S I M R E V I E W 1 5 / S P R I N G 2 0 0 5
ISIM/Lecture
bution to society if they conceded to the secular, and limited their role 
as the moral overseers of that society, and this is precisely how they 
could maintain their validity in this discourse. In different contexts, 
the particular role of the ulama in modern Muslim societies presents 
us with an excellent example of how the religious and secular mutu-
ally define their jurisdictions. The religious and the secular have not 
manifested as fixed overlays over certain aspects of social life. Rather, 
the particular political and social contexts determined and guided the 
articulation of the religious and the secular. 
The religious-secular division has a direct impact on the nature of 
the symbolic in Muslim societies. As an outcome of the division be-
tween the secular and the religious, the symbolic has been invest-
ed with an excessive religiosity. It is here that the tools of religious 
studies could also be employed in the understanding of change in 
Muslim societies. Dress, architecture, food, and landmarks have been 
invested with diverse symbolic value. On the surface it appears that 
the religious has had a new lease of life. But the re-appropriation of 
the religious is never a mimesis. Often it is a dramatic invention. There 
is no better example of this invention than the role of the modern 
mosque. 
A diverse number of studies have pointed to the rise of the mosque as 
a prominent site of power and religious significance. In colonial India, 
for example, the mosque was placed at the centre of Muslim communal 
identity. It became the symbol of the inviolable right of Muslims. From 
town planning to religious contestations, Muslim struggles invested 
the mosque with new significance. They became the pre-eminent sites 
of resistance against colonial encroachment and communal competi-
tion. In some celebrated cases, mosques were even personified in liti-
gation. Sandra Freitag, for example, has pointed to the growing role 
of the mosque in Muslim public space.4 Whilst the mosque was not 
an overtly political space, it provided a site for authority and symbolic 
representation in the broader social context. The maleness of the site 
was equally revealing about the new symbolization. The mosque as 
site of power, even though limited in relation to the modern state, also 
revealed a self-conscious gendered dimension. The mosque was pre-
eminently a site of male religious and social practice. 
The ritual production of the gendered mosque was revealed in 
the large number of texts on women produced in Muslim societies. 
Moreover, the gendered dimension was emphasized in the exclusion 
and marginalization of women in these mosques. Both texts and ar-
chitecture emphasized the special place for women; mainly in their 
absence from the main areas of the mosques. Women’s absence from 
the mosque was part of the symbolization of the mosque. While the 
mosque increased in importance with the decline of political power, 
and received added emphasis from a renewed religious sector, the ex-
clusion of women became particularly pronounced in the ritual elabo-
ration of this all-male space.
This process of symbolization is one example of how the transfor-
mation of religious sites and rituals may be approached to gain an 
understanding of the changes in the concept of Islam as religion. We 
can look at the reproduction of religious symbols and practices as crea-
tive reproductions. Such an approach might deter some crude anach-
ronisms. More importantly, they will help to understand the deeper 
struggles and contestations taking place in Muslim societies. The tools 
of religious studies provide an important medium for thinking about 
contemporary societies, the Muslim being one example. Religion as an 
abstract category, contrasted with the secular, as Asad correctly argues, 
is very much part of contemporary societies. The discourses among 
Muslims reveal the extent to which these categories are replicated in 
cultural texts and contexts. The study of religion might serve as an ob-
jective tool that will reveal the hidden secrets of incorrigibly religious 
people. It is, however, an instrument that helps researchers be sensitive 
to the continually reconstructed nature of societies. 
Modern societies seem driven to make and remake themselves in re-
lation to religion and the religious as an organizing principle. Beyond 
its analytical value, the analysis of religion and the religious in modern 
Islam also takes the debate within Islam from texts to modern con-
texts. Both sociological and normative debates about Islam, generally 
speaking, assume changing contexts for a theology (and law) fixed in 
pre-modernity. The former have provided considerable insights in the 
many ways in which Islamic values have been contextualized. African 
Islam, Asian Islam, or Islams in general are a product of this diversity as 
seen from below.
On the other hand, there is considerable debate among Muslims them-
selves about the correct application and re-appropriation of the past in 
the present. From this perspective, the modernist can be distinguished 
from the Islamist who is different from the radical, and the ensuing 
spectrum of other groups in between. While this debate is ongoing and 
important, it often ignores the transformation of Islam as religion in the 
modern period. The impact of Muhammad Abduh or Sayyid Qutb on 
the discourse need not be measured only against 
a stable body of texts and values. They need to 
be seen as important contributions to an ongoing 
contemporary discourse.
Looking at religion and the religious provides 
a framework for the transformation of modern 
Islam. And this framework suggests that all sec-
tors of Muslim societies are engaged in the trans-
formation. This perspective avoids the fallacy of 
viewing some Muslims as stuck in history, whilst 
others march into the promise of modernity. The 
religion angle takes seriously the cumulative tra-
dition of modern choices, failures, and successes. 
Nonetheless, it does not exclude the value of ap-
proaching the history of Muslim societies from 
other critical perspectives. Reading religion and 
the religious in modern Islam is about making 
sense of only one dimension of being Muslim in 
the modern world. 
 Notes
1. Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: 
Christianity, Islam, Modernity, Cultural 
Memory in the Present (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2003).
2. Cf. Islam and Secularism in the Middle East, 
ed. J. Esposito and A. Tamimi (London: 
Hurst & Company, 2000).
3. For Indo-Pakistan, see Muhammad Qasim 
Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: 
Custodians of Change (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2002); and for Indonesia, 
Martin Van Bruinessen, “Traditions for the 
future: the reconstruction of traditionalist 
discourse within NU,” in Nahdlatul Ulama: 
Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia, 
ed. G. Fealy and G. Barton (Clayton, Australia: 
Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, 
1996).
4. Sandra B. Freitag, “The roots of Muslim 
separatism in South Asia: personal practice 
and public structure in Kanpur and Bombay,” 
in Islam, Politics and Social Movements, ed. 
E. Burke, III and I. M. Lapidus (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988).
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Dramas of Nationhood
The Politics of Television in Egypt
By Lila Abu-Lughod
Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2005
This compelling work examines 
television serials as a cultural form that 
seek to bind together the Egyptian 
nation. Abu-Lughod shows how serials 
in Egypt both reflect and attempt 
to mold social life and political 
sensibilities about such contentious 
issues as the place of Islam, the 
propriety of gender, the value of 
education and development, and the 
virtue of consumer desire. 
Globalised Islam
The Search for a New Ummah
By Olivier Roy
London: Hurst & Company, 2004
In this innovate book Olivier Roy 
argues that a schism has emerged 
between mainstream Islamist 
movements in the Muslim word and 
the uprooted militants who strive to 
establish an imaginary ummah, or 
Muslim community. He posits that 
Islamic revival, or “re-Islamisation,” 
results from the efforts of westernized 
Muslims to assert their identity in 
a non-Muslim context. 
The Case for Islamo-Christian 
Civilization
By Richard W. Bulliet
This insightful book consists of 
four essays that deal with the past, 
present, and possible future of Muslim 
societies.  Bulliet argues that Islam 
and Christianity have tremendous 
common roots and history. He 
envisions a future where Muslim 
majority countries will have active 
democracies. 
Snow
By Orhan Pamuk
London: Faber and Faber
(Translated from the Turkish 
by Maureen Freely)
This novel by the Istanbul-based 
writer tells of Kars, a mysterious city 
near the Armenian border. Wasting 
away under the shadow of Europe, 
the city is consumed by religious and 
political conspiracies and haunted by 
silences. This novel evokes the spiritual 
fragility of the non-Western world, its 
ambivalence about the godless West, 
and its fury.
Teta, Mother and Me
An Arab Woman’s Memoir
By Jean Said Makdisi
London: Saqi Books, 2005
Set against a backdrop of political 
upheaval in Syria, Palestine, Lebanon, 
Egypt, and the United States, this 
family history reads as a gendered 
social history. It chronicles a grand-
mother’s childhood in Ottoman 
Syria, a mother’s experience of urban 
modernization in the Arab world, and 
the author’s own experience of raising 
a family in Beirut during the Lebanese 
civil war.  
Islam Embedded
The Historical Developments of 
the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 
(1951-2003), Volumes 1 & 2
By Farish A. Noor
Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological 
Research Institute, 2004
This impressive history of the Pan-
Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), the 
major opposition party in Malaysia, 
represents a social and political 
history of independent Malaysia 
as seen from the margins. It richly 
documents the party’s shift from leftist 
and communalist phases to various 
styles of Islamism in the contemporary 
period. 
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Rachid
Ben Ali
The Maroccan-Dutch artist Rachid Ben Ali exhibits recent
paintings in the Cobra Museum in Amstelveen (www.cobra-
museum.nl). Rachid Ben Ali´s work is born out of two cultures.
Often it is crude, passionate, cruel, and homoerotic. The can-
vases are filled with cartoon type drawings, crudely applied
acrylic paint, many dripping streaks, which give the work a
sense of great haste and urgency, and are often supple-
mented by strange, wrongly spelled words and sentences,
mainly in English, but sometimes in Dutch and Arabic. As a
result a kind of visual narrative full of obsessive associations
is created. Personal experiences are mixed in with general
concerns like the war, homosexuality and discrimination. It
is a highly personal rendering of the complex madness of
our age, in which war, violent fundamentalism, displace-
ment, sex, alienation, love and tenderness all play a role.
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